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Introduction and Overview 1 
 
Introduction and Overview 
 
This thesis looks at two topics that have been prominent on the development agenda for more than 
five decades: migration and informal markets. These topics made a joint appearance first as core 
features of Lewis’ (1954) dualistic model of economic development. He introduced the central idea 
that the development of a modern capitalist sector in urban areas of developing countries will be 
fueled by the inflow of labor from a traditional subsistence sector that is characterized by low wages 
and negligible or even zero marginal productivity. In Lewis’ theory the existence of segmented labor 
markets implies that the increase in capital formation in the capitalist sector leads to an increasing 
employment of peasant farmers in industrial production. After the national labor surplus is 
exhausted and wages begin to rise the surplus labor from other countries will be attracted resulting 
in ‘mass immigration’. 
In the following years two strands of literature grew out of Lewis’ contribution. The first started 
with the papers by Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) who emphasized the determinants of 
migration to understand the factors that underlie persistent rural-urban migration in the face of high 
unemployment rates in the urban centers. These authors identified not only wage-differentials but 
also employment probabilities as the main driver of migration, i.e. the expected returns from 
migration. The original focus of this literature, although Lewis had pointed to the importance of 
international migration, lay on movements from rural to urban areas within national boundaries. In 
the last decades this research field has extended its scope to international migration but is still 
strongly influenced by the classical approach in that it concentrates on wage differentials and 
unemployment probabilities. 
The second strand of literature can be traced back to Hart (1973) who took a closer look at the 
persistent attraction of the urban sector despite high official unemployment rates. He argued that 
migrants who did not find work in the formal sector would not remain unemployed. They would 
rather work in what he called the ‘informal’ sector. He thereby extended the original labor market 
segmentation of subsistence and capitalist sector of Lewis (1954) and applied it to the urban labor 
market labeling both segments formal and informal. The prevailing perception was that the informal 
sector is a residual that hosts all those who are not absorbed by the formal labor market. Hence, as 
in Lewis’ theory the informal sector was seen as a sector of low marginal productivity. 
Since the discussion was initiated in the 1950s, the economic and social context in which both 
migration and informality take place have changed dramatically in scope and scale. Between 1960 
and 2010 the population of low and middle income countries more than doubled. The population 
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growth coupled with decreasing transportation costs and persistent international wage gaps resulted 
in an almost fivefold increase in the emigration rate of these countries. Today an estimated 3 percent 
of the world population lives outside their country of birth. The increased mobility of people holds an 
enormous potential for increasing the welfare of migrants and for economic development of sending 
communities due to the capital flows generated by migrants. These remittances account for almost 
one quarter of national GDP of some countries such as Lesotho, Moldova and Nepal. The economic 
importance of remittances becomes even more visible through a comparison with other flows of 
external capital. While the combined official development assistance (ODA) amounted to USD 135.4 
billion in 2011 officially recorded remittances sent in 2011 sum up to USD 479.2 billion. Although 
global foreign direct investment still constitutes the largest monetary flow amounting to USD 
1658.13 billion, remittances appear to close this gap soon. Since 2000 remittances grew by 253.7 
percent, clearly outperforming official development assistance (25.4 percent) and foreign direct 
investment (172.5 percent).1  
Nevertheless, there are also potential downsides to migration. Apart from concerns about 
economic dependency and the inequality inducing effect of migration, two aspects figure most 
prominently in the recent discussion (de Haas 2010). First, the outflow of skilled labor is feared to 
reduce the human capital stock of migrant sending countries. Although remittances have a 
compensating effect they cannot always offset the negative externalities of the large-scale departure 
of many young and talented workers. This so called brain drain could be limiting long-term growth of 
the migrant sending countries. A second concern is the non-productive use of remittances. More 
precisely various authors have argued that households spend remittances disproportionately on 
consumer and status goods and do not employ the received capital productively. The outflow of 
workers coupled with the lack of investment could lead to stagnating local economies in the long run.  
The increasing population was to large extent also absorbed by the urban areas resulting in a 
doubling of urbanization rates to almost 50 percent. In the urban areas the informal sector has 
become an extensive element of the economic landscape in middle and low income countries that 
affects the livelihood of hundreds of millions, provides employment and contributes to economic 
production. Estimates indicate that for some countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Thailand the 
informal sector contributes as much as two thirds of GDP (Schneider and Ernste 2000). The informal 
sector is the main source of employment in many countries. Xaba et al. (2002) reports that around 
one quarter of urban employment in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are provided by the 
informal sector. For some countries such as Thailand, Boliva and Paraguay the share of informal 
workers is estimated to be above 70 percent (Blunch et al. 2001, Gasparini and Tornarolli 2009).  
                                                          
1 All figures in nominal terms and based on World Development Indicators database 2013. 
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Despite its economic importance it is undisputed that a large informal sector also has important 
drawbacks. Among them are problems such as limited government budgets due to foregone taxes 
and the impossibility to adjust government policies to the ‘invisible’ needs of the informal sector. 
Furthermore, enterprises operating informally may face constraints that directly impact on 
employment and income prospects of large parts of the population (Perry et al. 2007). If informal 
enterprises are limited in their growth and if existing constraints force them to produce below their 
optimum output level, the income of workers might be capped lastingly. Additionally, workers in the 
informal sector often remain uninsured against health shocks and other risks as well as uncovered by 
retirement benefit schemes, since the informal enterprises often do not provide formal mechanisms 
to cope with shocks for their workers.  Thus workers tend to remain poor and vulnerable to adverse 
shocks despite employment.  
To mitigate the problems of both migration and the informal sector, and harness their 
development potential, a clear understanding of the mechanisms at work is crucial. The present 
thesis aims to contribute to such an understanding by examining several issues that have not been 
resolved. The first two essays focus on the relationship between international migration and 
household investments addressing the problem of brain drain and the use of remittances. Essays 
three and four explore the constraints of enterprises in the informal sector. In the remaining part of 
this introduction we will first present the general context and background of each aspect and 
thereafter summarize the findings presented in detail in the four essays. 
Migration, Investment and Human Capital Formation 
 
In the classical contributions to the literature the determinants of agents’ migration decisions were 
considered only at the individual level (e.g. Sjaastad 1962, Lee 1966, Todaro 1969, Harris and Todaro 
1970, Fields 1975). The impact of migration on the sending communities and migrant households 
was almost absent from the literature. This gap was filled by the “New Economics of Labor 
Migration” (NELM) (e.g. Stark and Bloom 1985, Stark and Taylor 1989). The new class of models 
differed in two respects from existing research. First, it rejected the individualistic framework of the 
neo-classical models and spelled out migration as a household decision. Second, NELM concentrated 
on the effects of migration on sending communities and household members left behind. Under 
NELM migration is seen as a strategy to overcome liquidity constraints and as an instrument to 
diversify the household income portfolio in the presence of imperfect credit and insurance markets. 
Hence, the optimal decision is taken at the household-level and takes into account the trade-off 
between maximizing household income and minimizing income risk in imperfect markets.  
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While empirical investigations have documented the positive effect of migration on poverty 
reduction and consumption in developing countries (e.g. Adams and Page 2005, Acosta et al. 2008), it 
is still disputed how these remittances are used. At the macro-level there is no evidence that 
remittances have had any impact on economic growth. Barajas et al. (2009) provide evidence that 
during the period 1970 to 2004 in their sample of 84 countries there was no effect of remittances on 
growth. They conclude that although increasing household income leads to poverty alleviation and 
increasing consumption levels, remittances are not used for productive investments. However at the 
micro-level the picture remains quite mixed. There is some evidence of a negative correlation 
between agricultural investments and remittances, for example from China (De Brauw and Rozelle 
2008) and the Philippines (Quisumbing and McNiven 2010), while the opposite, i.e. a positive effect 
of migration on productive investments, has been documented for example for Pakistan (Adams 
1998) and Mexico (Chiodi et al. 2012).  
Essay 1 adds to this literature by providing novel evidence for the case of Mexico. In this paper 
we seek to assess empirically how remittances affect the investment behavior of households. Our 
approach differs from previous contributions by accounting explicitly for the diverse income 
generating activities of rural households by distinguishing between agriculture and livestock and by 
considering the presence of life-cycle effects in all estimations. We employ a panel dataset for the 
years 2002 and 2007 that is representative for rural Mexico and includes 1511 households in both 
waves. After addressing the problem of endogeneity by using an instrumental variable approach 
three results emerge from our analysis. First, life-cycle effects exert a strong and robust effect on 
investment activities in all households. More specifically, household investments decrease as the 
household head ages. There is some suggestive evidence that migrant households disinvest more 
strongly than households without migrants. Second, our results indicate that production 
fundamentals such as cash flows from other activities remain highly important for farm investments 
despite the presence of remittances. Throughout all estimated model specifications and investment 
categories cash flows are the best predictor of productive investments. Third, the differentiation of 
agriculture and livestock exposes important differences in the investment activities in these two 
categories. We find that migrants have accumulated more agricultural productive capital than non-
migrants while there is no significant difference with respect to livestock. This could indicate that 
households continue their agricultural activities to ensure daily consumption throughout the life-
cycle. This result is closely in line with the finding by Damon (2010) that migrant households tend to 
give up high value crops and focus increasingly on subsistence crops.  
Monetary remittances are only one aspect of migration. Human mobility also affects the 
transmission of information, values and norms. Recently these so called social remittances have been 
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investigated primarily with a focus on political institutions and outcomes. Both, studies relying on 
macro data (e.g. Docquier et al. 2011, Beine and Sekkat 2011, Spilimbergo 2009), as well as analysis 
using micro data (e.g. Batista and Vicente 2011, Omar Mahmoud et al. 2012, Chauvet and Mercier 
2013) find that migration has indeed a strong effect on democratic institutions and political values in 
the countries of origin. Integrating social change into the list of possible migration outcomes is 
important to allow a holistic analysis of the migration-development nexus. Yet, it should not be 
limited to the political realm but also include a wider array of social norms such as educational 
values.  
In Essay 2 we analyze the effect of migration on educational aspirations of caregivers and the 
resulting accumulation of human capital in migrant sending households. After outlining the causal 
mechanism underlying the relationship between migration, aspirations and human capital 
investments in the conceptual framework the essay’s focus is on the empirical estimation of the 
effect of migration on the educational aspirations of caregivers in Moldova. The data we use comes 
from a nationally representative household survey that was conducted in 2011/12. While the whole 
dataset contains detailed information about 3539 households we restrict our analysis to the 2082 
households in the sample with children. We correct for self-selection of migrants using instrumental 
variables based on GDP growth at the migration destinations and the presence of Soviet military 
personnel in the community before 1990. Our results suggest that migration can have a strongly 
positive effect on the educational trajectory of children in migrant households at the lower end of 
the human capital distribution through migration-induced upward adjustment of the educational 
aspirations of caregivers. Based on this finding we suggest a new channel of brain gain in the context 
of international migration. More precisely, while theoretical brain gain models only rely on monetary 
incentives we argue that an increase in human capital investment could also stem from the changes 
in aspirations triggered by international migration. We therefore present additional evidence that 
the pessimistic view of a brain drain caused by the outflow of human capital might not necessarily be 
true. 
Informal Sector Linkages and Constraints 
 
Early contributions to the literature on the informal sector often departed from a dualistic labor 
market, where entry barriers would force enterprises to remain informal. In this context salaried 
work in the informal sector and informal self-employment was traditionally seen as a survival 
strategy (e.g. Leibenstein 1968, Fields 1975, Mazumdar 1976, Dickens and Land 1985). This approach 
assumes that individuals are forced to work in the informal sector because of institutional barriers 
and discrimination. The models characterizing the informal sector as an option of last resort became 
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challenged by recent empirical contributions characterizing the informal sector as vibrant and 
dynamic (Ranis and Stewart 1999, Maloney 2004). In this context informality is seen as a rational 
choice where entrepreneurs, after weighing the costs and benefits, opt voluntarily for the informal 
sector. The primary reason for this rational choice is often seen in the existence of regulatory burden 
and formal sector inefficiencies. However the informal sector also offers non-pecuniary benefits such 
as flexible work time or the opportunity to use entrepreneurial abilities. For young people it also 
provides easier entry into the labor market that allows them to obtain experience and training (Arias 
and Khamis 2008). 
Another aspect that has recently received more attention is the heterogeneous character of the 
informal sector itself. Various authors have suggested that the informal sector is comprised of small-
scale subsistence firms and larger firms. Ranis and Stewart (1999) differentiated between a dynamic 
sub-sector that is tied to the formal sector by subcontracts and a subsistence sub-sector. The existing 
empirical evidence supports the theory that the informal sector is in fact not homogenous and 
consists of both a lower-tier segment that is constrained and an upper-tier segment that is composed 
of vibrant and dynamic firms that opt voluntarily for the informal sector (e.g. Günther and Launov 
2012, Bruhn 2013). The heterogeneity of the informal sector implies that a reform of business 
registration regulations to minimize the costs associated with formalization would affect the 
behavior of enterprises differently. Various studies have shown that micro-enterprises do not benefit 
from formalization (e.g. Fajnzylber et al. 2011, McKenzie and Sakho 2010). De Mel et al. (2012) argue 
that the reason for this result is the low net benefit of formalization. Analyzing a policy experiment 
from Sri Lanka they show that the mean increase in profits due to formalization is driven only by 
firms in the upper tier of the productivity distribution. These firms indeed engage in increased 
advertising and the use of advanced accounting instruments once formalized. Yet, if formality is only 
beneficial for mid-sized and large firms the focus should not be on simply formalizing firms but to 
allow them to grow. There is ample evidence that investments in these micro-firms can yield very 
high returns (e.g. McKenzie and Woodruff 2008, Grimm et al. 2012). Hence, the fact that these firms 
do not graduate from their (informal) micro status has to be understood as evidence for the 
existence of binding constraints. In Essays 3 and 4 we will concentrate on two types of constraints 
informal enterprises face. 
Essay 3 investigates the forward and backward linkages of enterprises in the informal sector 
with the formal sector. We seek to find out how informal enterprises are linked to the formal sector 
and how these linkages affect their performance in general. We use a cross-sectional dataset called 
“Enquêtes 1-2-3” that was assembled between 2001 and 2003. It contains detailed information 
about 5785 informal enterprises in Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Abidjan, Bamako, Dakar and Lomé. We 
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find that although informal enterprises have both forward and backward linkages with the formal 
sector, backward linkages are more prevalent. We also observe that informal-formal linkages occur 
less frequently if firms have a high degree of informality or low capital stocks. These descriptive 
results call standard dual economy models into question and suggest a complex interaction between 
the formal and the informal sector. With respect to the effect of linkages on firm performance we 
find positive effect of formal backward linkages on all performance indicators employed. Using both 
ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimation strategies we find that informality affects 
enterprise performance only indirectly through the existence of linkages to the formal sector. These 
estimation results let us conclude that one way to support the informal enterprises under 
investigation would be legal reforms that facilitate the interactions and transactions between firms in 
both the informal and the formal sector. 
To understand the constraints of enterprises not only supply side factors are important but also 
the demand structure they face. The last essay of this thesis therefore looks at the demand side of 
informal firms by investigating the expenditure structure of urban households in six West African 
countries. The data for this analysis is based on a household expenditure module that was part of the 
“Enquêtes 1-2-3”. It recorded expenditures and point of sale for 315 different products and services. 
The different characteristics of these products and services allow us to infer their informal or formal 
nature. We first analyze the distribution channel of both formal and informal products. There seem 
to be strong linkages between the formal and informal sector as many formal products are sold 
through retailers in the informal sector. However specifically informal goods are rarely bought at 
formal points of sale. We then turn to the demand elasticities of these different products. Based on 
estimated Engel curves our results tend to show that rising incomes are associated with an increased 
propensity to consume formal sector goods. By contrast elasticities for informal goods remain below 
unity throughout. Interestingly enough we observe little systematic variation in our estimates across 
the six countries. These results indicate that although there is a strongly overlapping customer base 
between the formal and the informal sector, the informal sector might be limited in its growth 
prospects by the changing demand structure of developing and emerging countries. 
 
  




Does Migration Raise Agricultural Investment?  





The effect of remittances on capital accumulation remains a contested topic. This essay uses a panel 
data set from rural Mexico to investigate the impact of remittances on agriculture and livestock 
investments. After controlling for the endogeneity of migration through an instrumental variable 
estimation our empirical results show that international migration has a significantly positive effect 
on the accumulated agricultural assets but not on livestock capital. This suggests that households use 
the capital obtained from international migration only to overcome liquidity constraints for 
subsistence production whereas migration itself seems to be the superior investment option 
compared to other productive activities such as livestock husbandry. 
Keywords: migration, investment, Mexico, agriculture 
JEL classification: D1, J6, O1  





Migration has received increasing attention in the development discussion over the last couple of 
years. This is due to the sheer magnitude of national and international migration and the perceived 
development opportunities this holds when considering the flows of money generated by migrants in 
the form of remittances. Nevertheless it remains disputed which strata of the society in sending 
countries benefit most from migration and what consequences the dynamic process of migration has 
for society in general. One topic that lacks consensus in particular is the use of remittances. 
The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory considers migration as a household 
strategy to overcome market failures such as credit constraints and missing insurance markets (e.g. 
Stark and Bloom 1985, Taylor 1999). Accordingly, it is argued that migration generates liquidity in the 
form of remittances which enables the households to invest in profitable activities. Hence, if credit 
constraints are binding for the households that have migrants, theory predicts that remittances will 
increase productive investments. Additionally, if the income generated by migration is uncorrelated 
or negatively correlated with other available income sources, it also reduces the overall income risk 
of the household. This insurance function can also have indirect effects on the investment behavior 
of farm households. Since modern production technology can increase the ex-ante risk farmers face, 
all activities that reduce the overall income risk can lead to the adoption of more risky but also more 
profitable production technologies (e.g. Lamb 2003, Mendola 2008).  
In the empirical literature that is explicitly concerned with the nexus of migration and 
investment the effects of remittances on productive investments remain contested. Some authors 
present evidence that remittance receiving households have a higher propensity to invest (e.g. 
Adams 1998, Yang 2008, Chiodi et al. 2012) and that they are able to raise agricultural productivity 
(e.g. Lucas 1987, Taylor et al. 2003, Taylor and Lopez-Feldman 2010). However, various other authors 
find that remittances often have only weakly positive or even negative effects on the productive 
investment propensity and volume of households engaged in the agricultural sector (e.g. De Brauw 
and Rozelle 2008, Quisumbing and McNiven 2010) and that migration can also result in falling 
productivity for agricultural households (e.g. Rozelle et al. 1999, Damon 2010).  
The conflicting findings regarding the impact of migration on the accumulation of productive 
agricultural assets are often reconciled by invoking theoretical explanations. One prominent 
explanation that is given in the context of NELM is the effect of missing labor markets (e.g. Rozelle et 
al. 1999, Damon 2010). If it is impossible to compensate the loss of household labor by hiring 
workers or hired labor is not a perfect substitute for family labor, a decrease in production, a move 
away from labor intensive crops or the use of labor-saving technologies can be expected as a 
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consequence of remittances. If the negative labor market effect is bigger than the beneficial effect of 
relaxing credit constraints then there will be a negative impact of migration on agricultural 
investment and production. 
Apart from this theoretical reconciliation of NELM with the ambiguous empirical results there 
are three additional issues that may give rise to more complex empirics than NELM suggests but are 
often neglected in empirical studies. First, studies that investigate the effect of migration on 
agricultural investments often do so without taking into account the structure of the standard factor 
demand model that describes investment behavior for a value maximizing farm. One central 
prediction of the financial theory of investment is that under imperfect capital markets investment 
decisions will be determined strongly by internal sources of finance (Hubbard 1998). Empirical 
approaches to agricultural investment behavior often employ a measure of cash flows to estimate 
the effect of inside finance on investments (e.g. Elhorst 1993, Hubbard and Kashyap 1992, Bierlen 
and Featherstone 1998). However, most studies that are concerned with the role of migration in the 
agricultural investment process only consider a reduced causal model without taking into account 
cash flows.  
Second, most studies do not account for the timing and heterogeneity of investments, either by 
neglecting the difference between capital stocks and flows or by pooling different capital categories. 
Although capital stocks depend by definition on capital flows and both are assumed to be 
proportional to each other, the measurement of stocks and flows is characterized by different issues. 
While observed stocks are determined by past investments, depreciation and retirement, observed 
capital flows in a particular period might be a weak representation of overall investment behavior 
due to the lumpy and infrequent nature of many capital investments. With respect to the pooling of 
distinct capital categories, such as agriculture and livestock, it is clear that neglecting the 
fundamental difference in characteristics of different agricultural income generating activities is likely 
to result in estimation results that do not reflect the true investment process. In the empirical 
literature, only the differential effect of migration on farm and non-farm investments has received 
considerable attention. Various studies have shown that remittances and the savings of returning 
migrants enable households to engage in off-farm self-employment in Albania (Piracha and Vadean 
2010), China (Démurger and Xu 2011), Egypt (McCormick and Wahba 2003), Pakistan (Ilahi 1999), 
and Turkey (Dustman and Kirchkamp 2002). Also for Mexico, evidence has been presented that 
remittances facilitate the formation of off-farm self-employment opportunities (e.g. Mesnard 2004, 
Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). 
Third, most studies are based on cross-sectional data and cannot take into account household 
and migration life-cycle effects. Yet if the permanent income hypothesis holds for rural households 
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we should observe that households seek to smooth consumption over the course of their life time. In 
the context of NELM the life-cycle has not been considered explicitly. The implicit assumption is that 
due to the transmission of wealth over generations, capital accumulation would not be affected by 
consumption smoothing. Yet without this bequest motive households would start to disinvest during 
old age. On the other hand households that do not bequest but can smooth consumption due to the 
increased liquidity provided by remittances might follow life-cycle consumption patterns more than 
those that are liquidity constrained (Zeldes 1989). Ahituv and Kimhi (2002) explored this topic in the 
context of agricultural investments and off-farm work. They found that the capital accumulation of 
farmers in Israel tends to follow an inverted U-curve over the life-cycle. With regard to international 
migration life-cycle effects have only received attention in the context of the savings and return 
behavior of migrants (e.g. Dustmann 1997, Dustmann and Kirchkamp 2002, Mesnard 2004) but not 
for productive investments. 
This essay contributes to the literature by concentrating on these three neglected aspects of the 
migration-investment nexus. By emphasizing the role of demographic variables and production 
fundamentals that underlie observed household behavior and differentiating between different 
productive categories as well as stock and flow variables it offers a new perspective on the effect of 
migration on productive investments. Also, by employing a unique panel dataset we can address 
some of the problems faced by previous cross-sectional studies. To briefly summarize our findings, 
migration that occurs at a late stage of the household life-cycle might not alter productive 
investments due to the short horizon for the realization of investment returns, production 
fundamentals such as cash flows generated through sales turn out to be the most important 
determinant of investments, and capital from migration is used to invest in subsistence categories 
such as crop production but not for other risky activities such as livestock husbandry. 
The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. In section 1.2 we lay out the theoretical 
framework that will guide the empirical analysis. In section 1.3 we describe the data set and define 
our core variables. Section 1.4 outlines the econometric approach and discusses the estimation 
methods employed, while section 1.5 presents our main results. The essay concludes with a short 
summary and discussion of the results. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Considerations 
 
In this section, we discuss a simple two period farm household model with migration which forms the 
theoretical framework of our empirical analysis. We use a household model comparable to the one 
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proposed by Wouterse and Taylor (2008). The household is assumed to have a well-behaved two-
period utility function: 
𝑈 = 𝑈(𝐶1,𝐶2) = 𝑈(𝐶1) + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑈(𝐶2)       (1) 
This additively separable utility function is continuously differentiable, monotonically increasing 
and strictly concave in both periods. Utility comes only from consumption (𝐶1,𝐶2) in both periods 
and is discounted by 𝛽 in the second period. While the standard agricultural household model 
separates agricultural and market purchased goods we simplify this structure by assuming without 
loss of generality that agricultural production generates the means for consumption. Our setup 
naturally assumes that household resources are pooled and that the allocation of resources and the 
organization of production are efficient. The production constraint the household faces is 
characterized by: 
𝑄 = 𝑓(𝐾, 𝐿)          (2) 
where K is capital and L labor and Q exhibits the characteristics 𝑓𝑘′(•) > 0, 𝑓𝑘′′(•) < 0, 𝑓𝐿′(•) > 0 and 
𝑓𝐿′′(•) < 0. . In this static model we omit the risk involved in agricultural production and assume 
perfect foresight on the part of the household. We assume that the household produces without 
hired labor which implies that L represents the total stock of household time. The household can 
allocate time in the first period either to agricultural production (𝑄) or to migration (𝑀), which 
generates remittances (𝑅). 
𝑅 = 𝑔(𝑀,𝑋,𝑊,𝐸)         (3) 
The decision to migrate and therefore the receipt of remittances depend on the characteristics 
of the individual (𝑋), the wages at the destination (𝑊), and the expenditures necessary to pay for 
migration (𝐸). This decision process and the role of wage differentials have been amply discussed in 
the literature (e.g. McKenzie and Rapoport 2010). Remittances increase in wages (i.e. the wage 
differential) and the probability to find employment abroad, and decrease in the cost of migration. 
However, since our interest lies in the use of remittances there is no need to model this process 
explicitly. 
In our model there is no capital market. Hence cash flows are the only means to finance 
investments. We choose to limit our analysis to the internal funds to reflect the prevalent capital 
market imperfection in rural Mexico.2 Cash flows are generated by either the remittances sent by 
migrants or agricultural production revenues and can be used for consumption (𝐶) and investments 
                                                          
2 See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) for an extensive discussion of the role of internal funds for 
investments in a constrained environment. 
Does Migration Raise Agricultural Investment? 13 
 
 
(𝐼) or can be saved (𝑆). If they are invested they augment the capital stock in the second period. The 
time path of the capital stock is described by 𝐾𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝜁)𝐾𝑡 + 𝐼, where 𝜁 is the depreciation of 
capital. We can summarize the behavioral constraints as follows:  
𝐶1 = 𝑝1 ⋅ 𝑓(𝐾1,𝐿 −𝑀) + 𝑅 − 𝐼 − 𝑆        (4) 
 
𝐶2 = 𝑝2 ⋅ 𝑓�(1 − 𝜁)𝐾1 + 𝐼, 𝐿� + (1 + 𝛿)𝑆      (5) 
where 𝑝𝑡 is the market price of the produced commodity, and 𝛿 is the return to savings (𝑆). We 
assume that farmers cannot liquidate their capital. Thus, while we do not explicitly include 
installation and adjustment cost, this irreversibility assumption of investment can be interpreted as 
an adjustment cost. The household thus faces the following maximization problem: 
max{𝑀,𝐼,𝑆}
𝑈(𝑝1  ⋅ 𝑓(𝐾1,𝐿 −𝑀) + 𝑔(𝑀,𝑋,𝑊,𝐸) − 𝐼 − 𝑆 ) + 
𝛽𝑈(𝑝2 ⋅  𝑓�(1 − 𝜁) ⋅ 𝐾1 + 𝐼, 𝐿� + (1 + 𝛿)𝑆)
     (6) 
Maximizing equation (6) with respect to migration, investment and savings yields the following 
first order conditions: 
FOC (S):  (1 + 𝛿) = 𝑈′(𝐶1)
𝛽𝑈′(𝐶2)
       (7) 
 
FOC (M):   𝑝1 ⋅ 𝑓𝑀′ (𝐾1,𝐿 −𝑀) = 𝑔𝑀′ (𝑀,𝑋,𝑊,𝐸)    (8) 
  
FOC (I):  𝑈
′(𝐶1)
𝛽𝑈′(𝐶2)
= 𝑝2 ⋅ 𝑓𝐼′�(1 − 𝜁) ⋅ 𝐾1 + 𝐼, 𝐿�    (9) 
The first order condition for savings describes the standard intertemporal substitution of 
present and future consumption. Equation (8) represents the first order condition with respect to 
migration. It states that the migration must yield a marginal return that is (at least) as big as the 
marginal product of labor in the household production. Equation (9) shows that investments are 
determined by the marginal productivity of additional capital, the capital depreciation, and the 
intertemporal discount factor. It is also clear that market forces, represented by fluctuations in the 
output price, are an important determinant. 
In this simple setting there are three potential mechanisms that could explain a lack of 
investment. First, if the discounting is very strong, we should expect, based on equation (9), that 
investments are very small. The high preference for current consumption must not necessarily be 
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due to impatience but could also reflect decreasing utility from investment in the context of the 
permanent income hypothesis. According to this logic it is also possible that household heads get too 
old to work on the farm. In this case labor input becomes zero and the household has no agricultural 
labor and no production in the second period. Both of these lines of argument imply that the 
marginal utility from investment would become very small or even zero. 
Second, it could be that households adjust their income portfolio based on the investment 
horizon and the marginal return of investment for different categories. For example, contrary to the 
standard NELM arguments, households invest until their marginal returns to investment in a specific 
category such as agriculture or livestock are equalized with the marginal cost and then start looking 
for a more profitable investment alternative: migration. In this scenario equation (5) would be 
reduced to savings and no investment would be undertaken. One explanation why rural households 
do not start investing in migration in the first place can be found in the comparatively high cost of 
migration. This is also the reason why often the middle class starts to migrate first (McKenzie and 
Rapoport 2007). While we do not model risk explicitly we have to acknowledge that the portfolio 
adjustment could also be brought about by the risk attached to additional investments in 
combination with the age of the household head. Gollier and Zeckhauser (2002) demonstrated 
theoretically the relationship between the risk of the asset category and the investment horizon of 
an agent. They showed that older people prefer less risky assets compared to younger individuals 
with the same characteristics under the assumption of risk aversion.  
A third explanation would be the rejection of the fungibility hypothesis of remittances. This 
implies that money received from migrants is not spent at the margin like income from other 
household activities but is used only for specific expenditure categories. Remittances could be 
earmarked by the migrant for specific uses such as human capital investments. Davies et al. (2009) 
argue that the significantly different marginal propensities to consume of various income categories 
and remittances they estimate for households in Malawi can be interpreted as evidence for the 
presence of mental accounting. Investments would then be financed only through cash flows from 
the production in the first period. Given that in case of migration the output in period one is likely to 
decrease due to the loss of labor, the overall cash available for investment would also decrease. In 
this case the investment predicted by equation (9) is by definition smaller than in a situation where 
remittances can be freely allocated. 
Guided by this discussion we proceed in the empirical analysis as follows. First, we try to find out 
how funds obtained through migration change investment. We do so by looking at the direct effect 
of migration on investments as well as the indirect effect migration has on the financing structure of 
investments. Second, we distinguish two types of activities and capital, namely agriculture and 
Does Migration Raise Agricultural Investment? 15 
 
 
livestock, to evaluate if they are qualitatively the same and can be aggregated as practiced in many 
empirical investigations. Third, we evaluate the presence of life-cycle effects in all estimations. If the 
expectations of the household are independent of time, the age of the farmer should not play a 
significant role. 
 
1.3. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
 
Our panel data set contains the results of two nationally representative rural household surveys 
called Encuesta Nacional a Hogares Rurales de Mexico (ENHRUM) which were implemented by the 
Colegio de Mexico (PRECESAM) and the University of California at Davis in 2002 and 2007 in 14 states 
of Mexico (see Figure 1.1). The multi-stage sampling frame was based on a general population census 
of the year 2000 for municipalities of between 500 and 2499 inhabitants. Due to attrition we lost 222 
households in the second round, which leaves us with a sample of 1511 observations that are 
present in both waves.  
The ENHRUM covered a broad range of topics including individual migration histories, labor 
market participation and various socio-economic variables such as education, health and fertility as 
well as agricultural production and non-agricultural business activities. As shown in Table 1.1, 
households had on average 4.5 (4.3) members and a household head with an average age of 48.9 
(53.4) years in 2002 (2007).3  Migrant households were significantly older in both years and had 
significantly less education than non-migrant households. In both years, income from farm activities 
constituted on average less than 10 percent of total income for all households. Income from livestock 
and non-farm businesses was also rather small, accounting for 4–8 percent of total income. This is 
due to the fact that less than half of the households had agricultural activities or livestock income 
and less than a third had non-agricultural businesses. The major sources of income were farm (11–19 
percent) and non-farm wages (21–31 percent). For households with international migrants farm and 
non-farm wages constituted only between 11 and 13 percent of total income while remittances 
made up 38 percent and 36 percent of their annual total income in 2002 and 2007, respectively. 
Income from transfers was equivalent to 14 percent (2002) and 18 percent (2007) of annual total 
income for non-migrant households and 11 percent (2002) and 13 percent (2007) of annual total 
income for households with international migrants. The average household was endowed with 
agricultural machinery worth 4,722 (8,785) Mexican pesos (MXN) and livestock with an average value 
                                                          
3 Since only 14 households had a household head in 2007 that was different from the household head in 2002 
there is no reason to be concerned about changes in the intra-household composition. 
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of MXN 8,579 (11,186) in 2002 (2007).  Comparing the descriptive statistics of income composition 
with respect to wages and remittances suggests that migrants substitute local wage employment 
with international migration. Furthermore, income shares earned from agriculture and livestock 
activities do not differ significantly between migrant and non-migrant households. Yet, Table 1.1 
shows that migrant households had significantly higher per capita income and accumulated 
significantly more agricultural assets as well as livestock.  
Table 1.1 – Household Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2002 2007 
         
 all nonmig mig Pr(diff!=0) all nonmig mig Pr(diff!=0) 
HH Size 4.48 4.53 4.28 0.07 4.25 4.35 3.98 0.01 
Children (<16) 1.55 1.61 1.30 0.00 0.94 1.02 0.72 0.00 
Sex of HH Head (1 = male) 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.51 
Age of HH Head 48.93 47.81 53.54 0.00 53.44 51.49 58.54 0.00 
Years of Education of HH Head 4.50 4.67 3.79 0.00 4.64 4.93 3.87 0.00 
Income per Capita (in LCU) 11978.00 10359.77 18648.47 0.01 15525.96 12991.32 22157.79 0.01 
of which (in %)                 
  Agriculture  0.09 0.09 0.09 0.76 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.95 
  Livestock  0.04 0.04 0.05 0.68 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.52 
  Non-Agricultural Business  0.07 0.08 0.07 0.36 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.16 
  Agricultural Wages  0.17 0.19 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.19 0.11 0.00 
  Non-Agricultural Wages  0.27 0.31 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.27 0.13 0.00 
  Transfers  0.14 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.00 
  International Remittances 0.07 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.36 0.00 
Ag. Machinery (in LCU) 4722.18 3937.44 7956.93 0.00 8785.09 6633.54 14414.53 0.00 
Livestock (in LCU) 8579.83 6778.10 16006.72 0.01 11186.22 9468.88 15679.57 0.00 
Priv. Land (in ha)  1.10 1.01 1.50 0.43 1.44 1.43 1.46 0.97 
International Migration (US)  0.20 0.00 1.00 - 0.28 0.00 1.00 - 
Obs 1762 1418 344 - 1537 1112 425 - 
Note: All income figures are in constant 2003 Mexican pesos and include negative incomes. In 2003, 1 Mexican peso was worth USD 0.62. 
Transfer income includes PROCAMPO, PROGRESA, transfers by non-governmental organizations and friends. For 2007 transfers also 
includes PROARBOL and PROGAN. Author’s calculation based on ENRUM. 
 
The migration prevalence in our sample has increased by 10 percent between the two waves.4 
In 2002, 344 of the households (about 20 percent) had members who migrated internationally. Five 
years later we encountered 425 households (28 percent) with international migrants in our survey. 
As can be seen from Table 1.1, households with migrants had on average significantly less children 
than those without migrants. We also find that household heads of families that have migrants were 
older than the household heads of families without migrants. This tendency as displayed in Figure1.2 
reflects the general trend of children to migrate. The age distribution of heads from migrant 
                                                          
4 Migrants are defined as individuals who reside or work abroad for at least 3 month out of the last 12 months. 
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households is shifted to the left, indicating that households with very young household heads have a 
lower likelihood to have migrants compared to older households.  
 




As can be seen in Table 1.2, only 31 percent (17 percent) of all households with international 
migrants in 2002 (2007) had a migrant household head. Migrants are mostly male household 
members with an average age of 32.6 (33.2) years. The high average migration duration reflects the 
fact that two thirds of the households in 2007 had at least one member who spent the last 12 
months entirely abroad. Unfortunately we have no measure that captures their return intentions. 
The most important aspect in Table 1.2 is that it is mostly sons and daughters who migrate. When we 
split these statistics by the average age of the household head of migrant households (i.e. 56 years) it 
becomes even more explicit that in older households mostly the household heads' children migrated.  
The survey asked households whether remittances were sent for a specific purpose, i.e. 
earmarked for a certain use. Interestingly only around 4 percent of the remittance receiving 
households stated that remittances were sent for the purchase of production inputs, livestock or 
land. All other households stated that remittances were sent to cover debt repayment, daily 
expenditures as well as health and schooling expenditures. This attitude regarding the use of 
remittances could also reflect the mental accounting of households and would suggest that 
remittances do not affect investments. However, household income is fungible and a clear judgment 
with respect to the mental accounting hypothesis cannot be reach based on these self-stated 
intentions. It is also important to note that only around 12 percent of the households had a debit, 
credit or savings account in 2007. To cover large lump sum investments the households would then 
have to hold all savings in cash which might be too risky. The stated preference for daily expenditures 
could therefore also reflect the inaccessibility of an adequate savings vehicle. 
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Table 1.2 – Migrant Characteristics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





Male   0.82 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.78 
Age   32.96 32.64 33.21 30.19 35.54 
Primary Education 0.49 0.55 0.45 0.48 0.51 
Secondary Education 0.30 0.26 0.33 0.32 0.28 
Married 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.55 0.64 
Average Annual Migration Duration 10.05 9.41 10.55 9.42 10.62 
Years of Migration Experience 7.80 7.85 7.70 6.24 9.19 
Migrants per Household 1.81 1.43 2.02 1.42 2.07 
HH Head (male) 0.24 0.31 0.17 0.43 0.06 
HH Head (female) 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 
Daughter (at least 1) 0.25 0.18 0.29 0.15 0.33 
Son (at least 1) 0.68 0.59 0.71 0.50 0.81 
Other relative 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.06 
Obs   737 326 411 370 367 
Note: All figures are expressed in Mexican pesos and are unconditional means. Author’s calculation based on ENRUM. 
 
Following the literature we separate investment alternatives into two logically coherent 
categories: agriculture and livestock. The former includes investments in agricultural assets such as 
expenditures to improve the plot and the installation of irrigation systems, acquisition of new 
machinery as well as expenditures to maintain productive assets. Investments in livestock include 
expenditure categories such as the acquisitions of new livestock and expenditures for new 
machinery. About one-third of the households invested productively 5 . The households with 
international migrants seem to have slightly higher propensities to invest in agricultural assets and 
livestock. Regarding the investment shares, neither category stands out. While livestock makes up 
the biggest part of investments in terms of frequency, agriculture seems to account for the bigger 
share in total investment volumes in both years. Unfortunately the survey data does not allow us to 
analyze the stocks and investment flows of other income generating activities.  
Given that the age of household heads differs markedly between non-migrant and migrant 
households, as observed in Table 1.1, the subsequent question is whether this pattern holds for the 
households’ investment activities. In Figures 1.3 and 1.4 we capture the relationship between 
investment status and the age of the household head differentiated into households that had no 
migrants and those that had international migration. The graphs reveal two things. First, households 
with international migrants seem to hold more agriculture and livestock assets in both years. Second, 
especially for livestock assets we observe a strong curvature that indicates a life-cycle investment 
structure. More precisely, the value of livestock increases up to the age of around 40 years of the 
                                                          
5 Not reported in the Tables. 
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household head and remains quite stable until the age of 60. Thereafter households seem to hold 
less livestock. 






Figure 1.3 – Profile Plots of Agricultural Assets 
  
 
Figure 1.4 – Profile Plots of Livestock 
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1.4. Econometric Strategy 
 
Econometrically the relation between investments and migration has been previously approached 
using a simple setup. Typically a certain type of investment is regressed on remittances controlling 
for household characteristics to account for their heterogeneity. However, this ignores the variables 
highlighted by the financial theory of investment, i.e. the importance of internal sources of finance in 
imperfect capital market situations (Hubbard 1998). By rearranging equation (4) it becomes clear 
that investments are determined by 
𝐼 = 𝑝1 ⋅ 𝑓(𝐾1,𝐿 −𝑀) + 𝑔(𝑀) −  𝑆 − 𝐶  (10) 
The investment equation we test differs from previous agricultural investment estimations (e.g. 
Elhorst 1993, Hubbard and Kashyap 1992) in two respects. First, due to data limitations we cannot 
include any measure of output or factor input prices. Yet this should not affect our estimates because 
although prices are most likely heterogeneous across regions it is unlikely that households in the 
same states face significantly different factor input and output prices. The variation between 
communities should be absorbed to a large extent by state fixed effects. We use only agricultural and 
livestock sales as a proxy for cash flows since we do not observe directly the savings or changes in 
inventories of households. We also deviate from the common approach where investments are 
estimated as a share of total capital. The reason for this deviation lies in the structure of our data. As 
outlined before the survey did ask explicit questions about investments, but the categories used in 
these investment questions do not perfectly match the categories of productive household assets. 
Second, we do not have any measure of market opportunities in the form of fundamental q as it is 
commonly used in investment analysis (e.g. Bierlen and Featherstone 1998). However, this should 
not be a major problem as we approach the data with a reduced form and do not derive a structural 
interpretation from the estimation model. In addition, the structural derivation of the q-model 
assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale which would be unrealistic in our context. 
Taking these limitations into account our general estimation equation takes the following form: 
log (𝐼𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  i=1,…,N; t=1,2; (11) 
where I is investment or an investment good, X is a vector of household characteristics, K is capital 
and C represents cash flows. The variable of main interest is migration (M). Household characteristics 
consist of the number of adults in the household as well as the age and education of the household 
head. We also included a squared age term for the household head to capture potential non-linear 
effects. Throughout all estimations the quadratic term should not have any statistical significance if 
there are no life-cycle effects. The capital vector contains the capital stocks of the household, i.e. the 
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aggregated value of agricultural assets and the value of the livestock the household owned. These 
stocks are not only important as a measure of productive capacity but also because they reflect the 
wealth of the household. This duality makes this measure somewhat ambiguous as it indicates both, 
the production setup and degree of specialization as well as the accumulated wealth of the 
household. The vector C describes the household’s cash flows and access to capital. Again the 
interpretation of the elasticity of investment with respect to cash flows is somewhat difficult as these 
variables contain different types of information. On the one hand they reflect the internal financing 
capacity of the household represented by cash flows vis-á-vis external capital in the form of credits. 
On the other hand cash flows could also indicate future investment opportunities and market 
conditions instead of the role of internal funds (Gilchrist and Himmelberg 1995). But since the 
objective of this analysis is not to determine whether households are credit constrained due to 
imperfect capital markets, the size of the effect is not of primary importance. Rather, the difference 
in the importance of cash flows for migrants and non-migrants is sufficient to test if migration 
provides capital for investment and thereby changes the financing structure of investments. It is 
worth noting that while this investigation focuses on capital expenditures it is also possible that cash 
flows are used to finance other production-relevant categories such as cash holdings, increases in 
inventories or non-farm activities. 
In addition to the theoretical reasons why farmers do not invest as outlined in section 1.2 there 
are also some empirical reasons why we might not observe investments. Most likely, capital 
investments are quite infrequent which is why the observation period of a single year cannot fully 
reflect the investment activity of a farmer. It is also possible that unobservable factors are driving the 
investment decision. For example, transaction cost can be too high due to the remote location of 
some municipalities, or the overall market situation depresses the expectations of the farmer. 
Unfortunately we have no way to clearly identify the cause of zero observations in our investment 
flows. The exclusion of households with zero investments for a given year would imply zero demand 
which is not necessarily true. If the selection into the observable subgroup is non-random OLS 
estimates are inconsistent. We address this problem in two ways. First, we use not only investment 
flows but also capital stocks which are by definition the result of all prior investment flows. Second, 
we use a Tobit model which produces consistent parameter estimates in the presence of a truncated 
dependent variable (Amemiya 1973).  
We begin the analysis by pooling the data set so as to evaluate the changes of investment 
between the years, i.e. the effect of time. This also allows us to check for attrition. By including a 
dummy that indicates if the household was observed in 2007, we can evaluate systematic differences 
of attriters. As pointed out by Arslan and Taylor (2011) attrition can be caused by (non-random) 
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whole-household migration. If this was indeed the case the estimations of our migration coefficients 
would be upward biased since these migrant households did not invest in agricultural assets but 
were unobservable in the second survey round.   
To exploit the advantage of having two periods we then employ a Lagged Dependent Variable 
(LDV) estimation. This approach helps us to control for events that happened prior to the period of 
observation and possibly influenced investment behavior permanently, but also to capture slow 
changing or invariant characteristics of the household such as entrepreneurial abilities and risk 
attitudes. Hence, the LDV must be understood as a proxy for all unobserved time-invariant variables 
that affect investment. One problem of this approach is the possible correlation of the lagged 
dependent variable with the error term. The bias introduced by this correlation shifts the coefficients 
of our explanatory variables toward zero (e.g. Griliches 1961). However, since we are neither relying 
on the point estimate of the lagged investment variables nor emphasizing the exact coefficient size of 
the other variables, there is no reason to refrain from using lagged variables. We should understand 
the LDV parameter estimates as the lower bound of the possible effects. 
The main advantage of the panel structure of our dataset is that it allows us to control for 
constant and slow changing household specific effects. Both, our pooled OLS and our LDV estimates 
would be biased and inconsistent in the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. To address 
this problem we also employ fixed effects estimation. However, since we are restricted to two 
periods this estimation is equivalent to first differences and only captures the effect of variation 
within our unit of observation. In our sample 203 households decided to migrate after 2002 and 76 
households ceased to have migrants in 2005. The FE estimation represents a comparison of new 
migrants and households that have concluded their migration activities. 6  
The central problem for the identification of the effect of migration in all of these setups is the 
non-random selection of households into migration. More precisely households that have migrants 
might be systematically different from those who do not. This intuition is supported by a simple 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi² test which rejects the exogeneity of our migration indictor in almost all 
regressions. For Mexico various migration instruments have been used successfully, among them 
migration networks (Chiodi et al. 2012), historic state-level migration rates (Woodruff and Zenteno 
2007, Taylor and Lopez-Feldman 2010), and migrant-weighted economic conditions at the 
destination (Orrenius et al. 2010, Arslan and Taylor 2011). We employ the number of years since the 
first migration occurred in each community. This variable reflects the age of the network and 
                                                          
6 We do not report our random effects estimation since after controlling for year and state fixed effects the 
results are quantitatively comparable and qualitatively the same as our pooled estimation results, which is due 
to the fact that we only observe two periods. 
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therefore the level of migration costs. Following the argumentation by McKenzie and Rapoport 
(2007) we expect migration probability to increase with the age of the network.7 In addition to using 
the age of existing migration networks, which partly captures the effect of historic migration, we 
construct an instrumental variable based on the U.S. state-level GDP growth weighted by the number 
of migrants each community had in 2002 and 2007 in different states.  
𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  
1
𝐷
⋅ ∑ �𝑀𝐼𝐺𝑗𝑘𝑡 ⋅ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑗𝑘𝑡�𝐷𝑘=1  j=1,…,60 (12) 
According to equation (12), the instrumental variable �𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡� for household i in village j is a 
weighted average of the GDP growth in all states D the community had a migration network with at 
time t. The assumption behind this instrument is that increased economic activity is strongly 
correlated with higher wages and a higher probability of finding employment for a migrant. There is 
no reason to believe that economic growth in U.S. states affects the investment activity in specific 
Mexican communities. This exclusion restriction would only be violated if for example farmers 
marketed their production in the United States as well which is unlikely since the households in our 
sample are small scale producers who only cater to local markets.  
Since we are not able to address the endogeneity of migration in the Tobit model due to the 
binary nature of our migration variable we follow the recommendation by Angrist (2001) to employ a 
conventional two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. In addition to obtaining consistent 
parameter estimates, this also allows us to perform a broad range of tests regarding the strength and 
validity of our instrumental variables. The Hansen J test cannot reject the hypothesis that our 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. We can therefore accept the orthogonality 
conditions required for our instruments to be valid. To evaluate the strength of our instrument we 
use the Kleinbergen-Paap test of under-identification and the Cragg-Donald F-statistic of our first 
stage regression. We report both tests in the last two rows of each table and find that our 
instruments are jointly significant throughout. Furthermore the Cragg-Donald F-statistic mostly 
exceeds the critical 10 percent value for weak instruments proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002) that 
stands at 19.93 for our specifications. Overall, these tests confirm the adequacy of our two 
instruments.  
Our estimation and instrumentation strategy has two important implications that should be 
considered before we turn to the results. First, a system estimation approach could help us to gain 
efficiency. However, we found only a very small correlation of agriculture and livestock residuals. This 
observation and our primary interest in migration shift the balance in favor of a single-equation 
                                                          
7 The variable also captures indirectly the effect of the diplomatic agreements signed by the United States and 
Mexico in the 1940s known as the Bracero Program that initiated the recruitment of temporary migrant 
workers. The communities with the oldest networks are also the ones that were visited by Bracero recruiters. 
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approach in this context. Albeit being less efficient our single-equation estimates remain consistent. 
Second, the 2SLS estimation model can only yield local average treatment effect (LATE) estimates 
since some households are defiers in the sense that they do not react to changes in the market 
conditions at the destinations. One way to overcome this limitation and also investigate the possible 
heterogeneity of other explanatory variables in both migrant and non-migrant households is to 
employ an endogenous switching regression model (SRM) which is a generalization of a Heckman 
selection correction (Heckman 1979). In doing so we are using a control function in form of the 
inverse Mill’s ratio that is added to equation (11). The exogenous variables used to derive the inverse 
Mill’s ratio are the same as in the 2SLS specification (see equation 12). This approach also allows us 
to observe the effect of age separately for migrant and non-migrant households without using 
instrumented interaction terms which could possibly suffer from decreased efficiency due to the 
lower correlation between the interacted endogenous migration variable and the interacted 
instrument. 
 
1.5. Estimation Results 
 
To evaluate the migration decision process that underlies our instrumental variable strategy we 
display Probit estimates of having an international migrant in the household in Table 1.3. After 
augmenting the basic setup with our migration instruments the estimated coefficients show that the 
exogenous instruments have significant effects on the propensity to migrate. We find that the age of 
the migration network increases the propensity to migrate. Similarly, the growth of GDP at the 
destination states weighted by the size of the diasporas increases the likelihood of having at least 
one migrant in the household. For both years we find that the probability of migration first increases 
with age and decreases after a turning point at around 61 and 72, in 2002 and 2007, respectively, 
keeping all other variables constant. When examining economic characteristics of the households, 
we find strong evidence that international migration is associated with current income flows. Higher 
current income from livestock sales and non-farm activities significantly reduces the probability that 
the household has at least one international migrant. Agricultural sales have no statistically 
significant relation with the propensity to migrate. By contrast, we find that agricultural assets have a 
slightly positive correlation with the probability of having an international migrant in the household. 
This could reflect asymmetric migration costs that only wealthier households are able to cover. A 
second interpretation that does not conflict with the first is that mostly the wealthier households 
start investing in more profitable activities such as migration. 
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Table 1.3 – Migration Determinants (Probit) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    2002 2007 Pooled 
Household          
 
adults (fem) -0.0034 -0.0108 0.0078 0.0112 -0.0042 
 adults (male) -0.0380 -0.0527 -0.0753** -0.0746* -0.0654** 
  age (in years) 0.0744*** 0.0876*** 0.0748*** 0.0810*** 0.0751*** 
  age² -0.0006*** -0.0007*** -0.0005*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** 
  edu (in years) -0.0012 -0.0035 -0.0120 -0.0150 -0.0109 
       
Productive Assets 
    
 
  plotsize (ha/10) 0.1598*** 0.1978*** 0.0001 0.0097 0.0822*** 
  ag capital (log) 0.0008 0.0005 0.0155*** 0.0129** 0.0092** 
  liv capital (log) 0.0025 0.0034 0.0099 0.0099 0.0088** 
       
Cash Flow and Liquidity      
  agsales (log) 0.0005 -0.0016 0.0080 0.0080 0.0042 
  livesales (log) -0.0152* -0.0202** -0.0127* -0.0127* -0.0169*** 
 other income (log) -0.0327*** -0.0319*** -0.0494*** -0.0490*** -0.0311*** 
 Credit (1=yes) -0.1050 -0.1016 -0.4477** -0.4681*** -0.2973** 
       
Instruments  
    
 










    
    
 
Constant -4.1359*** -4.5939*** -4.0988*** -4.3320*** -4.3816*** 
        
 
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes 
Obs 1733 1733 1506 1506 3239 
Chi² 218.03 267.34 191.70 200.91 454.88 
McFadden R² 0.166 0.210 0.157 0.168 - 
Count R² 0.826 0.835 0.767 0.771 - 
BIC -11271 -11332 -9294 -9299 - 
Note: Dependent variable is one if household has a member living or working more than three month per year in the US and zero otherwise;  * 
significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; T-statistics (two-tailed) based on robust standard errors. Author’s calculation 
based on ENRUM. 
 
In Table 1.4 we report the estimation results for the pooled estimations of both, the investment 
flows and stocks. The agricultural investment intensity seems to be independent of age while 
livestock investment flows decrease significantly with age. This could indicate that most households 
rely on agriculture for their daily consumption throughout the life-cycle. The asset accumulation 
follows a clear life-cycle pattern for both agricultural and livestock assets, peaking at the age of 48 
and 63 in the 2SLS specification, respectively. Apart from the age of the household head all 
production characteristics, i.e. productive assets and cash flows, are practically and statistically 
important determinants of investment behavior. The cash flow elasticity of investment of both 
agriculture and livestock is throughout strongly category specific. That is, investments in livestock are 
more sensitive to profits from livestock sales than from retained agricultural profits and vice versa. 
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Plot size as well as the value of agricultural assets and livestock have robustly positive effects. This 
result does not reject the decreasing returns to capital as predicted by theory but rather reflects the 
fact that our investment variable contains replacement expenditures. Furthermore if we use the 
share of investment as independent variable the asset coefficients have a negative sign. The year 
fixed effects show that both agricultural investments and assets are higher in the second wave in 
2007. From the attrition indicator we see that households that were not surveyed in 2007 seem to be 
characterized by slightly lower investments and assets throughout. In both the Tobit and the 2SLS 
specification, international migration seems to have a slightly positive effect on livestock investment 
flows and a robustly positive effect on agricultural assets. 
Table 1.4 – Determinants of Investment Volume and Assets (Pooled Regressions) 
     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Investment Volume Assets (End of Period) 
  AG LIV AG LIV 
  
  Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS 
Household Characteristics 
      
  
 adults (fem) -0.0390 -0.0438 0.0047 0.0648 -0.0158 0.0034 0.1745* 0.2488** 
 adults (male) -0.1024 -0.0709 0.1128* 0.1773* 0.4251*** 0.5929*** 0.2631** 0.2927* 
 
age (in years) 0.0113* 0.0031 -0.0189*** -0.0261*** 0.1752*** 0.0961* 0.1351*** 0.1832** 
 age²     -0.0016*** -0.0010** -0.0011** -0.0014** 
 
educ (in years) 0.0443 0.0373* -0.0024 0.0287 0.1058*** 0.1440*** -0.0731** -0.0741** 
          
Productive Assets         
 
plot (ha/10) 0.3758*** 0.3996*** 0.1826*** 0.3053*** 0.4935*** 0.6616** 0.7249*** 1.0424*** 
 
ag capital (log) 0.1858*** 0.1680*** 0.0260** 0.0361**     
 
livestock (log) 0.0342* 0.0085 0.2942*** 0.3400***     
         
Cash Flow and Liquidity         
 
agsales (log) 0.1250*** 0.1167*** 0.0250** 0.0404** 0.1317*** 0.1560*** 0.0592*** 0.0864*** 
 
livsales (log) 0.0467** 0.0609** 0.0759*** 0.1938*** 0.0847*** 0.1290*** 0.3820*** 0.5667*** 
 
other income (log) 0.0361 0.0289 0.0542*** 0.0535** 0.0063 0.0514 0.0911*** 0.0662 
 credit (1=yes) -0.2832 -0.0834 0.5837** 1.0611*** 1.2344*** 1.9057*** -0.3196 -0.5308 
         
Migration -0.1468 0.4616 0.5667*** 3.1313* 0.6569** 5.8220*** 0.4675 -1.5479 
         
Year (1 = 2007) 0.6323** 0.4483** -0.7127*** -0.9865*** 1.1515*** 0.8341** -0.0644 0.1207 
Attrition (1 = not in 2007) 0.1683 0.1308 -0.4875* -0.5562* -1.1815*** -0.8872** -0.7845* -0.8261* 
            
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 3239 
p-value Hansen J   0.708  0.187  0.499  0.073 
K-P Wald F-Stat  15.701  15.701  15.704  15.704 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat  38.914  38.914  42.682  42.682 
 
Note: Dependent variables in logs; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Tobit estimates are marginal effects 
(conditional on being uncensored); all censored observations are left-censored at zero; T-statistics (two-tailed) based on robust standard errors  
clustered at the village level. Author’s calculation based on ENRUM. 
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Table 1.5 reports the results for the Lagged Dependent Variable estimation. The lagged variable 
is also an indicator of the persistence of investment activities. That is, it measures how strongly 
current investment depends on past investments. The strong difference between flows and stocks 
can be interpreted as an indication of an infrequent and lumpy adjustment process of capital. 
Specifically for livestock, we can observe that past investments have a low predictive power for 
current investments, whereas our asset measure is quite persistent. Almost all of the results 
observed in the pooled specification regarding the demographic structure of investments, the 
importance of cash flows and the effect of migration remain unchanged.  
Table 1.5 – Determinants of Investment Volume and Assets (Lagged Dependent Variable) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Investment Volume Assets (End of Period) 
  AG LIV AG LIV 
    Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS Tobit 2SLS 
         
Lagged Dependent 0.1108*** 0.1107** 0.0382** 0.0767*** 0.1746*** 0.2012*** 0.2473*** 0.3053*** 
         
Household Characteristics 
      
  
 adults (fem) -0.0149 -0.0711 0.0877 0.1560 0.1271 0.0911 0.1325 0.1875 
 adults (male) -0.3280** -0.1073 0.0546 0.0883 0.3519** 0.7091*** 0.2862** 0.3414** 
  age (in years) 0.0063 -0.0248 -0.0238*** -0.0343** 0.1772*** -0.0668 0.1529** 0.1750* 
 age²     -0.0016*** -0.0000 -0.0014** -0.0016** 
  educ (in years) 0.0313 0.0544 0.0161 0.0540 0.1473*** 0.2264*** -0.0478 -0.0355 
          
Productive Assets         
  plot (ha/10) 0.2906** 0.3135 0.1254** 0.3021** 0.1536 0.2025 0.3077*** 0.4307*** 
  ag capital (log) 0.1760*** 0.1316*** 0.0206* 0.0199     
  livestock (log) 0.0710*** 0.0225 0.3013*** 0.3374***     
          
Cash Flow and Liquidity         
  agsales (log) 0.1372*** 0.1270*** 0.0141 0.0283 0.1025*** 0.0992** 0.0426** 0.0579** 
  livsales (log) 0.0397 0.0961*** 0.0764*** 0.2177*** 0.0719*** 0.1188*** 0.3200*** 0.4721*** 
  other income  (log) 0.0528 0.1287** -0.0247 -0.0103 -0.0053 0.1786** 0.0591 0.0462 
 credit (1=yes) -0.8499 0.0755 0.7115** 1.3413*** -0.2427 1.3447 -0.9230* -0.9223 
         
Migration -0.2498 6.1696 0.3058* 2.8312 0.8816*** 13.9189*** 0.3152 0.3871 
            
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487 1487 
p-value Hansen J   0.9329  0.0639  0.4477  0.0922 
K-P Wald F-Stat  9.192  8.645  10.084  10.370 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat  9.992  9.403  11.957  11.375 
 
Note: Dependent variables in logs; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; Tobit estimates are marginal effects 
(conditional on being uncensored); all censored observations are left-censored at zero; T-statistics (two-tailed) based on robust standard errors 
clustered at the village level. Author’s calculation based on ENRUM. 
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The results of Tables 1.4 and 1.5 suggest that the internally generated cash flows from 
market integration of the rural households in the form of sales are more important for the 
accumulation of livestock than the funds generated by the migration of household members, while 
agricultural asset accumulation clearly benefits from migration. However, to find out if the age of the 
household head and the cash flows the household receives have different effects in migrant and non-
migrant households the estimates provided by our 2SLS specifications do not suffice. If migration in 
fact injects capital for investment only for specific types of agricultural production we should observe 
marked differences in cash flow sensitivity between migrant and non-migrant households. To test 
this hypothesis we turn in Table 1.6 to the split sample parameter estimates obtained through the 
switching regression model. We find that the correlation coefficient of the error terms in the 
selection and regression equation (rho) is throughout negative for migrant households. This confirms 
that the households with migrants are positively selected in terms of the two instruments and are 
more likely to have higher investments and more accumulated assets than a household drawn at 
random from the population mirroring the results obtained from the 2SLS specification as reported in 
Table 1.4.  
Table 1.6 yields two important insights. First, the estimated elasticity of agricultural investment 
to changes in category specific cash flows represented by sales for households without migrants is 
12.4 percent, while migrant households exhibit an elasticity of about 15.1 percent. The difference is 
very small and statistically insignificant. The same is true for livestock investments and assets. In the 
NELM literature it is generally argued that remittances are used to overcome financing constraints. 
The comparison of the cash flow coefficients across the two subsamples of migrant and non-migrant 
households in Table 1.6 shows that the cash flow sensitivity does not vary systematically across 
households. Only for agricultural assets we see that the cash flow sensitivity becomes statistically 
insignificant for migrant households. While this evidence does not allow us to judge the extent of the 
existing credit constraints, it allows us to reject the hypothesis that funds generated by migration 
change the capital demand of farm households indiscriminately, but only do so for agricultural 
activities. Second, to find out if migrant households’ investment behavior follows a pattern that is 
consistent with the permanent income hypothesis more strongly than non-migrant households as 
indicated by the profile plots in Figure 3 we included an old age dummy, reflecting the mean age of 
household heads in 2007, instead of the continuous age variable in the switching regression model. 
We see that although the coefficient of the age dummy is negative for all specifications of migrant 
households, it is only significant for agricultural assets. A comparison of migrant and non-migrant 
households indicates that migrant households seem to disinvest more strongly during old age than 
non-migrant households. However, since this finding is not very robust we have to regard it with 
caution. 
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Table 1.7 shows the results from the fixed effects estimation of agricultural and livestock 
investments and capital stocks. Since the demographic characteristics of the household, i.e. age, 
composition and education, as well as plot size can be considered fixed over the short period of 
observation we did not include them. We find that agricultural and livestock sales are again positive 
and significant at the 1 percent level for the respective asset category throughout. International 
migration has again a positive and highly significant effect on agricultural assets in both the standard 
and the instrumented fixed effect specification. We also observe a strongly positive effect of 
migration on agricultural investments and a negative effect on livestock investments in the 2SLS 
specification. Since these parameter estimates are based on the comparison between households 
that had a migrant in 2002 but none in 2007 and households that started to migrate in 2007 we can 
conclude that revenues from migration are indeed only used to build up the subsistence category of 
agricultural capital. The negative coefficient of livestock investments can be interpreted as suggestive 
evidence that migration serves as a substitute for livestock production.  
Table 1.6 – Determinants of Investment Volume and Assets (LDV – Split Sample)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Investment Volume Assets (End of Period) 
  AG LIV AG LIV 
     
Migrant Households     
 old age (≥58) -1.2809 -0.6002 -2.4754** -0.5331 
 ag capital (log) 0.0980** 0.0252   
 livestock (log) 0.0657 0.3554***   
 agsales (log) 0.1518*** -0.0109 0.0639 0.0790* 
 livsales (log) 0.1021* 0.2233*** 0.0351 0.4488*** 
Obs 411 411 411 411 
rho -0.5594 -0.2178 -0.8177 -0.2626 
      
Non-Migrant Households     
 old age (≥58) 0.1191 -1.1205*** -1.1454* 0.0240 
 ag capital (log) 0.1752*** 0.0160   
 livestock (log) 0.0127 0.3339***   
  agsales (log) 0.1246*** 0.0509** 0.1202*** 0.0549* 
  livsales (log) 0.0654** 0.2118*** 0.1392*** 0.4785*** 
Obs 1076 1076 1076 1076 
rho  0.3223 0.3632 0.6650 -0.3874 
      
 State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: Dependent variables in logs; Included control variables are number of adult women and men, education of the household head, plot size 
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Table 1.7 – Determinants of Investment Volume and Assets (Fixed Effects) 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Investment Volume Assets (End of Period) 
  AG LIV AG LIV 
    FE 2SLS-FE FE 2SLS-FE FE 2SLS-FE FE 2SLS-FE 
          
Productive Assets         
  ag capital (log) 0.1820*** 0.1666*** 0.0255 0.0465*     
  livestock (log) -0.0068 -0.0125 0.3314*** 0.3393***     
         
Cash Flow and Liquidity         
  agsales (log) 0.1053*** 0.0920*** 0.0323 0.0505* 0.0777** 0.0391 0.0652** 0.0614** 
  livsales (log) 0.0316 0.0516* 0.1545*** 0.1272*** 0.0826*** 0.1259*** 0.3544*** 0.3585*** 
  other income (log) 0.0333 0.0408 0.0242 0.0139 0.0863* 0.1007* 0.1057*** 0.1071*** 
 credit (1=yes) -0.9590* -1.1677** 0.2091 0.4951 1.0863 0.4961 0.2360 0.1792 
         
Migration 0.1355 6.0482*** 0.2953 -7.8053** 0.9657* 16.3096*** 0.3083 1.7833 
            
Obs 3244 2978 3244 2978 3244 2978 3244 2978 
rho 0.40 0.45 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.58 0.57 
p-value Hansen J   0.1426  0.7785  0.3620  0.1426 
K-P Wald F-Stat  13.924  13.924  14.369  14.369 
Cragg-Donald F-Stat  27.034  27.034  28.797  28.797 
 
Note: Dependent variables in logs; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; T-statistics (two-tailed) based on robust 
standard errors clustered at the village level. Author’s calculation based on ENRUM. 
 
To summarize, we find that migration has strong positive effects on agricultural assets but not 
so much on livestock. Agricultural assets are built up with the capital received from migration. These 
effects are statistically significant, robust to changes in the specification of our estimation equation 
and are also practically significant since they have stronger effects than most of the other variables 
included. The estimates based on investment flow variables do not show a clear pattern, possibly due 
to their more volatile and infrequent nature. Our estimations also show that livestock seems to be 
driven more consistently by life-cycle effects than agriculture where we cannot observe a robust 
effect of age on investments and capital stocks. One possible interpretation of these findings is that 
livestock and migration are substitutes while agriculture seems to be a subsistence category that will 
never be excluded from the income portfolio since it guarantees a minimum level of consumption. 
This would explain why we do not observe strong life-cycle effects for agriculture but a strongly 
positive effect of migration on agricultural asset accumulation. In the context of our theoretical 
framework, these results support the argument that households adjust their income portfolio and 
use migration as a profitable investment alternative. A different reading of our results, which does 




Dercon (1998) for the case of rural Tanzania. This essential insurance function of livestock could 
become obsolete and no investments would take place if migration had a risk diversifying effect.  
1.6. Conclusion 
 
This essay addressed the prediction of NELM theory that remittances increase productive 
investments if credit constraints are binding for the migrant sending households. We explored three 
aspects that have so far not received enough attention in the literature regarding the nexus between 
migration and investments and that could possibly reconcile the contradicting results in the empirical 
literature on remittances and investments: the distinction between different productive investment 
categories, cash flows as fundamental investment determinants and possible life-cycle effects as 
important investment constraints. We employed various econometric techniques to investigate the 
effect of international migration on investment volumes and accumulated capital stocks.  
After ruling out that our results are driven by selection or endogeneity, we take away three 
important findings from our investigation. First, life-cycle effects may inhibit an increase in 
investments. Our estimates show strong live-cycle effects but no systematic difference between 
migrant and non-migrant households. We found some evidence that migrant households disinvest 
more strongly at the later stage of their life-cycle than non-migrant households. This observation 
calls for an explicit consideration of the stage of the migration cycle in future research regarding the 
effect of international migration on productive investments and asset accumulation. If migration 
occurs at a late stage of the life-cycle there is no reason to expect strong investments since the 
horizon for the returns to investments become shorter. Second, production fundamentals appear to 
be very important. Throughout category specific cash flows are the most predictive indicator of 
investments. Since all of the cash flows we observe are generated through market sales we have to 
conclude that market integration remains the strongest driver of investment. Third, pooling different 
investment categories distorts the causal relationship underlying the estimation. While our results 
indicate that migrants have accumulated more agricultural productive capital this is not the case for 
livestock, indicating that most households rely on agriculture for their daily consumption throughout 
the life-cycle. We should not expect strong investments in agriculture in general but only in the 
activities that secure the subsistence of the household.  
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International migration not only enables individuals to earn higher wages but also exposes them to 
new environments. The norms and values experienced at the destination country could change the 
behavior of the migrant but also of family members left behind. In this essay we argue that a brain 
gain could take place due to a change in educational aspirations of caregivers in migrant households. 
Using unique survey data from Moldova, we find that international migration raises parental 
aspirations in households located at the lower end of the human capital distribution. The 
identification of these effects relies on GDP growth shocks in the destination countries and migration 
networks. We conclude that aspirations are a highly relevant determinant of intergenerational 
human capital transfer and that even temporary international migration can shift human capital 
formation to a higher steady state by inducing higher educational aspirations of caregivers. 
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The nexus between international migration and human capital remains a disputed topic. At the 
individual level the positive effect remittances can have by relaxing liquidity constraints and thus by 
enabling educational investments are often cited and widely acknowledged. However, at the 
aggregate level especially the outflow of skilled migrants – what has been termed brain drain – has 
been characterized as detrimental to sustainable growth of developing countries. Only recently this 
perspective has been challenged by various authors (e.g. Stark et al. 1997, Beine et al. 2001) who 
show theoretically that the option to migrate could actually increase human capital investments by 
individuals. Their argument is rooted in a neo-classical framework emphasizing that the incentive to 
invest is driven by the possible monetary gains from going abroad. Since not all individuals who 
invest in education to migrate actually leave the country, a net increase of the human capital stock in 
the sending countries takes place. This hypothesis has been supported empirically by recent macro 
studies (e.g. Beine et al. 2007). Only few studies have attempted to test the human capital 
externalities of migration empirically at the household level. Batista et al. (2012) constitute a notable 
exception. The authors present evidence for the case of Cape Verde that cannot reject the brain gain 
hypothesis. 
In this essay we suggest a brain gain effect through a different causal channel and test it 
empirically. We argue that individuals and households do not maximize their utility independent of 
their environment and social context but that their decisions to e.g. invest in education are bound to 
the goals and aspirations set by their environments. This approach was suggested recently by Ray 
(2006) who pointed out that aspirations are an important determinant of behavior and could 
represent a key element of economic development. In line with this perspective we test the 
hypothesis that individuals adapt their aspirations if exposed to new environments. We exploit the 
variation of norms and values international migrants are exposed to in order to find out if migration 
has positive or negative human capital externalities by changing the educational aspirations of 
households.  
In our empirical analysis of household data from Moldova we find a strong relationship between 
enrollment, schooling expenditures and the educational aspiration caregivers have for their children, 
which supports the importance of aspirations for the analysis of household behavior. More 
importantly, using a 2SLS approach to address the endogeneity of migration, we find a positive short-
run impact of international migration on educational aspirations. These results provide a new 
perspective on the ongoing discussion about human capital externalities of migration and a possible 
brain gain. We thereby contribute to the growing literature about the effects of migration on 
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households in the sending countries with an emphasis on human capital accumulation. By focusing 
on aspirations, our analysis is also related to the nascent discussion about the transfer of norms and 
values in the context of international migration. 
The essay proceeds as follows. In the next section we review the literature on aspirations and 
human capital investment and describe the role of migration in this context in depth. In section 2.3 
we formulate a simple conceptual framework. We introduce the data used for the empirical analysis 
in section 2.4 and describe the econometric strategy in section 2.5. We present the descriptives and 
estimation results in section 2.6 and 2.7, respectively, and conclude in section 2.8. 
2.2. Previous Literature 
 
Because the concept of aspirations is a social construct it lends itself to a variety of definitions. 
Broadly defined aspirations can be understood as a desire to achieve a certain objective. Aspirations 
differ from expectations in that they often represent ideals or higher values. Expectations on the 
other hand account for constraints and perceived limitations. Accordingly we will use the term 
aspirations to describe goals that one would like to achieve in an ideal world without constraints and 
with full information and expectations as probabilistic goals that one expects to achieve taking into 
consideration all limitations one faces. 
In economics the idea of aspirations has been present for quite some time. Questioning classical 
economic theory and utility maximization, Herbert Simon (1959: 263) noted “[…] the conditions for 
satisfying a drive are not necessarily fixed, but may be specified by an aspiration level that itself 
adjusts upward or downward on the basis of experience”. When Kahneman and Tversky (1984) speak 
of the importance of reference points for utility maximization they reconcile ordinal utility theory 
with the observation that judgment and evaluations are based on prior experiences. Broadly 
speaking reference points are one major determinant of the goals people aspire to achieve. 
The connection between human capital accumulation and aspirations has recently gained more 
attention and has been used to model inequality and poverty persistence. Dalton et al. (2010) show 
formally that aspirations can serve as a behavioral explanation of poverty persistence. Their model 
establishes a theoretical link between constraints that are internal to the economic agent and 
persistent poverty. They define aspirations as a reference point and consider effort to be 
complementary to this reference point. The authors argue that an initially low reference point raises 
the likelihood of a persistent and binding internal constraint leading to a poverty trap. Dalton et al. 
(2010) use these results as a normative justification for empowerment programs that increase 
individuals’ aspirations. Mookherjee et al. (2010) analyze the effect of social context and parental 
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aspirations as determinants of investments in children’s education. At the core of their model stands 
the assumption that parental pride in their children’s achievements is on the one hand determined 
by the economic situation of their neighbors and does on the other hand determine their investment 
behavior. They conclude that spatial segregation and the implicit limitation of the aspiration window 
can lead to persistent inequalities. 
There is also a growing body of empirical evidence on the role of aspirations in the context of 
economic development that speaks to the relevance of the topic. Analyzing the nexus between 
aspirations and poverty Bernard et al. (2011) apply the theoretical framework proposed by Ray 
(2006) to households in Ethiopia. The authors argue that self-efficacy is an important determinant of 
goal content and pursuit and use a locus of control measure to proxy aspirations. The locus of control 
is a concept referring to the degree to which individuals believe they can influence important events 
in their lives. They find that the locus of control and the aspirations gap are strongly related and that 
the locus of control plays a central role in the credit demand of households.  
Apart from establishing that some kind of low aspiration equilibrium might be present, the 
central question is why these low aspirations prevail and how they can be changed. Various authors 
have proposed that aspirations could be influenced by the exposure to new role models. Chiapa et al. 
(2010) exploit data from the Mexican anti-poverty program Progresa and find that children that were 
randomly exposed to highly educated staff such as doctors and nurses had significantly higher 
educational aspirations. Another study that focused on the importance of role models is Beaman et 
al. (2012). The authors provide strong evidence from a randomized natural experiment in India 
where female community leadership inspired girls’ educational attainment. Macours and Vakis 
(2009) also use the random variation of female leadership in communities in Nicaragua to identify 
the effect of role models on human capital and educational aspirations. The authors show that 
changing aspirations brought about by new role models can have significant impacts on the 
investment behavior of households. An example for a direct intervention is presented by Krishnan 
and Krutikova (2010). The authors evaluate a NGO-program that attempts to raise the self-esteem 
and aspirations of children in slums of Bombay. They find that the program increases the aspiration 
window measured by the number of people children could name who are wealthier and serve as role 
models. 
These studies suggest that aspirations are responsive to changes in the environment and can be 
modified. Yet, they cannot overcome two problems. First, the authors often do not distinguish 
between aspirations and information. In a situation of incomplete information it is impossible to 
disentangle the information and aspiration effect. A pure aspiration effect must be understood as 
goal setting under perfect information. Second, it must be noted that ambitious goals or high 
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expectations do not translate with certainty into high educational achievements. Alexander et al. 
(1994) have shown that children from less advantaged background are less likely to convert their 
educational aspirations into the desired educational achievement. However, there is no doubt that 
with low aspirations high educational achievements are more unlikely. 
While the importance of aspirations for human capital formation is well established, there is no 
consensus as to whether the externalities of international migration are positive or negative for 
children’s education. While migration can improve the financial situation of the household through 
remittances, thereby alleviating the resource constraint of the household, it can also negatively 
affect the intra-household time allocation. Kandel and Kao (2001) find positive effects of parental 
migration on children’s school performance in Mexico. They attribute their finding to the improved 
financial situation of migrant families but also argue that parental migration changes the motivation 
of children to attain a good education. Mansuri (2006) presents evidence for Pakistan that points in 
the same direction. While migration eases the resource constraint and has positive effects on human 
capital accumulation in general, the prospect of migration does not alter schooling decisions. In 
contrast to these two contributions, Antman (2011) finds that paternal migration from Mexico to the 
U.S results in a reduction of time allocated to studies and an increased work load of children. Her 
estimates suggest that these negative short-term effects are driven primarily by boys in the age 
range of 12 to 15. Similar results are presented by McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) who also observe 
that migration seems to depress educational attainment of children. Additionally they show that the 
reduction in schooling is accounted for by the increased propensity of migration for boys and an 
increased household workload for girls. 
There are various other factors that will moderate the effects of migration on educational 
investments apart from the additional financial resources obtained via remittances. First, the 
permanent absence of one parent and the resulting lack of guidance and encouragement could have 
adverse effects on the educational attainment of children. This is especially important since the 
parental nurture effect is one of the main drivers of intergenerational human capital transfer 
(Holmlund et al. 2011) and might not be compensated by the increased income (Shea 2000). 
Second, migrants are exposed to new environments and ideas which can lead to an adjustment 
of their pre-migration priors. This migration induced transmission of knowledge, norms and values 
has been demonstrated to affect the up-take of low-fertility norms (Beine et al. 2009) but also the 
political realm (Spillimbergo 2009). For the case of Moldova empirical evidence by Omar Mahmoud 
et al. (2012) suggests a strong link between the political atmosphere in the migration receiving 
country and the subsequent voting behavior of migrant households in the sending country. More 
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precisely, westward migration seems to reduce the electoral support for the far left of the political 
spectrum in Moldova.  
Third, migration itself could become a viable option for the children who see their parents work 
abroad and thus affect educational attainment. Jensen (2012) has demonstrated that individuals 
adjust their behavior quite quickly to new job market opportunities. Using data from a randomized 
labor market intervention in India he shows that young women increase their schooling investments 
and postpone marriage when given the opportunity of non-farm employment. That migration has a 
similarly strong but qualitatively different effect on life-cycle planning of households has been 
proposed by Kandel and Massey (2002). They argue that migration becomes part of the household’s 
life plan in the migrant sending countries. They find that the prospect of migration to the U.S. shapes 
children’s behavior in Mexico by increasing the likelihood of migrating to the U.S. and by lowering 
their odds of continuing with school. Thus, low aspirations of children could be the result of their 
perception that education is not necessary to migrate, i.e. an underestimation of the return on 
investments in education that is induced by the exposure to an apparently “easy” exit. In line with 
this argument McKenzie et al. (2012) present evidence from Tonga that there is a systematic bias in 
the expected wage differential. The authors attribute this bias to underreporting of earnings by 
current migrants to moderate demands for remittances, and to disproportionate emphasis potential 
migrants put on negative migration experiences reported by other people. An alternative explanation 
could be the employment of their highly educated migrant parents in low skill jobs. Returns to 
foreign education are often low (e.g. Hartog and Zorlu 2009, Sanromá et al. 2009) and could 
therefore discourage parents and children who plan to migrate to adjust their aspirations upwards. 
There are only two papers we are aware of that have focused on the relationship of educational 
aspirations and migration. In a sample of Mexican students Dreby and Stutz (2012) detect a positive 
impact of maternal migration on educational aspirations while the migration of fathers leaves the 
aspirations children have unchanged. Opposed to this finding, Kandel and Kao (2001) report lower 
educational aspirations at all academic levels of Mexican children growing up in households with 
international migrants. Unfortunately both papers do not account for the self-selection of migrants 
and can therefore not establish the causal link between migration and educational aspirations 
convincingly. Our own analysis makes a contribution to the literature by carefully identifying causality 
(see Section 2.5). 
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2.3. Conceptual Framework  
 
Most models that are concerned with the effect of migration on human capital investments and a 
possible brain gain are built on the premise that wage differentials are the main determinant of 
migration (e.g. Stark et al. 1997, Mountford 1997, Vidal 1998, Beine et al. 2001). A problem with this 
setup is that it does not account for the intrinsic value of education. The present framework intends 
to clarify the relationship between aspirations and human capital investments. To allow an accessible 
interpretation of and direct predictions from our framework we keep matters as parsimonious as 
possible.  We employ a simple static model with no general equilibrium effects based on Stark et al. 
(1997) to show that the exclusion of the intrinsic value of human capital can lead to underestimating 
the effects of migration on human capital investments. Our approach proceeds in three steps looking 
at investments (1) under autarky, (2) with migration and (3) with dynastic migration. Our framework 
suggests that increased human capital investments might prevail after the migration option has 
ceased to be available in a dynastic human capital investment scenario. 
Assume individuals live for two periods, childhood and working age. Individuals derive utility 
from consumption 𝑐𝑡 in both periods and from the intrinsic value of human capital 𝜃 in the first 
period in each dynasty 𝑑. In the first period individuals can invest in human capital 𝜃 or work to 
finance consumption 𝑐1. In the second period individuals can only work to finance consumption 𝑐2. 
Their objective function is given by: 
𝑈𝑑 ≡ 𝑈(𝑐1,𝜓(𝜃), 𝑐2)         (1) 
Consumption is financed only by wages. Individuals can earn wage 𝑊𝐻(𝜃) in their home 
country. Labor demand and the wage function are exogenously determined and identical for all 
individuals. To keep matters simple we assume a linear wage function such that 𝑊𝐻(𝜃) = 𝑤0𝐻 +
𝑤1𝐻𝜃 where 𝑤1𝐻 is the education premium which is time invariant. Individuals face an exponentially 
increasing human capital cost function 𝐶(𝜃) =  𝛾𝜃2 were 𝛾 > 1. Human capital is aquired instantly 
in the home country in period one and remains unchanged in period two. For ease of exposition we 
impose no restrictions on the total amount of human capital that can be accumulated. Also there is 
no capital market. The individual faces the following resource constraints in the first and second 
period, respectively: 
𝑐1 =  𝑊𝐻(𝜃)−  𝐶(𝜃) =  𝑤0𝐻 + 𝑤1𝐻𝜃 −  𝛾𝜃2      (2) 
𝑐2 =  𝑊𝐻(𝜃) = 𝑤0𝐻 +𝑤1𝐻𝜃        (3) 
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In addition to these standard elements we introduce a reference point dependent disutility 
following the discussion by Kogszegi and Rabin (2006), which is represented by 𝜓(𝜃). The individual 
will choose the education of a certain reference group 𝜃𝑅 that acts as a benchmark to evaluate her 
own household’s education level.8 This reference point or aspiration level of education will most 
likely be influenced by the environment the individual is exposed to, e.g. family, neighborhood, 
coworkers. This relates to the results by Mookherjee et al. (2010) who have argued that spatial 
segregation will lead to persistent reference points, i.e. aspirations traps. The individual will aspire to 
this reference point and experience increasing disutility the farther away she is from this benchmark. 
Let  𝜓(𝜃) =  (𝜃𝑅 − 𝜃)2. It is reasonable to assume that individuals mostly aspire to higher goals and 
therefore - if available - choose a higher reference group than their current educational level such 
that 𝜃𝑅 ≥ 𝜃. 
Before introducing migration, let us consider the optimal human capital investment in autarky. 
By substitution we find that the individual will maximize the following objective function: 
𝑈𝑑 ≡ 𝑈(𝑐1,𝜓(𝜃), 𝑐2)  =  𝑤0𝐻 +𝑤1𝐻𝜃 −  𝛾𝜃2 −  (𝜃𝑅 − 𝜃)2 +𝑤0𝐻 + 𝑤1𝐻𝜃    (4) 
Solving for 𝜃 we observe that the optimal autarky level of human capital 𝜃∗ is: 
𝜃∗ =  𝑤1
𝐻+𝜃𝑅
𝛾+1
          (5) 
In autarky human capital accumulation will be driven by the education premium 𝑤1𝐻, by the 
reference level 𝜃𝑅, and by the cost of education 𝛾. Now we allow for the possibility to migrate 
temporarily in the second period to work abroad. Assume that the probability to migrate 𝑝 is 
exogenous and applies equally to all individuals.  In the foreign country individuals can earn a wage 
𝑊𝐹(𝜃) where 𝑊𝐹(𝜃) = 𝑤0𝐹 + 𝑤1𝐹𝜃. Let the education premium in the foreign country be bigger 
than the education premium in the home country, i.e. 𝑤1𝐹 > 𝑤1𝐻. Migration will be costly such that 
migrants will earn 𝜅𝑊𝐹(𝜃) in the foreign country were 0 < 𝜅 ≤ 1 is a cost factor. The resource 
constraint in the second period will therefore take the following form: 
𝑐2 =  𝑝𝜅𝑊𝐹(𝜃) + (1 − 𝑝)𝑊𝐻(𝜃) = 𝑝𝜅[𝑤0𝐹 +𝑤1𝐹𝜃] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑤0𝐻 + 𝑤1𝐻𝜃]   (6) 
By substituting the second period consumption of equation (6) into equation (4) the objective 
function reads: 
𝑈(𝑐1,𝜓(𝜃), 𝑐2) = 𝑤0𝐻 + 𝑤1𝐻𝜃 − 𝛾𝜃2 − (𝜃𝑅 − 𝜃)2 + 𝑝𝜅[𝑤0𝐹 + 𝑤1𝐹𝜃] + (1 − 𝑝)[𝑤0𝐻 + 𝑤1𝐻𝜃](7) 
                                                          
8 One possible way of describing the evolution of 𝜃𝑅  could be 𝜃𝑅 = ∑ 𝜃𝑘
𝑁
𝑁
𝑘=1  were 𝑁 represents the total 
number of families in the neighborhood.  
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The optimal level of human capital 𝜃∗ given the probability to migrate 𝑝 thus becomes: 
𝜃∗ =  2�𝑤1
𝐻+𝜃𝑅�+𝑝�𝜅𝑤1𝐹−𝑤1𝐻�
2(𝛾+1)
        (8) 
Notice that the only difference between equations (5) and (8) is that the latter contains the 
probability weighted wage difference term (𝜅𝑤1𝐹 − 𝑤1𝐻). It is readily observable that a higher 
probability to migrate and/or a higher wage differential will increase the investments in education in 
the first period. Given that migrants are only temporarily permitted to work abroad each generation 
faces the same decision.  
In a dynastic migration setting the implications of the reference point 𝜃𝑅 become even more 
pronounced. Let the migration of the last generation only have an effect on two variables: the 
migration cost 𝜅 and the reference point 𝜃𝑅. To emphasize the intergenerational transmission of 
these two variables we will use the subscript 𝑑.  
First, migration might decrease the migration cost. This effect reflects the strong evidence 
regarding the importance of migrations networks (e.g. Munshi 2003). By introducing the indicator 
variable 𝑚𝑑 =  {0,1} - where 𝑚𝑑−1 =  1 if the last dynasty migrated and zero if not - we can write 
𝜅𝑑 = 𝜅𝑑−1 + 𝛼(1 − 𝜅𝑑−1)𝑚𝑑−1. Alpha (𝛼) is a deterministic indicator reflecting how much the 
migration experience reduces migration costs and is defined as 0 < 𝛼 < 1. Thus, if the probability of 
migration is non-zero (𝑝 > 0) and the last generation also migrated (𝑚𝑑−1 =  1) we would observe 
increased human capital investment compared to a scenario where there is no connection between 
dynasties. 
Second, the migration in the last generation could also raise the reference point the dynasty 
uses. This change could come about through either externalities in the labor market in the 
destination country due to the matching of the migrant with a certain sector or other market 
interactions, or through externalities in social surroundings, i.e. interactions with coworkers, friends 
or neighbors. Let 𝜆 represent the difference between the home and the foreign reference group such 
that 𝜆 =  𝜃𝑅𝐹 − 𝜃𝑅𝐻 ≥ 0. We can think of the link of the reference point between dynasties as: 
𝜃𝑑𝑅 = 𝜃𝑑−1𝑅 + 𝜆𝑚𝑑−1         (9)  
If the last generation has migrated (𝑚𝑑−1 =  1) and the migrants adopted a higher reference 
point (𝜆 > 0) then the aspired level of education 𝜃𝑑𝑅 will increase compared to migration without 
dynasties. It is important to note that in absence of the possibility to migrate or a positive wage 
differential for the second dynasty, migration could induce higher human capital investments. 
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The two questions we will address primarily in the empirical analysis are (a) whether the 
reference point matters for human capital investment, i.e. whether 𝜃∗ really depends on 𝜃𝑅 and (b) 
whether migration through 𝜆 really affects  𝜃𝑑𝑅. We will also briefly look at the migration aspirations 
caregivers have for their children. High migration aspirations of caregivers could be a indication of 
lower migration costs (𝜅𝑑), i.e. parents will try to facilitate and support the migration of their children 




To investigate the role and evolution of aspirations empirically we employ a unique household survey 
dataset that was collected in Moldova between October 2011 and February 2012. Moldova is an 
excellent environment to study the effects of migration on aspirations and education. After Moldova 
emerged from the Soviet Union it faced the transition problems also observed in other post-soviet 
countries. High unemployment and a stagnant economy in the late 1990s led to increasing 
emigration of Moldovans. Thus international migration is a relatively new socio-economic 
phenomenon in Moldova. However, only few states worldwide have a higher net migration rate than 
Moldova, among them Samoa and Tonga.9 This is also reflected in the high volume of official 
remittances which is about 24 percent of the Moldovan GDP. 
We conducted a survey to understand the effects of migration on “Children and Elderly Left 
Behind” (CELB). The survey was built as a national representative survey of households with children, 
elderly people and migrants using the National Labor Force Survey (LFS) as sampling frame. In line 
with the LFS the survey is a stratified random sample of 3539 households in 129 communities.10 The 
questionnaire consisted of four modules. The first module elicited basic household characteristics 
including the household composition, labor market activity and income. It also contained an 
extensive section on the international migration of household members. This migrant section 
allowed us to capture in detail the migration history of each household member since 1999. Based on 
this first module, caregivers of all children, children in the age range of 10 to 18 and all elderly people 
in the household were identified. In a second module all caregivers were interviewed about topics 
such as health, education and behavior of their children. We interviewed caregivers of 3594 children 
in 2082 different households. In a separate third module 1282 children between the age of 10 and 18 
were interviewed concerning similar topics. Due to the structure of our sampling strategy we only 
                                                          
9 Comparisons are made based on data in 2010 from World Development Indicators compiled by the World 
Bank. 
10 Since the LFS does not include Transnistria our sample is limited to households that are located in the West 
of the River Dniester. 
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cover cases in which migrants have left Moldova at some stage during the last 12 months while their 
child stayed behind.11  Additionally, we conducted a community questionnaire collecting information 
on general aspects such as education, health, infrastructure and labor markets in each community.  
Central for our analysis are the questions we asked the caregiver. Two specific questions 
focused on the aspirations and expectations caregivers had for their children. First we asked 
caregivers the following question: 
(1) “Imagine finances were not a problem and everything else went right, what is the highest level of 
formal education you WISH [CHILD] could complete?” 
As noted before the literature often does not go into detail when defining what constitutes 
aspirations: a change in the information set available or a change in the utility maximization 
reference point under perfect information. Since Moldova has very good media coverage as well as 
free education, we believe that our results capture a pure aspiration effect under perfect 
information. 
For the level of formal education we used a scale that resembles the International Standard 
Classification of Education (ISCED) designed by the UNESCO. In the following analysis we converted 
this ordinal classification of educational attainment into years of schooling.  In addition to these 
absolute aspirations we also elicited the level of expectations. This is important for two reasons. First 
it is a forward looking measure that characterizes and refines the parental mind set. Secondly it 
allows us to contrast the novel notion of aspirations with the traditional expectations and investigate 
possible differences and similarities. We asked caregivers the following question to measure their 
expectations: 
(2) “Consider your current financial situation and the child’s prospects. Using this card on which 0 
means impossible and 10 is certain, how likely is it that [CHILD] will complete this level of 
education?” 
This question aims at capturing the probabilistic expectations of parents. We choose this 
approach in line with the recommendations by Delavande et al. (2011) and Attanasio (2009). More 
specifically we presented the respondent the stylized image of a ladder with 10 steps, explained the 
concept of probability and made clear that the last step represents certain achievement of a set goal.  
To corroborate the parental aspirations we also asked children about their aspirations in 
separate interviews. The correlation between the two is 0.98, which suggests that the 
intergenerational transmission of aspirations is very strong. In the following we will concentrate on 
                                                          
11 Migration is defined as being abroad for at least 3 months during the last 12 months. 
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parental aspirations for two reasons. First, it is contested whether educational plans can actually be 
interpreted as long-term goals. For example Alexander and Cook (1979) showed that the mere 
expression of intent by children can be quite volatile over time. Second, parents do control the 
financial resources of the household. Their decisions will therefore have a larger impact on the 
allocation of resources as compared to the aspirations of children.  
To validate our aspiration measures we also included questions to measure the locus of control 
as done by Coleman and de Leire (2003) and Bernard et al. (2011). In our data this personality 
measure is as expected positively correlated with aspirations and expectations but has no 
significantly predictive value for aspirations or expectations after controlling for household and child 
characteristics. Cebi (2007) for example finds no effect of locus of control on human capital 
investments in the form of high school graduation. She underscores the assertion that the locus of 
control merely proxies the unobserved ability of children. To use the locus of control approach for 
our research would require us to neglect these conceptual difficulties and would force us to assume 
that locus of control and aspirations can be equated, which excludes the possibility to evaluate the 
difference between idealistic goals (aspirations) and realistic expectations. For these reasons we will 
refrain from using the locus of control measure in the subsequent analysis. 
For our analysis we define aspirations as the unconstrained goal parents set for their children 
(i.e. question 1) and expectations as the product of the aspired years of education (question 1) and 
the expected probability of achieving this goal (question 2). 
To evaluate how migration as an alternative to local employment is transmitted between 
generations we also included one question about migration aspirations in the questionnaire of the 
caregivers. We asked them: 
(3) Do you think it would be good for [CHILD] to live or work in a different country when [CHILD] 
finishes his/her formal education? 
About one in five of the caregivers answered this question affirmatively; they were also asked 
about the reason for giving this answer, which country they would their children like to go to and 
whether formal education was important to work in the particular destination country. The two main 
reasons they stated were the absence of job opportunities in Moldova and a better way of life 
abroad. Family reunions were only mentioned by roughly 2 percent of the caregivers as a reason. In 
line with the two major migration corridors of Moldova about 41 percent of the caregivers named 
Russia as the most preferable destination followed by 20 percent who wanted their children to go to 
Italy. Irrespective of the destination there was a broad consensus regarding the importance of formal 
Migration and Educational Aspirations 44 
 
 
education: 96 percent of the caregivers said that it would be an important requisite to work in the 
destination country.  
 
2.5. Empirical Identification Strategy 
 
Our goal is to find out if, as assumed in the conceptual framework, a causal relationship between 
migration and aspirations exists. The parsimonious structural equation we will use to test the 
hypothesis of Eq. (9) is:  
θij =  α + λM𝑖𝑗 + X𝑖𝑗′ β +  εij        (a) 
In this baseline specification 𝜃𝑖𝑗  is the observed aspiration, X𝑖𝑗  a vector of individual 
characteristics of the child 𝑖 in household 𝑗 and M𝑖𝑗 is the observed migration status of the household 
the child is living in. While we will concentrate primarily on educational aspirations, as suggested by 
our framework, we will also include expectations and migration aspirations in our analysis. The 
former will allow us to examine whether the concepts of aspirations and expectations differ. The 
latter enables us to test the presence of chain migration dynamics.  
Since none of our dependent variables is independent of migration (M𝑖𝑗) we cannot expect that 
𝐸�εij|M𝑖𝑗� = 0. Suppose we observe a household were two parents raise two children. We observe 
that one parent migrates to Italy and that the remaining caregiver has high educational aspirations 
for her children. The couple could have had high aspirations for their children before one of them 
migrated and choose to work abroad to overcome the credit constraints to fulfill these aspirations. 
They could also be very ambitious in general which let them choose the migration strategy but is 
reflected by high aspirations independently of this migration decision. Thus, because migrants are 
not randomly drawn from the population, OLS estimates could be severely upward biased if positive 
self-selection is present. However, if negative self-selection is the dominant migration pattern the 
OLS estimates could also underestimate the effect migration has on aspirations. To address this 
problem we employ an exogenous variable (Z) as an instrument for the migration status in a two-
stage least squares (2SLS) setup. The structural equation of our first stage is then: 
M𝑖𝑗 =  α + ϕZij + X𝑖𝑗′ β + ζij        (b) 
Following McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) and Antman (2011) we use as an instrumental variable 
the GDP per capita growth rate in each of the destination countries between 2004 and 2010 
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weighted by the size of the migrant network proxied by the number of migrants from the community 
who had migrated to the destination country by 2004. The instrument is based on the assumption 
the that higher GDP per capita growth the more likely are migrants to find employment and the 
higher are the wages, i.e. we emphasize the pull effects of economic growth at the destination. While 
there is no doubt that the change in GDP growth is completely exogenous to the conditions and 
characteristics of the household in Moldova it seems necessary to adjust the strength of this pull 
effect by the size of the migrant network at the time of the change. We regard the migration network 
as the information channel through which the exogenous shock operates. Migration networks 
proxied by current migrant stocks have also been used in a number of studies to capture the 
migration cost decreasing effect networks have as they improve the chances of employment and 
finding housing at the destination. Using the World Development Indicator data base we found that 
GDP per capita (in constant 2005 international $) grew on average 2.9 percent per annum in the 90 
countries the index is built from. The most prevalent migration destinations in 2004 were Russia, 
Italy, Romania, Ukraine and Portugal which consequently weight most heavily in the index. These five 
countries had an average growth rate of GDP per capita of 2.6 percent between 2004 and 20010. Our 
identifying assumption is that changes in economic growth represented by GDP per capita in the 
destination countries, weighted by the strength by which communities in Moldova were connected 
to these countries through migration networks in 2004, are predictive of current migration rates and 
only have an impact on current enrollment and educational aspirations through migration.  
In the context of Moldova there is – in addition to the issue of self-selection – the question of 
sorting. There are two major migration corridors that lead to the West, mainly Italy, due to lingual 
proximity of Romanian and Italian, and to the East, mainly Russia due to historic ties. Yet, it is not 
possible to use the GDP variation to estimate the effect of migration to one specific country since this 
instrument only represents an overall pull effect. Thus, we cannot disentangle the effect of going to 
Russia compared to migrating to Italy using only the GDP per capita growth rate. Nevertheless this 
difference is of crucial importance since Russia alone absorbs around 60 percent of Moldovan 
migrants in our sample. We therefore employ an additional second instrument: the presence of 
Soviet military personnel in each community before 1990. The assumption behind this binary variable 
is that the allocation of Soviet military in Moldova was independent of household characteristics and 
regional differences but that it was rather driven by strategic factors. Because Moldova as part of the 
Soviet Union constituted one of the border countries with the West it was considered strategically 
important. Additionally, because of the small size of Moldova Soviet military personnel was present 
in many communities. In about one quarter of the communities in our sample community leaders 
told us that Russian military personal was living or working in the community before 1990. The 
assumptions this instrument is based on are similar to those described in the case of migration 
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networks. Since soldiers became part of the local social network we expect their presence to 
decrease the migration cost to Russia for people living in these communities. Thus the presence of 
Russian military personnel before 1990 should only boost migration to Russia but have no effect on 
migration to the West. 
One threat to the validity of our instruments is the recent emergence of the migration networks. 
Since migration in Moldova only took off in the late 1990s we use relatively recent migration stocks 
as a proxy for the evolving networks. This bears the risk that our instruments do not only capture the 
network effect but also the current economic conditions of the region. We therefore include regional 
fixed effects and various household control variables. To ensure that we only capture the migration 
effects for one migration spell independent of the migration history we also tested the robustness of 
our findings by including a dummy variable that indicates if the household had migrants before 2011. 
This dummy did not alter our results qualitatively. A second problem is the non-linearity of the 
effects migration has on the households in the sending country. More specifically, parents would 
have to spend a longer time at the destination to update their priors about education, i.e. to 
decrease or increase their aspirations. Also from a financial perspective, migrants who leave the 
country for the first time will have to bear more costs than regular migrants which will decrease the 
amount of money remitted to their families. The observed effects of recent migration can therefore 




Table 2.1 reports the basic summary statistics. On average the household size is 4.9 and 2.1 children 
live in each household (see column 2). Out of all households with children 28 percent had a member 
who lived or worked abroad for at least 3 months in 2011. About one third of the migrants go to 
countries in Western Europe and two thirds migrate to the East, i.e. almost exclusively Russia (see 
column 4). On average about 60 percent of the migrants that leave for Western destinations are 
female. By contrast, migrants to the East are predominantly male (74 percent). We also observe a 
convergence of migrant skill levels for eastward and westward migrants (see Figure 2.1), which 
suggests that the positive selection of migrants who go to the West seems to have decreased since 
1999. Migrants are on average 34 years old and have 11.12 years of education at the mean. About 63 
percent of all migrants are married. It is mostly the husbands who leave their wife and children 
behind. However an increasing feminization of migration seems to take place as also women migrate 
in increasing numbers, mostly to the West. 
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Table 2.1 – Descriptive Statistics 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





    
all non-migrant (N=2584) 
migrant 
(N=1014) 
Panel A       
Households  Household size 3598 4.89 4.81 5.1 0.00 
 Number of Children 3598 2.12 2.16 2.01 0.00 
  Migrant household 3598 .28 - 1 - 
 West Migrant 3598 .10 - .35 - 
 East Migrant 3598 .19 - .68 - 
 HH Income in US$ 3201 3588.27 3180.77 4622.09 0.00 
 Remittances as share of Income 3201 .13 - .46 - 
  Educ. expenditure as share of Income 3201 .20 .22 .15 0.00 
 Below Poverty Line (2 Int. $) 3201 .03 .03 .02 .02 
 Urban (yes=1) 3598 .23 .26 .16 0.00 
Panel B       
Caregiver Age of Caregiver 3337 38.15 37.61 39.52 0.00 
  Gender of Caregiver (male =1) 3337 .10 .08 .16 0.00 
  Education in years 3333 11.01 11.03 10.95 .43 
  Educ. Aspirations in years 2860 15.41 15.36 15.53 .09 
  Educ. Expectations in years 2777 11.53 11.36 11.98 0.00 
  Migration Aspirations (yes=1) 3598 .20 .19 .21 .16 
Panel C       
Children Age 3598 9.84 9.75 10.05 .15 
  Gender (male=1) 3598 .51 .52 .51 .62 
 Enrolled (10 - 18 years) 1918 .90 .91 .88 .07 
 Enrolled (10 - 15 years) 1166 .98 .99 .98 .32 
  Enrolled (16 - 18 years) 752 .76 .77 .76 .77 
Note: Authors calculation based on households with children in CELB 2012. Answers “Don’t know” and “Refused to answer” excluded. 
 
Figure 2.1 – Self-Selection and the Education of Migrants 
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 Nearly half the migrants were unemployed before they left for the first time and most of them 
worked in agriculture and construction. Roughly 84 percent of the migrants come back at least once 
a year or go back and forth on a regular basis. While abroad, 85 percent communicate with 
household members at least once a week or more often. Thus, the connection between migrants and 
those left behind is by all means quite close. On average 63 percent of the migrants have a work 
permit for the destination country. In the destination countries the migrants work mostly in the 
construction sector or have individual household employers, i.e. sectors that are likely to have a low 
education premium. The remittances generated by these migrants make up about 46 percent of the 
total household income of migrant households in Moldova. This also explains the significant 
difference between total income of migrant and non-migrant households.12 
Caregivers are predominantly the biological parents of the children (87 percent). However, 
about 10 percent of the children live in so called gap-household structures where both biological 
parents have migrated and grandparents have taken on the role of caregivers. On average caregivers 
are 38 years old and have 11 years of schooling (see Panel B in Table 2.1). The significant difference 
in age of about two years between migrant and non-migrant caregivers is attributable to the gap-
households. There is no significant difference in the average years of schooling between caregivers in 
migrant and non-migrant households. We also looked at the education of migrants and caregivers 
and could not find any significant difference.  
Caregivers would like their children to complete on average 15.4 years of schooling (see Panel B 
in Table 2.1). When taking into consideration the constraints they face they expect their children to 
complete around 11.5 years of schooling which equals upper secondary. These means conceal that 
aspirations are actually concentrated around tertiary education (see Figure 2.2). Caregivers desire in 
53.15 percent of the cases a first stage tertiary degree for their children. Note that very few 
households in the total sample stated second tertiary education as their aspiration. Caregivers expect 
that their children will reach the set educational goal on average with a probability of 74.2 percent. 
When asked what the main reason for not reaching the set goal was, 9 out of 10 caregivers cited 
financial constraints. Caregivers in migrant households expect their children to complete a 
significantly higher number of years of formal education. This is confirmed by the visual comparison 
of the distribution of expectations of migrant and non-migrant households in Figure 3. Caregivers in 
migrant households tend to have a more optimistic attitude towards the realization of the 
educational aspirations of their children. However, the enrollment rates of children in all cohorts are 
                                                          
12 Total income comprises the personal income of all household members from compensation for labor, 
pensions, social insurance benefits, remittances and other transfers as well as the income of the household as a 
whole from the sale of agricultural production and livestock and social security benefits.  
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almost indistinguishable based on simple means testing (see Panel C in Table 2.1). The median 
expenditure per child is around 6 percent of the total household income.13 
Figure 2.2 – Distribution of Aspirations  
 
Figure 2.3 – Distribution of Expectations  
 
 
When asked about migration aspirations 20 percent of the caregivers stated that it would be 
good for their children to work or live abroad (see Panel B in Table 2.1). Since we also asked the 10-
18 year olds we were able to compare their answers with the point of view of their caregivers. The 
transmission of migration aspirations between children and parents is quite strong. After controlling 
for various individual and household characteristics we found that children were 53.5 percent more 
likely to state that they would like to migrate if their caregiver also told us so. 
2.7. Estimation Results 
 
Clearly, putting aspirations at the center of an economic analysis is only justified if it affects behavior. 
Before turning to the relationship of migration and aspirations, we therefore test this hypothesis by 
analyzing the correlations of aspirations and enrollment as well as the monetary expenditure of 
households for schooling. Because education is compulsory for 9 years from age 7 to 16 in Moldova 
we concentrate on the narrow age range of 16-18 which captures enrollment in the upper secondary 
level which is not compulsory since this education permits access to higher education. Unfortunately 
we cannot investigate the effects of aspirations on higher education directly since we only have 
cross-sectional data for children up to the age of 18 due to the structure of the survey. 
Table 2.2 contains the results of the estimations concerning the effect of aspirations on 
enrollment (columns 1-4). A one year increase in aspirations is associated with a 2.4 percent higher 
                                                          
13 Schooling expenditure per child comprises expenditures on schooling materials such as textbooks and 
uniforms as well as additional gifts to school teachers, transportation expenditures and the cost of 
supplemental tutoring. 
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probability of being enrolled in the age range of 16-18. Our expectations measure has a 
quantitatively less important impact on enrollment but is also significant at the one percent level 
while the aspiration to migrate has no effect on the enrollment of children aged 16-18. Two 
observations warrant attention. First, the education of the caregiver has a significantly positive effect 
on enrollment. Second, aspirations are not fully independent of caregiver education. Since the effect 
of aspirations on enrollment works slightly at the expense of other variables such as caregiver 
education, marital status and socio-economic status of parents we have to conclude that they are to 
some extent a mediator of parental education. On the other hand if they were a mere representation 
of parental education we should not observe any significant effect of parental education on 
educational investments after introducing the aspiration measure. To evaluate the robustness of our 
continuous aspiration and expectation variables we also included a dummy variable which equals 
unity if parents have educational aspirations lower than secondary education. Again this aspiration 
failure has throughout a significantly negative impact on enrollment rates (not reported in Table 2). 
Based on these results we therefore conclude that aspirations are partly independent of parental 
characteristics in the context of enrollment.  
Table 2.2 – Effect of Aspirations on Enrollment (age 16-18) and Schooling Expenditure 
  enrollment 16-18 – logit schooling expenditure – OLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ed. Aspirations in 
years 
 0.60***    272.38***   
 (0.10)    (42.95)   
Ed. Expectations in 
years 
  0.57***    154.93***  
  (0.09)    (34.65)  
Mig. Aspirations 
(yes=1) 
   -0.21    333.68* 
   (0.37)    (178.81) 
Age of Child in years 
-0.85*** -0.85*** -0.81*** -0.85*** 311.43*** 291.45*** 280.76*** 312.14*** 
(0.18) (0.20) (0.27) (0.18) (35.81) (38.02) (39.33) (35.87) 
Gender of Child 
(male=1) 
-0.74** -0.30 -1.10** -0.74** -129.04 55.89 -3.42 -135.19 
(0.35) (0.44) (0.48) (0.35) (117.53) (141.68) (134.40) (116.77) 
Education of 
Caregiver in years 
0.35*** 0.23** 0.17 0.34*** 118.54*** 64.40 66.43 118.66*** 
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (42.77) (47.15) (49.55) (42.91) 
Other children (yes=1) 
-0.11 -0.34 -0.59 -0.11 -266.21 -72.70 -117.90 -256.85 
(0.36) (0.47) (0.55) (0.37) (169.87) (182.38) (183.54) (167.89) 
Absolute Poverty 
(yes=1) 
-1.83*** -1.48** -1.31 -1.84*** -1,164.30*** -650.89 -762.09* -1,160.79*** 
(0.60) (0.59) (0.91) (0.61) (401.21) (428.73) (447.82) (399.79) 
Obs 472 406 467 472 1828 1685 1655 1828 
Adj. R²     0.22 0.25 0.24 0.22 
McFadden's R² 0.26 0.36 0.51 0.26     
District FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Authors calculation based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Controlling also for child health, school distance, subjective school quality, relationship with caregiver, marital status of parents, orphan and 
semi-orphan, ethnicity, household composition; Standard errors clustered at the household level. Grade level fixed effects included. 
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Our OLS estimates of the effect of aspirations on expenditure on schooling are displayed in 
columns 5-8 of Table 2.2. Again both aspirations and expectations matter greatly for the investment 
in the education of children. A one year increase in aspirations yields an average increase in 
schooling expenditure of about 7 percent per child per year. We also observe that migration 
aspirations have a significantly positive effect on schooling expenditures. If parents favor the future 
migration of their children the education expenditure increases by 10.6 percent over a baseline of 
mean effects of 3162 Moldovan Leu per child per year.  
Overall, this evidence highlights the importance of aspirations and expectations for the 
extensive and intensive margin of human capital accumulation. We can therefore not reject the 
hypothesis of the conceptual framework that 𝜃𝑅 increases human capital investments.  
Table 2.3 – The Effect of Migration (OLS) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Educational Aspirations Expectations Migration Aspirations 
Migration Total since 1999  0.38**   0.47**   0.27*  
   (0.17)   (0.21)   (0.14)  
Migration Total in 2011   0.44**   0.42**   0.05 
   (0.17)   (0.18)   (0.17) 
Age of Child in years 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.06*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender of Child (male=1) -0.78*** -0.77*** -0.77*** -1.05*** -1.04*** -1.04*** 0.15 0.15 0.15 
  (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Education of Caregiver  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.41*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Other children (yes=1) -0.34** -0.31** -0.30** -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.21* -0.19* -0.20* 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Absolute Poverty (yes=1) -1.04** -0.99* -1.04** -0.96* -0.90* -0.97* -0.14 -0.08 -0.14 
  (0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) (0.51) (0.49) (0.50) (0.49) 
Obs 1685 1685 1685 1655 1655 1655 1964 1964 1964 
McFadden's R² 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.08 0.08 0.08 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Authors calculation based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Controlling also for child health, school distance, subjective school quality, relationship with caregiver, marital status of parents, orphan and 
semi-orphan, ethnicity, household composition; Standard errors clustered at the household level. Grade level fixed effects included for educational 
Aspirations and Expectations. 
In Table 2.3 we report the OLS estimation results concerning the association between migration, 
aspirations and expectations. Throughout all specifications migration is associated with significantly 
higher levels of aspirations and expectations (see columns 1-6). We employ two different measures 
of migration experience. The first variable captures if any migration has taken place in a household 
since 1999, which is when large scale migration from Moldova to other countries started. We 
introduce this variable to find out whether accumulated migration experience is a confounding 
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factor. The reason is that first time migration is likely to be more costly then repeated migration and 
first time migration could also be insufficient to alter the migrant’s stance on education. Thus 
someone with 10 years of migration experience will make different contributions to the household 
than someone who left the country recently for the first time. Since we do not observe significant 
differences between the accumulated migration experience since 1999 and the current migration in 
2011 we do not have to be overly concerned about the non-linearity of migration effects. In columns 
6-9 we also relate the household’s migration status to the migration aspirations the caregivers have 
for their children. Here we observe that only in households with a long migration history caregivers 
seem to favor the migration of their children. This could be due to the before mentioned nonlinearity 
of migration effects.  
Table 2.4 – First Stage - The Migration Decision (Logit)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Current migrant 2011 
 All West East All West East 
GDPpc Growth 2004 0.25*** 0.48*** -0.04 0.35*** 0.50*** 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Migrant Stock in Italy 2004 -0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.01* 0.00 -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Migrant Stock in Russia 2004 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.02* -0.02** -0.04*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Military Base    0.35*** 0.21 0.42** 
    (0.13) (0.19) (0.17) 
Age Household Head -0.02*** -0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.00 -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education Household Head 0.05*** 0.12*** -0.01 0.05*** 0.12*** -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Household Size 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.34*** 0.40*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) 
Obs 2989 2989 2989 2437 2437 2437 
McFadden R² 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.15 
Wald Chi² 618.6 240.8 517.3 450.5 233.8 350.6 
 
Notes: Authors calculation based on all households in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; 
Controlling also for migration stocks in Romania and Ukraine and gender of household head. Standard errors clustered at the household level. 
Regional fixed effects included. 
 
Because estimating the causal effect of migration on an observable outcome is often 
problematic due to endogeneity we resort to an instrumental variable strategy as outlined before. 
Using the conventional Wu-Hausman F and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi² test (not reported) we 
have to accept the null that migration is an endogenous regressor. Table 2.4 shows the effects of our 
instruments in the first stage. As expected the average GDP growth in the destination countries 
between 2004 and 2010 increases the propensity to migrate in communities which have networks 
Migration and Educational Aspirations 53 
 
 
with these countries. A one unit increase of the growth in all destinations weighted by the stock of 
migrants in each destination increases the probability to migrate by 3.5-5 percent (see columns 1 and 
4). This effect is statistically significant and robust over all specifications except for migration to the 
East. We also observe a clear specialization of networks; communities that had migrants in Italy in 
2004 are less likely to witness migration to the East in 2011 while households in communities with 
strong migratory ties to the East in 2004 are less likely to migrate to the West in 2011. It is important 
to note that the former presence of Russian military personnel in the community increases the 
likelihood of migrating in 2011 to Russia by around 4.2 percent but has no effect on migration to the 
West. This allows us to instrument not only the migration decision of households but also the self-
sorting of migrants into Eastern and Western countries. Under our identification assumption, the 
strong effect of the exogenous GDP growth at the destination and the quasi-random presence of 
Russian military personnel in the community on migration allow us to test the causal effect of 
migration on aspirations.  
The corresponding IV estimates of migration effects are reported in Table 2.5. In column 1 the 
coefficient of migration is positive and statistically significant which points to a strong effect of 
migration on the educational aspirations of caregivers. Since the level of aspirations is capped at the 
post tertiary education the migration experience cannot shift the aspirations any further than 22 
years of education. Hence the effect of migration should be stronger for households with a low 
human capital endowment. In column (2) we interact our instrument with a dummy variable (LEduc) 
if the caregiver has less than 11 years of education. The threshold of 11 years represents the mean 
level of education of caregivers. We observe that the migration of household members in households 
with poorly educated caregivers has a significantly positive effect on the educational aspirations of 
caregivers while the overall effect of migration becomes indistinguishable from zero. One possible 
interpretation of this finding is that highly educated households already have aspirations for their 
children that are at the high end of our aspiration scale. Thus the migration experience cannot shift 
the aspirations any further up. On the other hand they also do not seem to decrease their 
aspirations. If highly educated migrants were not able to generate a wage premium from their 
education during their stay abroad they might be induced to consider education for their children as 
futile and reduce their aspirations. This is not the case. When we split the effect of migration by 
destination we see that the sign for eastward migration is positive and significant at the 5 percent 
level, while the sign for westward migration is positive but statistically insignificant (see column 3). 
This also reflects the negative selection of eastward migrants. In conclusion, households with a small 
endowment of human capital have a tendency to adjust the educational aspirations caregivers have 
for their children upwards due to the migration experience of the household members. Evoking the 
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notation of the framework this analysis is based on, we cannot reject the hypothesis that migration 
changes the aspiration of the household, i.e. 𝜆 > 0, which translates into an increase in 𝜃𝑑𝑅. 
Columns 4-6 of Table 2.5 contain the effect of migration on expectations. Our results indicate 
that caregivers become more confident about the educational attainment of their children. This may 
reflect the relaxation of the resource constraint of migrant households as a result of receiving 
remittances. Direct schooling cost and foregone earnings of the child due to continuing education 
appear less problematic which allows caregivers to be more optimistic and to expect higher 
educational attainment. It is interesting that only caregivers in households with migrants in the West 
have more positive expectations whereas living in a household with migrants in the East has no effect 
on the expectations of caregivers at any conventional significance level. We believe that this result 
reflects the different returns to migration. Westward migrants sent on average 16 percent more 
remittances than migrants in the East. This interpretation is in line with the hypothesis that the 
expectations are strongly driven by the resource constraint of the household. The strong difference 
between the effect of migration on educational aspirations and expectations also underline the 
different implications of these closely related measures.  
Table 2.5 – The Effect of Migration (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Educational Aspirations Expectations Migration Aspirations 
Mig_2011 3.24** 0.74  3.77** 2.68  0.40* 0.76***  
  (1.64) (2.05)  (1.73) (2.02)  (0.21) (0.25)  
Mig_2011*LEduc  4.70*   0.85   -0.68  
  (2.42)   (3.06)   (0.49)  
Mig_2011 West   1.98   6.62**   0.32 
   (2.01)   (2.98)   (0.25) 
Mig_2011 East   4.75**   0.78   0.57 
    (2.24)   (2.31)   (0.36) 
Obs 2503 2503 2503 2435 2435 2435 2926 2926 2926 
F-Statistic 20.18 18.05 15.91 21.77 23.69 18.01 7.472 5.691 6.388 
CDW F-Statistic 15.63 8.550 11.74 16.32 9.188 13.57 10.20 4.389 7.681 
Hanson J-Statistic 0.177 0.479 - 0.097 0.194 - 0.430 0.197 - 
 
Notes: Authors calculation based on households with children in CELB 2012. Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Controlling also for age and gender of child, caregiver and household characteristics, migration stocks in Italy, Russia, Ukraine and Romania. 
Standard errors clustered at the household level; Instruments are GDP per capita growth (2004-2010) and migration stocks (2004) in destination 
countries. Regional fixed effects included. 
 
Contrary to the OLS results regarding the effects of migration on migration aspirations (see 
Table 2.3) we find a significant increase in migration aspirations of caregivers living in households 
with migrants. The linear probability estimates in columns 7 to 9 of Table 5 suggest an increase in the 
likelihood of favoring the migration of their children. In the context of our conceptual framework we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that migration networks (𝜅𝑑) show self-reinforcing dynamics by 
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transmitting preferences for migration to the next generation of the household. This observation 
supports what has been called chain migration. 
At the bottom of Table 2.5 we also report the results of two tests to evaluate the validity and 
strength of our instruments. First, the results for the Hanson J reported in the last row of Table 2.5 
cannot reject the null that the excluded instruments are valid with one exception. Second, we use 
the Cragg-Donald F-statistic of the first-stage estimations to check the relevance of our instruments. 
We report these F-statistics and conclude based on a comparison with the reference values for weak 
instruments presented by Stock and Yogo (2002) that our instruments will allow us to infer the effect 
of migration on aspirations and expectations. However, we have to be cautious with the 
interpretation of our results regarding the effect of migration on migration aspirations due to 
possibly weak instruments. 
While both our OLS and 2SLS estimates point to the economically significant effects of migration 
we have to note the considerable differences in estimated coefficients. As noted before one 
explanation for the higher coefficients of the instrumented estimation effects compared to OLS could 
be negative self-selection of migrants. Yet, since from our descriptive statistics no clear picture 
regarding self-selection emerges we think a more plausible explanation for the higher 2SLS 
coefficients is the heterogeneity of the treatment effects. Our 2SLS estimates only represent a local 
average treatment effect since we cannot be sure that those responsive to our instrumentation, i.e. 
the GDP per capita growth at the destination, are representative of the overall population (see 
Angrist et al. 1996). Using a threshold of 0.5 our first stage correctly predicts 75 percent of the cases. 
The households which do not respond to the exogenous variation in GDP at the destinations but still 
migrate are concentrated in the north of the country and are mostly located at the border with the 
Ukraine or Romania. Migrants in these households are more likely to go to the East than those who 
comply with the variation of our instrument. However, these correlations do not reveal possible 
differences in unobservable characteristics such as the motivation to migrate and we are not able to 
identify the true subpopulation of compliers. We hypothesize that the non-compliers leave out of 
economic necessity, irrespective of the change of the situation at the destination, and do not 
consider the migration option as an opportunity. This pressure could lead them to reject the norms 
at the destination and thereby leave aspirations unaffected. Those who respond to the improving 
situation at the destination reflected by the change in GDP might be able to choose migration as a 
superior income source and are more receptive to influences at the destination.  
We have to acknowledge several potential caveats when interpreting our findings. As noted 
before it is difficult to disentangle the information and aspiration effect of migration. We believe our 
results reflect a pure aspiration effect, i.e. that migration changes the goal setting of households 
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under full information for two reasons: First, 91.6 percent of the households in our sample have a 
television and about one third of the households have a computer, i.e. people have the means to 
access information. Second, and more importantly, if migration was only an information channel 
previous village migration would have made pure information available before 2011. Since our 
estimations control for the migration stock in 2004 the access to information e.g. about available 
education premia abroad would have already been supplied by these migrant networks. 
Another drawback of our analysis is that we cannot observe the effect of remittances directly. 
This means that we cannot eliminate the possibility that the additional financial resources are 
responsible for the change in aspirations. Although we explicitly included a condition of “unlimited 
resources” in the question for aspirations, we cannot be sure that this phrasing was enough to 
visualize this situation. While this income effect is a serious issue our results suggest that it rather 
affects expectations than aspirations. If the observed effect was driven only by the decreased 
liquidity constraints due to remittances the effect of aspirations and expectations should show no 
differences. Yet, by comparing column 3 and 6 in Table 2.5 it becomes clear that migration to the 
East and to the West have significantly different effects on aspirations and expectations. While 
eastward migration changes aspirations, it has no effect on expectations. On the other hand 
westward migration has a strong impact only on expectations. We would argue that this difference 
reflects the different amounts of remittances received, with migrants in the west sending 
significantly more money, which allows households with migrants in the West to be more confident 
about the educational achievements of their children.   
Finally, the interpretation of our results with respect to a possible “Brain Gain” requires two 
qualifications. First, the cross-sectional nature of our data set does not allow us to observe the 
realization of the educational aspirations that constitute the core of our argument. Second, it must 
be acknowledged that the brain gain will only take place if not all children in migrant households 
leave the country, after realizing more education. In this respect we rely on the same assumption as 
contributions that argue in favor of the monetary incentive effects. 
 
2.8. Concluding Remarks  
 
In this essay we have argued that international migration affects human capital accumulation apart 
from relaxing the resource constraints of households through a change in the educational aspirations 
caregivers have for their children in the migrant sending households. By using a unique household 
survey dataset we were able to test this hypothesis. The different lines of evidence we have 
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presented converge on the conclusion that parental migration can change the educational trajectory 
of children in migrant households with low human capital endowment through an upward 
adjustment of educational aspirations. This suggests that migrants update their priors about the 
importance of education while abroad and transmit them to the caregivers of children in the sending 
country. Since we tested our hypothesis of the relationship between aspirations and migration in a 
country with high enrollment rates and a generally high level of formal education our results must be 
interpreted as the lower bound of the effect migration can have on aspirations. 
Overall, these findings suggest a new channel of brain gain as a result of international migration. 
While the current models are based on the premise that human capital investments will be increased 
by the opportunity to migrate we suggest that an increase in human capital could also be triggered 
by the positive externality migration has on educational aspirations. Our results imply that even a 
temporary migration spell could induce increased human capital investments. Thus, a brain gain 
could even take place if parents had the chance to migrate while children do not have this 
opportunity. 
Our results are also highly policy relevant in a broader context. Important determinants of 
human capital accumulation such as parental education are quite inflexible whereas aspirations react 
quite flexibly to new impulses. If intergenerational human capital transfer is regulated strongly by the 
aspiration levels of parents, public policy could increase overall human capital accumulation by 
implementing measures that shift the educational aspirations parents have for their children 
upwards. Such a policy would not only counter inequality but could also be more cost-effective than 
other policy measures since supply-side interventions in the education sector will have a low return 
on investment without  the necessary demand for education; more schools will not lead to an 
increased human capital stock without high educational aspiration of parents and children. 
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Abstract 
Employing a unique dataset that covers almost 6000 informal enterprises from six West African 
urban centers, this essay examines the backward and forward linkages of these enterprises to the 
formal sector. We first provide a descriptive analysis of the existing formal-informal linkages. It turns 
out that formal backward linkages are much more prevalent than formal forward linkages, and that 
linkages vary with the degree of informality, occurring less frequently if firms have no ties to the 
formal sector at all or low capital stocks. In the second step, we employ a Probit approach to identify 
major factors associated with the observed backward linkages. The Probit analysis corroborates the 
importance of the degree of informality for the existence of linkages and shows various enterprise 
characteristics to be significant determinants as well. Finally, we analyze whether backward linkages 
matter for enterprise performance using both OLS and IV estimations. We find a positive and robust 
impact of backward linkages, whereas the degree of informality of the enterprises in our sample 
seems to affect firm performance only indirectly through their linkages to the formal sector. 
Keywords: Informal sector, formal-informal linkages, enterprise performance, West Africa 
JEL codes: D22, D40, O17   




By far the largest part of urban employment in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is generated by informal 
enterprises. These enterprises often lack the financial means or the managerial and technological 
skills required to expand their activities. One way of overcoming these constraints is to establish links 
with the formal sector. As emphasized by Hirschmann (1958, 1977), the interdependence of 
economic actors plays an important role in the dynamics of economic development. More recently, 
Ciccone (2002) and Rodriguez-Clare (1996) have shown theoretically that economic growth and 
industrialization relies on deep vertical linkages. The exchange between different economic actors 
can take the form of fiscal, consumptive and productive linkages. While the informal sector is per 
definition characterized by the absence of fiscal linkages, it remains unclear how well informal 
enterprises are connected with the formal sector in terms of consumptive and productive linkages.  
Based on the dual economy literature (e.g. Lewis 1954, Todaro 1969), the urban informal sector 
was traditionally considered as the residual part of a segmented urban labor market, providing 
employment for the labor surplus that cannot be absorbed by the formal urban economy (e.g. Fields 
1975). A growing urban informal labor force competing in the same market would then exert 
downward pressure on informal sector earnings (Mazumdar 1976). Linkages via product markets 
were also assumed to be largely absent (Harriss 1990). The formal and informal sector were modeled 
as supplying similar goods but serving different markets at different prices and qualities, with 
markets segmented by purchasers’ income. According to this view, demand for informal products 
would predominantly come from poor informal customers (e.g. Fortin et al. 2000; La Porta and 
Shleifer 2011; Reilly et al. 2006), providing another reason for a weakly performing informal sector.   
More recently, the pure informal and the pure formal sector have been described as 
constituting extremes on a continuum of production relationships (Chen 2006), and an alternative 
view has been emerging which describes formal and informal product markets as inter-linked. This 
view is backed by a few empirical studies for SSA. Covering a sample of 13 Sub-Saharan African 
countries, Xaba et al. (2002) detect substantial inter-linkages in the final product market, with each 
sector being a strong supply as well as demand base of the other sector. Böhme and Thiele (2011) 
corroborate this finding for six West African capitals. As concerns intermediate demand, the available 
evidence is less conclusive. Hugon (1990) and Harriss (1990) point to an asymmetry, where the 
informal sector buys many of its inputs from the formal sector but purchases in the opposite 
direction are of little importance. By contrast, a case study for Burkina Faso by Grimm and Günther 
(2006) reveals only minor backward linkages between small informal production units and formal 
Informal-formal Linkages and Informal Enterprise Performance 60 
 
 
enterprises. In the same vein, De Paula and Scheinkman (2007) show that backward linkages of 
informal firms in Brazil tend to be directed towards the informal sector.  
This essay aims to broaden the evidence on the formal-informal backward and forward linkages 
in African product markets, extending the existing empirical literature in various ways. First, our 
analysis employs a unique set of internationally comparable data covering informal enterprises from 
the commercial capitals of six West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) member states. 
Second, we at least tentatively account for the observation that the informal sector is characterized 
by a high degree of heterogeneity. While previous research (e.g. Grimm et al. 2011) has shown that a 
split of the informal sector into a high-return, upper-tier and a low-return, lower-tier segment along 
the lines of Ranis and Stewart (1999) does not adequately capture this heterogeneity, we simply 
assume that linkages to the formal sector vary along the continuum of production relationships. 
Accordingly, we divide the sample of informal enterprises using (i) registration with official entities 
such as having a tax number, paying trade tax, being in the trade register and holding a trade 
certificate, and (ii) capital endowments as alternative categorization criteria. These two criteria are 
meant to depict the extent to which the informal enterprises are “formalized”. Third, while most of 
the previous literature has been descriptive, we additionally conduct regression analysis in order to 
identify possible correlates of the observed patterns of formal-informal linkages and to examine 
whether linkages help explain differences in enterprise performance. 
The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the dataset used in 
the empirical analysis and provides descriptive evidence on the linkages of the informal enterprises 
under consideration. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 present estimates of the main determinants of formal-
informal linkages and of their consequences for different indicators of enterprise performance, 
respectively. Section 3.5 summarizes our main results and draws some conclusions. 
 
3.2. Nature of backward and forward linkages 
a. Data and enterprise characteristics 
We use data provided by the “Enquêtes 1-2-3”. This survey was implemented between 2001 and 
2003 in seven economic capitals of the WAEMU and consisted of three integrated phases for a 
representative set of households (Amegashie et al. 2005). It intended to capture a detailed picture of 
the main characteristics of the informal sector in the seven cities. Using an identical survey 
methodology in all sites renders the information comparable across the urban centers of the sample. 
The employment section of this survey (phase one), which was conducted between 2001 and 2002 
with a sample size of 2500 households in each country (3000 in Cotonou), solicited information on 
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the enterprises that employed or were managed by household members older than 10 years. In 
identifying informal activities, the 1-2-3 surveys follow international statistical guidelines, which 
suggest that informal sector employment should be defined in terms of characteristics of the 
enterprise or production unit such as size and different legislative criteria (Hussmans 2004). 
Specifically, the 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as small production units that (a) do not 
have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered with the tax administration. 
For the second phase of the survey, a randomized sub-sample of approximately 1000 
enterprises in each country was drawn from the production units identified as informal in phase one 
(Brilleau et al. 2005). The focus of this phase was on characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their 
production units. It also contains information on input use, capital stocks, sales, profit as well as the 
unit’s forward and backward linkages and therefore provides the basis for the subsequent analysis. 
Since disaggregated data are not available for Niamey (Niger), we work with a total sample of 5785 
enterprises from Cotonou, Ouagadougou, Abidjan, Bamako, Dakar and Lomé. 
Based on Chen’s (2006) notion of a continuum of production relationships, we account for the 
heterogeneity of the informal sector by dividing it into different segments. First, we lump together 
those enterprises that have any kind of formal link with the public sector, calling them registered 
informal enterprises as opposed to unregistered informal enterprises. Specifically, we define 
registered units of production as those who hold a tax number, have an entry in the commercial 
register or pay business tax or some kind of license tax.14 The second approach we apply is to leave 
registration aside and to use the mean capital stock of the whole sample (240 000 CFA) as a 
threshold to divide the sample into low capital informal enterprises (<240 000 CFA) and high capital 
informal enterprises (>240 000 CFA).  
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the 5785 enterprises across the six cities and the sub-groups 
defined above. Applying registration or higher-than-average capital stocks as cut-off criteria leads to 
roughly the same size of the segments of the informal sector. The share of registered and high capital 
enterprises in the overall sample amounts to 18.5 and 17.2 percent, respectively. The most notable 
difference between the distributions implied by the two definitions occurs in the trade sector: while 
about 17 percent of the enterprises involved in trading activities are registered, less than 10 percent 
own a capital stock exceeding the average value of 240000 CFA. This reflects a general pattern of 
markedly lower capital endowments in the trade sector as compared to the industry and services 
sector.  
                                                          
14 Note that while these production units do not fulfill part (b) of the above definition of informality they still 
count as informal enterprises because part (a) applies to them. 
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Table 3.1 – Distribution of Sample 
  Industry Trade Services Total 
Benin - Cotonou 14.33 15.54 19.15 937 
Burkina Faso - Ouaga 19.35 16.92 13.89 974 
Côte d'Ivoire - Abidjan 15.32 16.74 19.98 996 
Mali - Bamako 19.56 16.46 14.89 985 
Sénégal - Dakar 18.04 18.02 15.72 1,004 
Togo - Lomé 13.39 16.32 16.37 889 
REGISTERED 16.74 17.06 22.46 1,072 
UNREGISTERED 83.26 82.94 77.54 4,713 
Low Capital 82.64 90.33 73.23 4,789 
High Capital 17.36 9.67 26.77 996 
Total 1,912 2,181 1,692 - 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
Taking a closer look at the sectoral distribution of informal activities (Table 3.2) reveals that 
petty trade is the predominant activity in the trade sector. This is particularly true at the lower end of 
the continuum. About 30 percent of all unregistered and low capital informal enterprises in the 
sample are classified as petty traders. Construction is another sector where these two groups are 
more strongly represented than registered and high capital enterprises. The latter, in turn, have a 
much higher probability of offering repair and transport services than the former. Overall, the 
sectoral pattern of activities across sub-groups turns out to be fairly similar for the two classifications 
we apply.   
 
Table 3.2 – Sectoral Distribution of UPIs 
 REG UNREG Low Capital High Capital Industry Trade Services 
Clothing and apparel 11.85 10.95 10.54 13.86 33.63 – – 
Other manufacturing 14.09 14.22 14.12 14.56 42.94 – – 
Construction 3.92 8.61 8.33 4.92 23.43 – – 
Wholesale/retail shops 19.78 8.47 10.19 12.35 – 28.01 – 
Petty trading 14.93 29.92 30.95 8.84 – 71.99 – 
Hotels and restaurants 6.06 7.09 6.89 6.93 – – 23.58 
Repair services 10.07 4.86 5.22 8.73 – – 19.92 
Transport 10.26 3.46 1.98 17.87 – – 16.13 
Other services 9.05 12.43 11.78 11.95 – – 40.37 
        
Total 1,072 4,713 4,789 996 1,912 2,181 1,692 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
Table 3.3 reports further characteristics of the different groups of informal enterprises. Starting 
with production factors, the number of employees is only moderately higher in the high 
capital/registered segment of the informal sector, whereas differences in capital stocks and the use 
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of electricity and telephones are much more pronounced. Enterprise owners were also asked if they 
were members of professional associations or received help from professional associations. 
Membership is generally low but more common among registered and high capital informal 
enterprises. Assistance is granted more frequently and only slightly biased in favor of these two 
groups. The last three rows of Table 3.3 display characteristics of the owners or managers of the 
enterprises. Most notably, registered and high capital enterprises are much less likely to be managed 
by women than unregistered and low capital enterprises, which is mainly driven by a very strong 
presence of women in petty trade. Furthermore, owners or managers of enterprises belonging to the 
upper end of the informal sector have more years of schooling and a somewhat higher age than their 
lower-end counterparts. Again, the pattern that emerges applies irrespective of whether enterprises 
are sorted with respect to capital stocks or registration. 
Table 3.3 – Characteristics of UPIs 
  REG UNREG Low Capital High Capital Industry Trade Services 
Age of Company in Years 10.81 9.72 9.95 9.81 10.47 9.73 9.55 
Capital in 1000CFA 692.15 139.46 37.36 1223.59 243.25 124.05 390.54 
Number of Employees 2.44 1.52 1.49 2.63 1.97 1.31 1.86 
Water 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.12 
Electricity 0.46 0.18 0.17 0.51 0.27 0.16 0.26 
Telephone 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.09 0.06 0.12 
Member of Association 0.13 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.05 
Support from Association 0.46 0.35 0.36 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.37 
Sales per worker 260.35 129.68 136.46 237.37 106.40 204.15 143.03 
Profit per worker 87.67 47.44 47.99 88.46 56.08 48.41 62.05 
Return to capital 343.00 490.28 567.01 22.71 367.45 632.88 363.48 
Asset turnover 10.23 13.51 15.86 0.68 7.18 23.78 6.53 
Sex (male = 1) 0.75 0.44 0.45 0.74 0.62 0.30 0.61 
Age 37.72 35.6 35.70 37.39 35.74 36.63 35.47 
Years of Schooling 4.84 3.71 3.57 5.60 3.97 3.27 4.69 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
A final aspect that substantiates our typology is the kind of business setup. Enterprises were 
asked about the locality of their activities. As can be seen from Table 3.4, more than 60 percent of 
registered and high capital informal businesses have either access to permanent business setups 
(permanent booths on markets, workshops, shops, or restaurants) or use vehicles. Unregistered and 
low capital enterprises, by contrast, most frequently work at home without equipment or as 
ambulant traders and street vendors. 
Taken together, the analysis so far has shown that our classification captures important aspects 
of the heterogeneity of the informal enterprises in the sample.  In the following, it will be used to test 
whether the segments of the informal sector differ with respect to their linkages to the formal 
sector. 
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Table 3.4 – Business Setup of UPIs 
 
REG UNREG Low Capital High Capital Industry Trade Services 
Ambulant 3.73 15.17 14.49 6.12 9.31 18.84 9.81 
Improvised booth on street 5.32 11.18 11.13 5.12 8.21 10.77 11.35 
Permanent booth on street 8.77 10.76 10.96 7.63 6.85 11.23 13.3 
Vehicle 5.22 1.27 0.33 10.04 0.1 0.18 6.5 
At customers‘ home 2.89 9.99 9.79 3.31 16 3.21 7.45 
At home without equip. 2.15 20.52 19.52 5.52 22.49 13.53 15.66 
At home with equip. 4.38 6.54 5.7 8.23 7.95 4.68 5.97 
Improvised booth on market 7.18 9.76 10.77 2.11 4.92 16.74 4.61 
Permanent booth on market 25.56 6.05 8.29 16.27 7.58 12.93 7.8 
Workshop, shop, restaurant 33.3 7.89 8.14 34.04 16.16 6.97 15.84 
Other 1.4 0.87 0.86 1.51 0.42 0.87 1.71 
        
Total 1,072 4,713 4789 996 1,912 2,181 1,692 
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
b. Linkages 
Following Hirschmann (1958), we differentiate consumption and production linkages. While the 
former only concerns sales to final demand, the latter can be split up into forward and backward 
linkages. Forward linkages refer to the use of an enterprise’s output as an input in other productive 
activities, while backward linkages comprise the enterprise’s purchases of intermediate inputs. Our 
analysis focuses on the existence rather than the size or the share of specific linkages. The reason is 
that only 168 enterprises have both formal and informal backward linkages and only 16 have both 
formal and informal forward linkages, which would render a comparison of shares meaningless. 
The questionnaire gathered detailed information about the inputs and outputs of all enterprises 
with respect to the type of services or products involved as well as their destination and origin. 
Possible destinations and origins include the public sector, big private enterprises, small enterprises, 
households, imports and exports. This allows us to define the formal sector as being represented by 
the public sector and big enterprises and the informal sector as being composed of small enterprises. 
Additionally, we use the type of service or product purchased by the enterprises to define the sector 
they maintain backward linkages with. In doing so, we distinguish four different sectors: agriculture, 
industry, trade and services. As concerns forward linkages, the data does not allow us to determine 
the destination sector given that the type of product sold only characterizes the production unit 
itself. Even though we can differentiate exports and imports, it is important to recognize that out of 
the 5785 enterprises only 60 report imports and 13 report exports. 
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The use of informal enterprises’ output is clearly dominated by final demand, i.e. sales to 
households. Only 683 enterprises do not sell any of their goods or services to households. As shown 
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the share of sales directed towards final demand generally exceeds 80 percent. 
The only exceptions are trade-related activities by registered enterprises (Table 3.5) and by high 
capital informal enterprises (Table 3.6). Mostly as wholesalers, these enterprises cater more strongly 
to other enterprises, in particular small ones in the informal sector.  
The structure of formal-informal linkages exhibits two interesting regularities. First, even for 
registered and high capital informal enterprises, sales to the formal sector are less important than 
those to the informal sector. Second, with a share of slightly above 2 percent, the formal sector plays 
a negligible role as a buyer of goods and services from unregistered and low capital informal 
enterprises, which is in accordance with Ranis and Stewart’s (1999) assumption that enterprises 
belonging to the lower tier of the informal sector have no production links with the formal sector. As 
shown in the lower panels of Table 3.5, respectively, the formal forward linkages of these enterprises 
in the industrial and trade sector are significantly lower than those of their registered and high 
capital counterparts. The most important formal forward linkage (with a share of 7.5 percent) exists 
for registered enterprises towards the industrial sector (Table 3.5). This may at least partly reflect 
subcontracting agreements with large domestic firms and the government.15 
According to the self-stated business perspectives of the entrepreneurs contained in the 
questionnaire, the dominance of consumption linkages over (formal) forward linkages tends to be 
viewed as a constraint for informal enterprises. While finding customers in general is viewed as a 
problem by the majority of the informal enterprises in the sample (more than 60 percent), a sizeable 
minority emphasizes the specific importance of forward links to big enterprises. In the industrial 
sector, the share of entrepreneurs who stress that formalization would allow them to sell to big 
enterprises (15 percent) is almost as large as the share of entrepreneurs who point to the availability 
of credit as the main advantage of formalization (19 percent). 
 
  
                                                          
15 In a case study for Nigeria, Arimah (2001) shows that subcontracting accounts for a substantial share of 
existing forward linkages.   
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Table 3.5 – Forward Linkages of UPIs, Registered vs Unregistered  








 FOR INF HH EXP N 
Registered      
 IND 7.53 8.44 82.47 0.31 320 
 TRA 3.38 18.02 77.79 0.27 372 
 SER 2.82 9.58 86.10 0.45 380 
 ALL 4.42 12.17 82.13 0.35 1072 
Unregistered      
 IND 2.82 9.60 86.77 0.25 1592 
 TRA 1.22 9.93 88.29 0.06 1809 
 SER 3.71 7.38 88.00 0.23 1312 
 ALL 2.45 9.11 87.70 0.17 4713 
        
 Pr(|T|>|t|)      
  IND 0.00 0.50 0.04 0.84  
  TRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22  
  SER 0.39 0.15 0.31 0.46  
  ALL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23  
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
Table 3.6 – Forward Linkages of UPIs, Low Capital Informal vs High Capital Informal  








 FOR INF HH EXP N 
Informal– 
low capital      
 IND 
2.97 9.48 86.65 0.20 1580 
 TRA 
1.43 10.41 87.50 0.10 1970 
 SER 
2.90 7.67 88.64 0.14 1239 
 ALL 
2.32 9.39 87.52 0.14 4789 
Informal – 
high cpital      
 IND 
6.58 9.06 83.22 0.54 332 
 TRA 
3.07 19.80 77.13 0.00 211 
 SER 
5.16 7.43 84.65 0.66 453 
 ALL 
5.19 11.05 82.58 0.48 996 
        
 Pr(|T|>|t|)      
  IND 
0.00 0.81 0.92 0.26 
 
  TRA 
0.06 0.00 0.00 0.64 
 
  SER 
0.21 0.60 0.02 0.06 
 
  ALL 
0.00 0.10 0.00 0.03 
 
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
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Table 3.7 – Backward Linkages of UPIs, Registered vs Unregistered 
   FROM (SECTOR) …  






  IND SER IND SER  N 
Registered        
 IND 1.77 8.81 2.69 52.37 9.36 0.00 320 
 TRA 8.58 13.20 7.74 26.53 24.64 5.38 372 
 SER 3.62 7.30 4.93 24.15 12.10 0.26 380 
 ALL 4.79 11.19 5.24 33.40 15.63 1.96 1072 
Unregistered        
 IND 5.28 3.57 1.16 39.43 11.14 0.22 1592 
 TRA 23.58 8.54 3.32 36.44 16.47 1.70 1809 
 SER 8.33 3.25 1.91 25.53 9.31 0.08 1312 
 ALL 13.16 5.39 2.20 34.41 12.68 0.75 4713 
          
 Pr(|T|>|t|)        
  IND 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.34 0.38  
  TRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
  SER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.10 0.35  
  ALL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.01 0.00  
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
Table 3.8 – Backward Linkages of UPIs, Low Capital Informal vs High Capital Informal 
   FROM (SECTOR) …  






  IND SER IND SER  N 
Informal –  
low capital        
 IND 
5.26 3.08 1.30 40.29 11.19 0.22 1580 
 TRA 
22.34 9.09 3.11 35.04 18.35 1.76 1970 
 SER 
8.64 2.53 1.86 27.25 10.15 0.08 1239 
 ALL 
13.16 5.41 2.19 34.76 13.87 0.82 4789 
Informal –  
high capital        
 IND 
2.01 10.98 1.95 47.84 9.21 0.00 332 
 TRA 
8.76 18.69 13.04 32.00 13.28 7.58 211 
 SER 
3.51 8.61 4.57 19.66 9.35 0.22 453 
 ALL 
4.12 11.54 5.49 31.67 10.13 1.71 996 
          
 Pr(|T|>|t|)        
  IND 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.01 0.28 0.37  
  TRA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.06 0.00  
  SER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.61 0.46  
  ALL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01  
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 survey. 
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When comparing the backward linkages shown in Tables 3.5 to 3.8 to the forward linkages, it 
turns out that informal enterprises are much more likely to buy intermediate goods and services 
from the formal sector than vice versa, which corroborates the notion of an asymmetric formal-
informal relationship in intermediate product markets (Hugon 1990). The frequency of formal 
backward linkages is by far highest in the trade sector. About 19 percent of the high capital trading 
companies in our sample, for instance, purchase goods from the formal industrial sector (Table 3.8).  
The pattern of backward linkages is in several respects similar to that of forward linkages. Again, 
linkages to the informal sector are considerably more frequent than linkages to the formal sector for 
all sub-groups of enterprises, and again formal linkages are of minor significance for unregistered and 
low capital informal enterprises. The latter is particularly pronounced for purchases of formal 
services, which only account for around 2 percent of overall expenditures. Irrespective of how we 
define them, informal enterprises at the higher end of the continuum are more than twice as likely as 
those at the lower end to buy goods and services originating from the formal sector, the difference 
being significant at the one percent level for purchases from the industrial, trade and services sector 
alike (Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Unregistered and low capital informal enterprises, and especially the 
traders among them, have fairly strong backward linkages to the agricultural sector, from which they 
mainly buy food items. 
3.3. Correlates of backward linkages 
Based on the descriptive statistics presented above, we construct a simple Probit model to 
investigate whether it is possible to identify some of the major factors associated with the choice of 
informal enterprises to enter formal-informal linkages.16 In doing so, we focus on backward linkages 
which in our descriptive analysis above have been shown to be quantitatively much more important 
than forward linkages. We distinguish six different types of correlates: 
(i) Primary production factors (capital stocks, employees), infrastructure (electricity, 
telephone), and credit. The expectation is that enterprises with higher endowments are 
in a better position to establish formal linkages. 
(ii) Experience as measured by the age of the enterprise. The expectation is that it takes 
time to build up business relationships. 
(iii) Characteristics of the owner/manager of the enterprise (age, schooling, sex). We expect 
that male as well as older and more educated owners are more likely to establish formal 
linkages. 
                                                          
16 Since consumptive linkages, i.e. final demand, allow no formal-informal categorization we exclude them from 
the analysis in the following sections. 
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(iv) Membership of or help from professional associations. Contact with associations may 
facilitate networking and thereby raise the likelihood of formal business relationships. 
(v) Dummies indicating whether the enterprise is registered or has higher-than-average 
capital. The evidence in Tables 3.5 to 3.8 clearly suggests that registered and high capital 
enterprises exhibit stronger formal backward linkages. 
(vi) Dummies indicating whether a formal forward linkage exists. This is to test whether an 
enterprise with formal forward linkages is more likely to engage in formal backward 
linkages. 
In addition to these control variables, the estimations include a set of country and industry dummies. 
Table 3.9 – Correlates of Backward Linkages, Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Formal Backward Linkage 
  
 



























logVAL 0.0035*** 0.0027** 0.0012 0.0028** 0.0013 
totalemployees 0.0104*** 0.0084*** 0.0079*** 0.0077*** 0.0073*** 
credit 0.0328* 0.0324* 0.0308* 0.0299* 0.0285* 
sex 0.0650*** 0.0583*** 0.0605*** 0.0564*** 0.0585*** 
age 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
scol 0.0047*** 0.0045*** 0.0043*** 0.0041*** 0.0039*** 
firmage -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0013** -0.0014** -0.0014** 
telephone 0.0474*** 0.0416** 0.0419** 0.0366** 0.0368** 
association -0.0109 -0.0179 -0.0117 -0.0157 -0.0096 
support 0.0059 0.0040 0.0054 0.0045 0.0058 
Obs 5717 5717 5717 5717 5717 
χ ² 337.03 349.88 345.84 358.18 356.28 
 
Notes: The dependent variable equals one if the enterprise has formal backward linkages. Included country and sector dummies are not reported. 
Coefficients are reported as marginal effects. Figures in parenthesis are cluster robust standard error; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Authors’ 
estimations based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
The results of the Probit analysis are reported in Table 3.9. We start with a baseline specification 
that only includes enterprise characteristics as explanatory variables (column 1). It turns out that 
several of these characteristics are statistically significant and have the expected sign. Backward 
linkages to the formal sector are more likely to exist for enterprises with a higher number of 
employees as well as better access to credit and telephone services, and where the owner is male 
and has more years of schooling. The existence of backward linkages to the formal sector is also 
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positively related to the size of the capital stock. For two other firm characteristics, expectations are 
not corroborated by the empirical evidence: a higher age of the enterprise as well as membership in 
(or help from) professional associations are not associated with more frequent linkages to the formal 
sector. Membership in associations rather appears to be favorable for the establishment of informal 
forward linkages, suggesting that networks may be more easily built among similar firms.17  
In the next two regressions, we additionally include the registration dummy (column 2) and the 
lower-than-average capital dummy (column 3). The dummies (UNREG and LOWCAP) are both 
significant at the one percent level, suggesting that the probability of engaging with the formal sector 
is higher for registered and high capital informal enterprises. The impact of all other control variables 
remains the same as before, with one exception: when entering the regression jointly with the high 
capital dummy, the capital stock variable is still positive but turns insignificant as the former captures 
part of its impact. Finally, as indicated by the respective dummy variable, which is significant at the 
one percent level, formal forward and backward linkages are positively associated with each other. 
By contrast, our regression results do not point to a similar relationship between informal forward 
linkages and formal backward linkages. 
3.4. Backward linkages and enterprise performance 
Having established that formal backward linkages are correlated with various enterprise 
characteristics and that their existence varies with the different classifications of informal 
enterprises, we now examine whether the linkages matter for enterprise performance. There has 
been extensive theoretical work on the question of whether inputs should be produced by the firm 
itself or whether they should be procured by independent suppliers (e.g. Williamson 1971). Market 
failures and the associated transaction costs bring about internalization, i.e. the decision to produce 
inputs that could be provided more efficiently by suppliers in the absence of transaction costs. 
Focusing on vertical linkages, Lall (1980) and Mead (1984) argue that this internalization can lead to 
lower productivity because independent suppliers would benefit from economies of scale for a 
particular intermediate good and because the internalization limits the gains from specialization. In 
addition, if enterprises are not able to procure intermediate goods from an independent supplier and 
lack the physical or human capital to produce the goods themselves, they will be restricted in their 
ability to introduce innovations to their production. More generally, it can be assumed that linkages 
facilitate the dispersion of technical innovation. Based on these considerations we expect backward 
                                                          
17 Results for informal linkages are not shown here given that our focus is on the links of informal enterprises 
with the formal sector, but they are available from the authors on request.  
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linkages and especially formal backward linkages to exert a positive influence on the productivity of 
enterprises in the informal sector.  
When estimating the effects of backward linkages on firm performance, the main problem that 
may arise is endogeneity (e.g. Griliches and Maitresse 1995). First, it is very likely that linkages and 
other potential right-hand-side variables such as primary inputs are determined simultaneously. 
Second, it is not clear a priori whether an exceptional performance would allow firms to engage in 
the formal intermediate input market or whether it rather is improved access to formal supply 
channels that would trigger higher performance. Hence, reverse causality could also be a serious 
issue.  
Before turning to a strategy of how to deal with endogeneity, we first present OLS regressions as 
a baseline. Our performance indicators are sales per worker and profit per worker. We also employ 
return on capital as a proxy for profitability and asset turnover as a proxy for the degree of activity of 
the informal enterprises, defining the return on capital as the ratio of profit to capital and asset 
turnover as the ratio of sales to capital. As shown in Table 3.3 above, all indicators differ markedly 
between the different categories. Registered and high capital informal enterprises tend to have 
higher sales per worker and also generate higher profits per worker compared to their counterparts. 
Their returns to capital are lower and they turn less of their capital over. Control variables include the 
same enterprise characteristics as before as well as the registration and high capital dummy, the 
latter being employed alternatively.   
The OLS results are reported in Table 3.10. The most important finding is the significantly 
positive effect of formal backward linkages on all indicators under consideration. Even though there 
are few enterprises in the sample with imports we find that these import linkages also tend to be 
associated with higher performance. Most of the enterprise characteristics (capital, employment, 
firm age, sex and schooling of the owner, telephones, membership of associations in the full sample) 
are significant and have the expected sign. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no robust positive effect 
of credit availability on firm performance and in some cases even a negative impact of professional 
support from associations. The latter may well reflect reverse causality in the sense that 
underperforming firms are more likely to be eligible for professional support. Finally, there is 
evidence that the degree of informality is important for the performance of enterprises. While the 
registration dummy is always negative and significant at least at the 5 percent level (Table 3.10), a 
low capital endowment is shown to decrease sales per worker and profit per worker but to have no 
discernable impact on return on capital and asset turnover. 
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Table 3.10 – Effects of Linkages on UPI Performance, OLS  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PERFORMANCE PROFITABILITY ACTIVITY RATIO 
 log sales per worker log profit per worker log return on capital log asset turnover 
         
formBACKW 0.75*** 0.76*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 
informBACKW 0.25*** 0.27*** -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
IMP 1.13*** 1.17*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.57** 0.59** 1.12*** 1.16*** 
UNREG -0.34***  -0.15***  -0.13**  -0.27***  
LOWCAP  -0.30***  -0.20***  0.04  0.05 
logVAL 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.87*** -0.85*** -0.83*** -0.81*** 
totalemployees -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 
credit 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.08 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.19*** 0.18*** 
sex 0.32*** 0.35*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 
age 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00* 0.00* 
scol 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01** 0.01** 
firmage 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
telephone 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 
association 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.20* 0.22** 0.16** 0.22*** 
support -0.08** -0.07* -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10** -0.06* -0.05 
Observations 5717 5717 5317 5317 4649 4649 4983 4983 
R² 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.64 0.64 0.69 0.69 
 
Notes: Included country and sector dummies are not reported. Figures in parenthesis are cluster robust standard error; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Authors’ estimations based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
While being suggestive, the OLS estimates are likely to be biased: the Durban-Wu-Hausman test 
points to the endogeneity of formal backward linkages in almost all specifications. As an attempt to 
overcome the endogeneity problem, we depart from the theoretical argument made by Hirschmann 
(1977) that firms will only engage in backward linkages if markets exist to which they can sell their 
products, reflecting a demand-led growth perspective. Accordingly, we assume that forward linkages 
come logically before backward linkages. Furthermore, firms in the informal sector consider a lack of 
demand from big enterprises in the formal sector as one of their major constraints. This leads us to 
use the existence of formal forward and export linkages as instrumental variables for incurring formal 
backward linkages.  
Causality could also run from backward to forward linkages, or both could be jointly determined 
by third factors, which would render the theory-based instrument invalid. We therefore employ the 
informal share of a given sector of origin as a second instrument to evaluate the robustness of our 
findings. The underlying idea is that the bigger the informal share the less likely it is that (informal) 
enterprises will have formal linkages to this sector. The first phase of the 1-2-3 survey asked 
household members about their employment status as well as the sector, size and legal status of the 
company they worked for. This allowed us to derive the informal share of the sectors listed in Table 
Informal-formal Linkages and Informal Enterprise Performance 73 
 
 
3.2 for each city in the survey.18 Since the second phase of the questionnaire comprises a random 
sub-sample of the first phase we can be confident that the calculated shares are not systematically 
biased and that they serve as exogenous instruments.  
The fact that our theory-based instrumental variables are binary would call for a local average 
treatment approach (Imbens and Angrist 1994). Yet, given that this Maximum Likelihood method 
does not allow us to assess the quality of the instruments we opt for a 2SLS approach instead.19 The 
2SLS is less efficient but consistent in the present setting (Wooldridge 2002). A disadvantage of the 
2SLS procedure is that the size of the coefficients of the fitted values in the second stage cannot be 
interpreted in a meaningful way. Hence, we have to rely on the sign and the statistical significance of 
the coefficients when comparing IV and OLS estimates.  
As for the quality of our instruments, we have already shown in Table 3.9 that formal forward 
linkages are closely related to the formal backward linkages of informal enterprises. As a formal test 
of the strength of the instruments we report the Cragg-Donald F-statistics. Their critical value for the 
present IV estimations is 7.25 for the theory-based instrument and 5.53 for the informal sector share 
instrument according to Stock and Yogo (2002). Both instruments appear to be strong in the two 
performance equations, whereas values of the Cragg-Donald test are close to the thresholds in the 
profitability and activity equation. Furthermore, we test the orthogonality assumption of the 2SLS 
approach, employing the standard Sargan statistic of overidentifying restrictions. This can only be 
done for the theory-based instruments as there is only one informal sector share instrument. Results 
are mixed: in half of the cases the null of endogeneity is clearly rejected, pointing to the validity of 




                                                          
18 Since company size is only reported on a scale with non-linear intervals, the calculated shares are not valid 
point estimates. Nevertheless, they do represent the relative size of the informal sector in each city. 
19 Our overall results are not affected by this choice as they point in the same direction under a local average 
treatment approach. The results of the local average treatment regressions are available from the authors 
upon request.  
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Table 3.11 – Effects of Linkages on UPI Performance, IV Using Forward Linkages as Instrument 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PERFORMANCE PROFITABILITY ACTIVITY RATIO 
 









formBACKW 6.34*** 6.42*** 6.91*** 6.94*** 7.09** 7.14** 5.62*** 5.73*** 
UNREG 0.01  0.24  0.14  -0.05  
LOWCAP  0.10  0.20  0.22  0.24* 
logVAL 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02** -0.97*** -0.95*** -0.91*** -0.87*** 
totalemployees -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
credit -0.00 -0.00 -0.31 -0.30 -0.42* -0.42* -0.08 -0.09 
sex -0.00 -0.00 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13 -0.09 -0.09 
age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
scol -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
firmage 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
telephone 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.16 
association 0.42*** 0.43*** 0.41** 0.37** 0.39* 0.37* 0.37** 0.39** 
support -0.08 -0.09 -0.11 -0.11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
Observations 5717 5717 5317 5317 4649 4649 4983 4983 
F-statistic 26.34 25.25 23.38 23.05 109.06 107.93 190.33 184.37 
CD F-statistic 9.62 9.25 10.47 10.08 6.01 5.99 6.80 6.68 
Sargan p-value 0.05 0.06 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.41 0.04 0.04 
 
Notes: Included country and sector dummies are not reported. Figures in parenthesis are cluster robust standard error; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Authors’ estimations based on 1-2-3 survey. 
 
Table 3.12 – Effects of Linkages on UPI Performance, IV Using Informal Market Share as Instrument 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
PERFORMANCE PROFITABILITY ACTIVITY RATIO 
 









formBACKW 9.71*** 10.00*** 5.94** 5.87** 3.37 3.56 8.15** 8.49** 










logVAL 0.02 0.03* 0.02** 0.03*** -0.91*** -0.90*** -0.95*** -0.91*** 
totalemployees -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
credit -0.18 -0.19 -0.25 -0.25 -0.19 -0.20 -0.23 -0.25 
sex -0.16 -0.18 0.25* 0.24 0.29*** 0.28*** -0.18 -0.21 
age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
scol -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 
firmage 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
telephone -0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.04 
association 0.53** 0.51** 0.39** 0.36** 0.28** 0.29** 0.47** 0.47** 
support -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 
Observations 5717 5717 5317 5317 4649 4649 4983 4983 
F-statistic 12.69 11.77 26.02 25.82 264.29 252.42 103.86 96.29 
CD F-statistic 8.767 8.524 9.216 8.643 5.684 6.353 6.221 7.210 
 
Notes: Included country and sector dummies are not reported. Figures in parenthesis are cluster robust standard error; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Authors’ estimations based on 1-2-3 survey.  
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The IV results are displayed in Table 3.11 for the theory-based instrument and in Table 3.12 for 
the informal sector share instrument. In accordance with our OLS results, we find that - irrespective 
of the instrumentation strategy - formal backward linkages have a positive and significant impact on 
the performance, profitability and activity variables. The only exception is the profitability equation 
in Table 10, where the respective coefficient is only marginally significant but still positive. The 
negative effect of being unregistered and having a lower-than average capital stock we found in the 
OLS estimations vanishes in most cases. This suggests that the degree of informality of the 
enterprises in our sample mainly affects firm performance through their linkages to the formal 
sector. By contrast, several other control variables (capital stocks, employees, firm age, and 
membership in associations) retain their independent impact on most of the indicators under the IV 
specification.  
3.5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Along the lines of Hirschmann’s linkage methodology, this essay has analyzed to what extent 
informal enterprises in six West African urban centers are engaged with the formal sector. We have 
shown that formal-informal linkages do exist, that backward linkages to the formal sector are much 
more prevalent than forward linkages, and that linkages vary with the degree of informality, 
occurring less frequently if firms are unregistered or have low capital stocks.  Another important 
finding is that various measures of firm performance are strongly improved by the existence of 
formal backward linkages, whereas the degree of informality of the enterprises seems to affect firm 
performance only indirectly through their linkages to the formal sector. 
Taken together these results lead us to conclude that the pessimistic view on the prospects of 
the informal sector implied by standard dual economy models is not justified. Yet, it has to be 
recognized that the unregistered and low-capital enterprises of our sample are rather weakly 
integrated with the formal sector, which in turn impairs their development prospects. These 
enterprises are most likely in need of public support, be it in the form of microcredit, investments in 
infrastructure or legal reforms that facilitate transactions among firms. 
As concerns future research, the important role that linkages play according to our findings 
would call for a more detailed analysis of how business relationships between enterprises come 
about and are sustained. Such an analysis could, for example, build on the growing literature on 
social networks in developing countries, or it could take a closer look at the spatial distribution of 
formal and informal activities. A deeper knowledge of the conditions under which formal-informal 
linkages are successfully established might enable governments to provide support that more 
effectively removes existing bottlenecks.  
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Abstract 
Employing a unique dataset that covers households from six West African capitals, this essay 
provides new evidence on the demand for informal sector products and services. We first investigate 
whether demand linkages exist between formal and informal products and distribution channels. In a 
second step, we estimate demand elasticities based on Engel curves. We find strong demand-side 
linkages between the formal and informal sector, with the exception that informal goods are hardly 
bought through formal distribution channels. The estimated demand elasticities tend to show that 
rising incomes are associated with a lower propensity to consume informal sector goods and to use 
informal distribution channels.  
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In urban Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), formal employment covered by labor legislation and social 
protection schemes is the exception rather than the rule. By far the largest part of urban 
employment is generated by micro and small enterprises, and (self-) employment in those 
enterprises can be considered informal by almost any definition one might want to apply. The 
informal sector is characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity comprising both low and high 
return activities. If markets fail to equalize returns, this can imply substantial welfare losses where 
poor urban households are prevented from escaping the lower tier of informal employment. Among 
the constraints that may bring about persistent differentials in returns, supply side factors such as 
capital market failures and entry barriers have received considerable attention in the literature (e.g. 
de Mel et al. 2008; Grimm et al. 2011).   
It has been less well recognized that the evolution of the informal sector is also shaped by the 
demand side, in particular by the structure of final demand as well as linkages to the formal sector. 
The literature on the structure of demand has mainly been descriptive. It has not only distinguished 
informal and formal products and services, but also formal and informal customers or households, 
typically identified by the (main) sector of occupation of the household head (formal or informal). A 
core proposition of this literature has been that informal and formal products will often have an 
overlapping customer base (Sethuraman 1997). Such overlaps may reflect complementary or 
competitive product markets. The most common example of a complementary market occurs when 
the informal sector sells formal sector products. In competitive markets, the two sectors compete 
within the same product market, and the informal sector may for example retain market shares by 
charging lower prices. The rather limited evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa tends to confirm the notion 
of an overlapping customer base. Covering a sample of 13 Sub-Saharan African countries, Xaba et al. 
(2002) find rather strong inter-linkages in the final product market, with each sector being a strong 
supply as well as demand base of the other sector. Similar results are obtained by Grimm and 
Günther (2006) for the case of Burkina Faso. 
By contrast, Fortin et al. (2000) suggest various reasons why working in the informal sector will 
raise the probability of buying products in the informal market, thereby limiting the demand overlap. 
For instance, those working in the informal sector may have an informational advantage about how 
and where to obtain informal goods and services. In accordance with this reasoning, Livingstone 
(1991) finds that in Kenya informal goods target mainly low-income consumers, while Reilly et al. 
(2006) obtain an inverse relationship between purchases from informal markets and income. For a 
sample of 24 African countries, La Porta and Shleifer (2011) show that informal firms mostly sell to 
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informal clients for cash, which they attribute to differences in quality between formal and informal 
firms.  
Of crucial importance for the economic prospects of informal entrepreneurs is the elasticity of 
demand for their products, which in turn depends on the strength of formal-informal linkages. Again, 
evidence on this issue is scarce. The only exception in the African context is Lachaud (1990) who 
shows that rising wages lead to a lower propensity to consume informal sector goods. In a similar 
vein, D'Haese and Van Huylenbroeck (2005) find evidence that supermarkets create fierce 
competition with local agricultural sales in South Africa. With rising income households tend to 
purchase their goods at supermarkets because they are able to offer a broader variety and a higher 
quality at lower prices. Even though D'Haese and Van Huylenbroeck do not address the informal 
sector directly it can be assumed that local agricultural sales are often informal. 
This essay aims to broaden the evidence on the characteristics of demand for informal sector 
products and services in Africa. We extend the literature in various ways. First, by using fully 
comparable data for a sample of six West African countries, we provide a comprehensive set of 
demand elasticities based on Engel curves. Second, in contrast to previous papers, our dataset allows 
us to consider imported goods in addition to domestically produced formal and informal goods, and 
to account for informal and formal distribution channels. Hence, we are able to categorize goods 
along two dimensions – their origin (formal, informal, imported) and their point of sale. For example, 
a good such as industrial bread, which is produced by the formal sector, may either be sold formally 
in a supermarket or informally by a market hawker. Third, we address methodological challenges 
such as the potential endogeneity of income and the nonlinearity of Engel curves. This has been done 
before (e.g. Gibson 2002; Kedir and Girma 2007), but not in the context of the informal sector. 
The overall objective of the essay is to investigate the extent to which the informal sector is 
constrained from the demand side in the sense that the demand for informal goods and distribution 
channels is income-inelastic. In combination with supply side factors such as credit constraints, 
inelastic demand would severely limit the prospects of those working in the informal sector. If 
informal goods are mainly bought by poor informal households via informal distribution channels, 
due to lower information costs or quality differences, one would expect low demand elasticities 
throughout. If, by contrast, formal-informal linkages play a significant role, for instance because 
formal customers value certain characteristics of the informal sector such as higher flexibility in 
terms of longer opening hours, the picture could be much more nuanced, with certain segments of 
the informal sector benefiting from strong demand by richer households who earn their income in 
the formal sector. 
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The remainder of the essay is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the dataset employed 
in the empirical analysis and presents descriptive evidence on whether there are demand-side 
linkages between the formal and informal sector. Section 4.3 derives some hypotheses concerning 
the demand elasticities and describes the Engel curve methodology, while Section 4.4 discusses the 
estimated elasticities. Section 4.5 summarizes our main results and provides some concluding 
remarks. 
 
4.2. Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
The Dataset 
We use data provided by the “Enquêtes 1-2-3”. This survey was carried out between 2001 and 
2003 in seven economic capitals of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). It 
consisted of three integrated phases for a representative set of households. The first phase of the 
survey was constructed as a general labor force survey, interviewing formal and informal workers 
and entrepreneurs. It provides detailed information about individual socio-demographic 
characteristics and employment. In identifying informal activities, the 1-2-3 surveys follow 
international statistical guidelines, which suggest that informal sector employment should be defined 
in terms of characteristics of the enterprise or production unit such as size and different legislative 
criteria (Hussmans 2004).  Specifically, the 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as small 
production units that (a) do not have written formal accounts and/or (b) are not registered with the 
tax administration.  
The second phase of the survey interviewed a sub-sample of the informal production units 
identified in phase one. The focus of this phase was on characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their 
production units. It also contains information on input use, investment, sales, profit as well as the 
unit’s forward and backward linkages.  
The third phase, on which the subsequent analysis will mainly rely, collected data on household 
expenditure including the point of sale. Expenditures were recorded based on a classification of 315 
different products and services. The technique of registration varied according to the periodicity of 
the purchase. While food expenditures were registered on a daily basis for 15 days, for other types of 
expenditure such as clothing, housing, health, transport and education a retrospective module was 
used. All expenditure aggregates are recorded at the household level, annualized and given in local 
currency units. A two-stage random sample design was applied based on an updated general 
population census of each country (Amegashie et al. 2005). Area codes were used as the primary 
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sampling unit, of which 125 were selected for each city. Households were the secondary sampling 
unit, of which 20 (24 in Benin) were drawn from each primary unit. Data was then collected for each 
household member. The 4200 households included in phase three constitute a representative 
subsample drawn from the 15300 households of phase one.  
The data collected in phase one permitted an additional stratification based on income and 
sector of activity of the household head in phase three. This constitutes one major advantage of 
using the integrated 1-2-3 survey, because it allows us to distinguish formal and informal households 
and thus to test whether these two groups differ in their demand patterns as suggested by Fortin et 
al. (2000). A further strength of the 1-2-3-surveys is that they used exactly the same questionnaire 
and were conducted more or less simultaneously in the seven economic capitals of the WAEMU, 
rendering the datasets fully comparable. Finally, being coordinated by AFRISTAT and DIAL and 
financially supported by the European Commission, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
World Bank, the surveys were elevated into the status of official data, which should add to the 
credibility of the results based on them. 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of selected socio-demographic household characteristics for 
the six West African capitals under consideration.  Most interestingly in the context of this essay, 
between 40 percent and 60 percent of the household heads receive their primary income from 
informal sector activities, classifying the respective households as informal. The share is lowest in 
Dakar, the capital of Senegal, the richest country in the sample. The primary wage income of informal 
households is on average roughly 70 percent of the income of formal households. At the country 
level, informal households have throughout less income than formal households; this difference is 
significant (except for Mali) but varies in size across countries. 
The other major household characteristics listed in Table 1 also exhibit a considerable degree of 
variation across countries. Average household size, for instance, is by far highest in Dakar due to a 
strikingly large number of adult members.20 The mainly Christian capitals of Togo and Benin are 
characterized by high rates of primary school completion among household heads and a rather high 
share of female-headed households, whereas the opposite is true for the mainly Muslim capitals of 




                                                          
20 The large number of adults may partly reflect polygamy. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to 
this possible explanation. 
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Category coastal sahel sahel sahel coastal coastal 
                
Mean number of household members             
  Infants (<6) 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 
  Children (6-15) 0.7 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 0.7 
  Adults (>15) 3.0 4.0 3.6 3.9 6.1 3.0 
Mean age of household head 42.5 43.2 43.8 44.5 50.5 39.6 
Sex of household head (male=1) 72.9% 87.0% 88.6% 86.3% 73.0% 72.1% 
Completed primary education of household head 
(%) 
83.9% 54.2% 53.1% 48.0% 58.7% 83.3% 
Primary wage income source is public sector (%) 12.6% 19.0%% 13.1% 18.9% 13.4% 10.9% 
Primary wage income source is private sector (%) 75.4% 71.7% 77.6% 68.0% 75.1% 79.9% 
Household head earns primary income in the 
informal sector (%) 
54.1% 46.8% 50.1% 47.1% 38.2% 61.3% 
Observations 573 936 956 575 567 569 
              
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys. 
 
Structure of Demand 
To analyze the structure of demand for goods and services, we aggregate annual expenditures in 
two different ways. First, we apply a conventional sectoral classification, where expenditures are 
allocated to eleven different categories.21 This classification has the advantage that it can directly be 
matched with the survey information and closely resembles what has been done in previous studies, 
allowing a comparison of our results. This has to be weighed against one important disadvantage, 
namely that the sectors only roughly correspond with the distinction between formal and informal 
goods we are interested in. One can argue, for instance, that Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 
includes mainly informal products, whereas Transportation and Communication supplies mainly 
formal goods and services, but at the same time one has to acknowledge that within categories there 
are notable exceptions such as informal taxi services.  
Second, we distinguish four types of expenditures: on domestically produced formal goods, 
domestically produced informal goods, imported goods and services. In principle, this option is 
                                                          
21 These categories are:  (1) Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages, (2) Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, (3) 
Clothing and Shoes, (4) Housing, (5) Gas, Electricity and Water, (6) Furniture and Household Maintenance, (7) 
Health and Education, (8) Transport and Communication, (9) Leisure and Culture, (10) Hotels and Restaurants 
and (11) Diverse Goods and Services. 
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superior to the sectoral classification as it directly captures the distinction between formal and 
informal goods. However, the households in the survey were not asked whether they bought any 
specific product from the formal or informal sector. The best available alternative was to use certain 
characteristics of the products that households purchase to sort them into the two different 
categories. Specifically, agricultural, artisan and traditional products were assumed to be produced 
informally, whereas capital intensive, technologically advanced and industrial products were 
assumed to be produced formally. The first category mainly comprises food products such as 
traditionally made bread, while the second category consists mainly of electricity, fuel, construction 
materials, household articles, clothing and footwear, as well as certain food products such as 
industrially produced bread or canned meat. With this procedure, we cannot rule out that specific 
products are sorted into the wrong categories, but are confident that the aggregates constitute a 
meaningful representation of informal and formal goods. Still, findings based on this categorization 
have to be interpreted cautiously.   
In contrast to domestic formal and informal goods, demand for imports and services can readily 
be identified from the survey. Households can with an acceptable margin of error name the country 
of origin of goods purchased due to the packing and labeling. One central characteristic of services is 
the quasi-concurrence of production and purchase. Hence, knowing the distribution channel is 
sufficient to distinguish between formal and informal services. The questionnaire asked consumers 
about the location of their purchases such as explicitly formal enterprises, supermarkets and the 
public sector, which are assumed to be formal points of sale, and household production, mobile 
traders and public markets, which are assumed to be informal points of sale. This allows us to 
distinguish purchases via formal and informal distribution channels for each of the demand 
categories defined above.  
As can be seen in Table 4.2, food products and non-alcoholic beverages account for roughly 30 
percent of annual household expenditures throughout the sample. If non-frequent purchases are 
excluded, i.e. only monthly expenditures are used this share rises to over 70 percent for all West 
African capitals. Housing and Transport and Communication constitute the next-biggest positions, 
accounting for 10-18 percent and 10-16 percent of total expenditures respectively. The structure of 
demand does not seem to vary in a systematic way across the sample countries. We do, for example, 
not find higher shares of food expenditures in poorer countries such as Mali and Niger than in richer 
countries such as Senegal and Benin. While one might argue that this finding works against Engel’s 
law, our interpretation is that even the richer countries in the sample are still too poor to exhibit 
significantly lower food expenditure shares. 
 





















                  
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 29.0 29.6 35.0 36.2 36.4 33.4 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 1.7 2.9 0.5 1.1 0.8 1.8 
Clothing and Shoes 6.1 6.6 7.2 7.1 5.2 8.5 
Housing  14.4 11.2 15.9 13.2 17.8 9.8 
Gas, Electricity and Water 6.9 6.7 9.6 7.6 8.3 5.4 
Furniture and Household Maintenance 3.8 4.6 5.3 5.7 6.0 4.4 
Health and Education 8.5 9.4 5.3 5.7 6.4 7.9 
Transport and Communication 14.7 16.3 13.5 12.4 9.8 10.8 
Leisure and Culture 3.1 3.8 1.7 2.7 2.9 2.5 
Hotels and Restaurants 7.0 4.9 1.7 4.6 2.2 9.3 
Diverse Goods and Services 4.8 4.0 4.3 3.6 4.1 6.2 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys.  
 
This interpretation is also in accordance with our within-country finding that the expenditure 
share of food and non-alcoholic beverages even rises slightly from the first to the second income 
quintile and only then starts to drop in accordance with Engel’s law (Table 4.3).22 In all countries, 
expenditure shares tend to fall across quintiles for Housing23 as well as Hotels and Restaurants, while 
they tend to rise substantially for Health and Education as well as Transport and Communication. 
From Table 4.4 it appears that the informal sector is the dominant point of sale.24 The only 
notable exception is Health and Education where services are almost exclusively distributed through 
formal channels. For Gas, Electricity and Water and Transport and Communication we see a rather 
balanced relationship between formal and informal expenditure shares. Households turn to the 
formal sector for purchases of capital intensive products such as private vehicles and for the use of 
public transportation, and to the informal sector for rather inexpensive transportation-related goods 
such as bicycles and spare parts. In the food and beverages sector, formal outlets such as 
supermarkets appear to be virtually non-existent. 
                                                          
22 For Togo, we find no evidence pointing to an Engel curve. 
23 Housing expenditures include imputed rents for owner-occupied housing. 
24 The results of Table 4.4 remain comparable or become even more pronounced when we focus on the 
frequency of purchases. 
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Table 4.3 – Average Annual Household Expenditure Shares by Sector and Quintile (percent) 
 
Country Benin - Cotonou Burkina Faso - Ouaga Mali - Bamako 
Quintile (Total Expenditure) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
      
               
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 34.7 34.8 33.6 31.9 26.6 37.6 40.7 37.2 34.5 24.1 39.7 43.3 41.5 38.2 29.7 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 4.5 3.2 3.3 3.7 4.4 7.6 4.6 5.2 5.5 4.7 4.6 3.8 2.2 1.4 1.6 
Clothing and Shoes 6.9 7.2 7.3 7.1 6.5 6.9 6.6 7.0 7.0 7.7 7.6 6.9 8.5 8.2 8.5 
Housing  19.5 13.8 12.0 13.0 13.7 15.9 12.6 11.7 11.5 11.1 27.1 20.3 18.0 17.6 12.7 
Gas, Electricity and Water 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.4 6.2 6.5 6.7 7.5 7.1 6.8 6.0 6.3 7.7 9.4 12.0 
Furniture and Household Maintenance 3.4 4.0 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.1 3.6 3.7 4.2 5.7 4.2 4.7 4.5 5.5 7.3 
Health and Education 4.4 5.9 8.4 8.5 10.6 5.8 7.0 8.6 9.6 10.7 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.7 6.9 
Transport and Communication 9.2 10.5 10.3 11.9 17.1 6.7 8.4 9.7 11.7 19.9 8.3 10.0 10.2 10.9 16.5 
Leisure and Culture 3.3 2.8 3.1 3.8 4.0 3.1 2.8 3.8 3.9 4.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.5 2.3 
Hotels and Restaurants 12.2 9.3 9.4 7.5 5.7 14.6 8.2 6.7 5.9 3.6 11.8 6.1 3.6 4.5 2.7 
Divers Goods and Services 4.9 5.5 5.5 4.6 4.4 4.3 3.8 3.8 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.4 4.6 5.0 








(Table 4.3 continued) 
Country Niger - Niamey Senegal - Dakar Togo - Lomé 
Quintile (Total Expenditure) 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
        
 
     
  
     
   
 
 Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 41.3 48.9 44.9 40.6 29.9 40.1 43.3 42.3 40.1 30.0 28.7 33.2 34.7 33.1 29.9 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 7.3 3.7 4.2 2.2 3.4 4.4 1.2 2.9 1.7 1.4 6.9 6.6 4.0 4.8 4.0 
Clothing and Shoes 5.9 6.8 8.1 8.4 7.9 5.5 5.6 5.2 5.1 6.0 7.6 7.6 9.1 8.7 9.5 
Housing  19.2 14.4 13.8 13.6 12.6 18.1 19.0 20.3 17.8 16.9 17.4 12.6 10.8 9.6 8.3 
Gas, Electricity and Water 8.5 7.5 6.1 7.6 8.4 10.2 9.4 9.6 8.6 7.5 5.9 5.7 4.8 5.9 5.6 
Furniture and Household Maintenance 3.9 4.6 6.1 5.6 7.2 5.3 4.4 5.4 5.9 7.2 4.5 4.3 3.8 4.2 5.0 
Health and Education 3.5 3.4 4.9 5.4 7.1 3.6 4.6 4.7 5.7 8.8 5.3 5.9 7.3 7.0 10.2 
Transport and Communication 6.1 5.8 5.8 7.8 16.8 5.3 4.7 4.7 7.6 13.8 9.4 7.9 8.7 10.0 13.4 
Leisure and Culture 2.1 1.8 2.5 2.9 3.6 2.3 2.9 2.4 2.6 3.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 3.3 
Hotels and Restaurants 13.6 7.0 7.3 6.8 4.0 10.8 6.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 13.2 13.1 11.0 10.2 7.7 
Divers Goods and Services 3.8 3.4 4.4 4.0 4.2 4.0 4.2 3.8 4.8 4.3 7.5 6.2 6.9 7.2 5.8 
                                 
 
Note: Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys. 
  




Table 4.4 – National Annual Household Expenditure Shares by Sector and Distribution Channel (percent) 
 
Country Benin - Cotonou Burkina Faso - Ouaga Mali - Bamako Niger - Niamey Senegal - Dakar Togo - Lomé 
Distribution Channel formal informal formal informal formal informal Formal informal formal informal formal informal 
                              
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 2.0 27.0 1.1 28.5 0.4 34.5 0.5 35.8 1.0 35.4 0.3 33.0 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 0.2 1.5 0.1 2.7 0.0 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.1 1.8 
Clothing and Shoes 1.4 4.7 0.8 5.8 1.0 6.2 1.1 6.1 0.9 4.3 0.2 8.3 
Housing  0.5 13.9 0.7 10.5 0.9 15.0 0.4 12.8 1.7 16.0 0.1 9.7 
Gas, Electricity and Water 4.0 2.9 4.3 2.4 6.0 3.6 4.3 3.3 5.0 3.3 3.0 2.4 
Furniture and Household Maintenance 0.8 3.1 0.5 4.1 0.4 4.9 0.6 5.1 0.7 5.3 0.2 4.3 
Health and Education 7.6 0.9 7.7 1.7 3.7 1.6 4.5 1.3 5.3 1.1 6.3 1.5 
Transport and Communication 6.4 8.3 8.3 8.0 5.4 8.0 6.7 5.7 6.5 3.4 3.0 7.8 
Leisure and Culture 1.4 1.7 1.3 2.5 0.4 1.3 0.8 1.9 1.3 1.6 1.0 1.5 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.5 6.5 0.4 4.5 0.2 1.5 0.6 4.0 0.4 1.9 0.4 8.9 
Divers Goods and Services 1.0 3.7 0.6 3.5 0.7 3.5 0.6 3.0 0.8 3.3 0.4 5.8 
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Turning to the classification by expenditure categories, a clear pattern emerges where the 
informal distribution channel predominates for all four types of expenditures (Table 4.5). This is most 
obviously the case for informal goods, which are hardly ever sold via formal distribution channels. 
Comparing the six capitals, demand for formal goods is found to be highest in Dakar, but even there 
the bulk of products are distributed informally. Overall, formal-informal demand relationships do not 
appear to vary systematically with income per capita. For example, the demand share for informal 
goods is lower in the poorest country, Niger (15 percent), than in the richest country, Senegal (18 
percent). This lack of a clear relationship may reflect that cross-country differences in per capita 
income are not sufficiently pronounced. Strikingly, Togo has the lowest expenditure shares on both 
formal goods and goods distributed via formal distribution channels and at the same time exhibits by 
far the worst governance indicators among the countries under consideration. Import shares vary 
considerably across countries, ranging from 15 percent in Dakar to 38 percent in Niamey. Around 30 
percent of all imported goods in Cotonou, Ouagadougou and Bamako are produced in other (mainly 
neighboring) African countries, while this figure is substantially higher in Niamey (46 percent) and 
substantially lower in Dakar (9 percent).  
 
















Budget share formal goods             
   Formal distribution channel 4.3 5.5 7.2 4.5 8.3 0.4 
   Informal distribution channel 9.5 11.9 15.1 9.3 22.2 7.2 
 Budget share informal goods             
   Formal distribution channel 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.1 
   Informal distribution channel 17.1 17.3 25.5 15.0 17.7 21.7 
 Budget share imported goods             
  Formal distribution channel 10.0 10.1 5.2 6.7 4.1 8.8 
  Informal distribution channel 18.3 21.9 16.5 31.6 11.3 24.5 
 Budget share services             
  Formal distribution channel 10.7 9.5 6.4 8.6 10.7 6.1 
  Informal distribution channel 29.4 23.2 23.7 24.1 25.1 31.3 
 
Note: For each country, budget shares sum up to 100 percent; Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys.   
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Table 4.6 reveals that expenditures by informal households as defined above are by no means 
restricted to informal goods and informal distribution channels. In Cotonou, for example, these 
households account for more than a third of total expenditures on formally distributed formal goods 
(36.8 percent) and formally distributed imports (34.6 percent). Irrespective of product category, 
distribution channel and city, their expenditure share is in no case lower than 20 percent. Conversely, 
the fact that the expenditure share of informal households in no case exceeds 60 percent implies 
that formal households are important buyers of informal goods and goods distributed through 
informal channels, which points to a strong overlapping customer base. 
Overall, this section has shown that significant formal-informal linkages exist in the six West 
African capitals. They may well be strong enough to affect the pattern of estimated demand 
elasticities, to which we will turn in the next section, in a way that eludes the notion of a simple 
formal-informal sector dichotomy.  
 
Table 4.6 – National Shares of Informal Households in Overall Expenditures (percent) 











Togo - Lomé 
 
Goods             
  Formal goods 
          Formal distribution channel 36.8 24.1 31.0 48.1 26.2 35.5 
    Informal distribution channel 50.0 39.7 43.7 50.5 34.6 56.3 
  Informal goods 
      
    Formal distribution channel 27.0 37.4 24.3 56.2 33.8 55.4 
    Informal distribution channel 49.6 42.1 46.1 49.1 35.2 57.5 
  Imported goods 
      
    Formal distribution channel 34.6 24.3 31.5 35.2 24.5 48.0 
    Informal distribution channel 48.5 38.2 41.8 51.8 34.5 56.7 
Services 
      
       Formal distribution channel 36.0 24.8 34.3 43.2 20.8 48.6 
       Informal distribution channel 35.5 26.9 28.3 37.1 18.4 48.4 
Note: Informal Households are defined as those for whom the informal sector is the primary income source. From each cell, expenditure shares of 
formal households can be calculated as 100 percent minus the expenditure share of informal households. The expenditure share of formal 
households on formal goods distributed through formal distribution channels in Benin, for example, is 100 - 36.8 = 63.2; Authors’ calculation 
based on 1-2-3 Surveys.  
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4.3. Estimation of Engel Curves 
 
Hypotheses 
While demand estimation is often primarily concerned with quantities, consumers also face a quality 
choice (Deaton 1988, Blundell and Stoker 2005). Consequently the observed expenditure patterns 
will be conditioned by price, quantity and quality of the available products. Merella (2006) has shown 
that Engel Curves depend on the assumption of constant quality. With increasing quality of a product 
the marginal utility of this same product would not decline. Based on this assumption the author 
asserts that increasing income will first affect the quantity of products bought and only thereafter 
the shift between products due to quality differences. More generally, poor households will be 
concerned primarily with subsistence and therefore quantity while rich households’ consumption is 
driven by quality differences in goods. This theory has implicitly been corroborated in prior studies 
(e.g. Wan 1996) where food and shelter – which are necessities and are expected to show an 
elasticity coefficient that is greater than zero but less then unity – have been found to be treated as a 
luxury by extremely poor households.  
Recently, Banerji and Jain (2007) introduced a new perspective by arguing that the dynamics of 
the informal sector are also driven by changes in consumer demand. At the core of their argument 
stands the observation that there is a marked quality difference between formal and informal goods 
and services. Accordingly, the informal sector caters to a consumer base that is not able to pay high 
prices for high quality. 
From these theoretical considerations a testable hypothesis can be derived. If Banerji and Jain 
(2007) are correct and formal and informal goods and services differ markedly in their quality, we 
have to expect significantly different income elasticities for the same goods produced or sold by 
formal and informal enterprises. If, in addition, Merella (2006) is right then we should observe 
smaller income elasticities for low quality products, i.e. informal sector products. To obtain a rough 
indication of whether quality differences exist, we compared the unit prices between informal and 
formal points of sale following the trade literature (e.g. Fontagne et al. 2006). Out of the product and 
service categories we were able to compare on a disaggregated level, 46 percent showed 
significantly different unit prices, and in 96 percent of these cases the mean unit price was found to 
be lower for the informal point of sale. While these results are suggestive of quality differences, we 
have to interpret them cautiously given that the aggregation and the enormous variance in prices 
could drive the differences. In addition, the fairly strong formal-informal linkages we find suggest 
that demand for informal goods and distribution channels is not exclusively driven by quality 
dualism, but may also reflect positive characteristics of the informal sector such as flexibility in terms 
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of longer opening hours or less paperwork that are valued by formal consumers. The existing linkages 
may lead to a more nuanced picture of elasticity estimates. 
Methodology 
To answer the question of whether customers behave differently vis-á-vis formal and informal 
products and distribution channels we estimate demand elasticities for different aggregated 
production sectors and different types of expenditures as defined above. As predicted by neoclassical 
consumer theory private demand for goods and services is a function of disposable income and 
prices. Since the data we work with is cross-sectional, estimations have to be simplified assuming 
prices to be constant across observations. The corresponding specifications, known as Engel curves, 
represent the evolution of Marshallian demand functions for a particular good or service category as 
income varies, holding the prices for all goods constant. 
Deciding on whether to estimate the Engel curves by means of a simultaneous equation 
approach or equation by equation involves a trade-off. On the one hand, estimating a demand 
system would allow us to account for the restrictions required by utility-based demand theory such 
as the adding-up criterion. A Breusch and Pagan test in a number of cases rejects the null hypothesis 
of no correlation among the error terms of different equations, pointing to interdependencies 
between demand categories. On the other hand, the equation-by-equation approach has the 
advantage that mis-specified equations do not affect overall results, which we consider to be 
especially relevant given the strong indications of differences in functional forms between demand 
categories (see below). We therefore decided to present estimates equation by equation as our 
preferred approach, but also estimated demand systems for both sectors and expenditure 
categories. The results of these estimations are shown in the Appendix; a brief comparison of the 
two sets of results is given below. 
Since non-parametric Kernel density regressions as well as formal Ramsey RESET tests point to 
the absence of non-linearities in all but two cases (see below), we adopt a simple linear double-
logarithmic model as our base specification.25 The equation fitted takes the following form: 
𝒙𝒊𝒋 = 𝛃𝟎𝒋 + 𝛃𝟏𝒊𝒋𝒙𝒊 + 𝛃𝟐𝒊𝒋𝑯𝒊 + 𝛃𝟑𝒊𝒋𝑫𝒊 + ∑ 𝛄𝒌𝒊𝒋(𝒎𝒊)𝑳𝒌=𝟏  + 𝒖𝒊𝒋          𝒊 = 𝟏, …𝑴  𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒋 = 𝟏, …𝑵  (1) 
with: 𝑥𝑖 = ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑁𝑗=1   
                                                          
25 See Blundell and Duncan (1998) for a detailed discussion of household expenditure and non-parametric 
kernel regressions. 
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where xij is the log of expenditure of household i on product category j, xi is the log of household 
income, Hi is the log of household size in adult equivalents, mi are L different household 
characteristics including age, sex and religion of the household head, household composition 
variables such as a dummy for elderly members, an indicator of primary school completion of the 
household head, and sector of employment of the household head, and Di are district dummies.  
While we include the additional control variables primarily to account for household 
heterogeneity, the occupation variable also allows us to test the hypothesis (e.g. Fortin et al. 2000) 
that being employed in the informal sector raises the likelihood of consuming informal goods and 
services. Concerning household size, we performed robustness checks using simple household size 
instead of equivalence scales as predictor variables, which hardly affected our results. Likewise, 
results do not change when we employ years of schooling rather than primary completion as an 
indicator of education. 
When estimating the Engel curves, several challenges arise. One problem is that observed 
income might not be the main driver of expenditure behavior. More specifically, we have to consider 
the possible seasonal volatility of employment and earnings which casts doubt on the 
appropriateness of monthly income as a representation of disposable annual income. Thus, we use 
total expenditure as a proxy of income, even though our data contains information about declared 
monthly income from primary and secondary employment as well as income from other sources such 
as remittances and assets for all household members. A further justification for using total 
expenditure instead of total income is based on the permanent-income hypothesis. Accordingly, 
expenditure will be conditional upon long-run income rather than transitory income, even though it 
has to be conceded that consumption smoothing in West Africa is likely to be far from perfect as a 
result of liquidity constraints.26  While the use of total expenditure can lead to biased or even 
inconsistent estimation results given that it is only a proxy of income, various authors (e.g. Lewbel 
1996, Gibson 2002) have argued that this bias tends to be small compared to the bias introduced by 
using transitory income.  
Using total expenditure does, however, introduce an econometric complication, namely the 
possible correlation of the independent variable with the error term since by definition our 
dependent variable, the expenditure on different product categories and types, will always be part of 
the explanatory variable. This possible simultaneity bias calls for the use of instrumental variables. In 
addition, measurement error in household survey data is a well-known problem in demand 
estimation (Liviatan 1961, Griliches 1974, Theil 1979, Keen 1986, Lewbel 1996, Hausman 2001). This 
                                                          
26 For a general discussion of whether income or expenditure constitutes the preferred welfare indicator in the 
context of developing countries, see for example Deaton (1997).  
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problem can also be mitigated by using instrumental variables. Based on the classical errors-in 
variables assumption that presumes a correlation between the observed variable and the error term 
one would expect the OLS estimator to be closer to zero than the true estimator represented by a 
valid IV coefficient. Several authors have pointed to exceptions to this rule in the context of demand 
analysis (e.g. Keen 1986; Liviatan 1961). Most recently, Gibson and Bonggeun (2007: 479) have 
asserted that “[…] only some form of correlated error could cause” the coefficient “to be biased 
downwards”. 
In the context of consumer behavior most of the previous studies have instrumented total 
expenditure by monthly income (e.g. Lewbel 1996, Kedir and Girma 2007). We also did so, but 
additionally employed a wealth index, given that it seems plausible to assume that household wealth 
will also influence the observed expenditure patterns, perhaps even more so than current income. 
We constructed a wealth index, using a principal components analysis along the lines of, for example, 
McKenzie (2005) and Filmer and Pritchett (2001). In doing so, we converted all available wealth and 
asset variables (housing characteristics, access to infrastructure and durable assets) into binary ones, 
except for the number of rooms in the household. One of the main advantages of such an index is 
that it reduces measurement error. Since reporting errors in household income and household 
wealth cannot be ruled out, we additionally considered an instrumentation strategy using variables 
that describe the activity portfolio of the household (number of fixed-contract wage earners in the 
household; share of wages/salaries from public sector, primary sector, industrial sector, commercial 
sector and service sector) as well as job characteristics (sector of occupation; type of job; type of 
contract; type of wage payment; hours worked) of the household head and the main wage earner in 
the household.27 
We started our empirical analysis by employing ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimation 
techniques. The explanatory power of this simple model is rather good; in almost all cases up to one 
half of the observed variation can be explained. As already noted above, a non-parametric analysis of 
the data pointed to a non-linear relationship in some cases, which was confirmed by a formal Ramsey 
RESET test. Specifically, we had to reject the null hypothesis of no omitted variables and therefore 
our linear specification for food and non-alcoholic beverages at the 1 percent level and for transport 
and communication at the 5 percent level for all countries in favour of a more flexible specification. 
To account for these test results we included a quadratic term of the log of total expenditure for 
these two categories. 
 
                                                          
27 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us to this option. 
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Using a Hausman test we can reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity of the log of total 
expenditure for all sectors apart from Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages as well as Electricity, Gas 
and Water. By contrast, the Hausman test points to potential endogeneity for all four expenditure 
categories (formal goods, informal goods, imports, services) at least in some of the countries. 
Accordingly, we performed two-stage least-squares (2SLS) estimations for our linear specifications 
when this was suggested by the test results. We found no evidence of endogeneity in the non-linear 
specifications for Food and Transport and therefore did not employ the 2SLS approach for this setup. 
To evaluate the strength of our proposed instrumental variables we applied the test suggested 
by Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2002). According to this test, income and the wealth 
index are strong instruments, The F value of the wealth index being somewhat higher throughout, 
whereas the indicators of activity portfolio and job characteristics generally turn out to be weak 
instruments.  
 
4.4. Estimation Results 
 
Our OLS estimates at the sectoral level displayed in Table 4.7 are in line with the findings of prior 
studies for East Africa (Massel and Heyer 1969, Ostby and Gulilat 1969, Humphrey and Oxley 1976, 
Okunade 1985, Teklu 1996) and for other developing countries such as India and China (e.g. Tiwari 
and Goel 2002, Chern and Wang 1994). In particular, we find Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages as 
well as Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco to be necessary goods as suggested by Engel’s law. An 
increase of one percent in disposable income would on average lead to an increase of expenditure on 
food and non-alcoholic beverages of 0.77 percent in the six countries.28 Clothing and Shoes, 
Furniture, Health and Education, Transport and Communication as well as Leisure and Culture turn 
out to be luxury goods in all countries under consideration. The low demand elasticities for hotels 
and restaurants may appear somewhat surprising, but the previous literature is inconclusive as to 
whether food-away-from home - for hotels, there is no comparable evidence - constitutes a necessity 
or a luxury good (Byrne et al. 1996, Min et al. 2000).  
 
  
                                                          
28 We get virtually the same result when pooling the data from the six capitals (see last column of Table 4.7).  
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Elasticities by Sector    
                    
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 0.80*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.74*** 0.80*** 0.95*** 0.80*** 4160 
Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 0.87*** 0.84*** 0.51*** 0.28 0.16 0.74*** 0.57*** 1601 
Clothing and Shoes 1.07*** 1.14*** 1.19*** 1.17*** 1.24*** 1.27*** 1.14*** 3696 
Housing  0.68*** 0.64*** 0.48*** 0.59*** 0.81*** 0.42*** 0.70*** 4159 
Gas, Electricity and Water 0.87*** 0.86*** 1.18*** 0.90*** 0.79*** 0.86*** 0.97*** 4138 
Furniture and Household Maintenance 1.23*** 1.19*** 1.24*** 1.27*** 1.36*** 1.15*** 1.21*** 3868 
Health and Education 1.24*** 1.32*** 1.26*** 1.28*** 1.48*** 1.33*** 1.25*** 3948 
Transport and Communication 1.36*** 1.75*** 1.68*** 1.71*** 1.85*** 1.38*** 1.57*** 3962 
Leisure and Culture 1.11*** 1.18*** 1.27*** 1.32*** 1.39*** 1.22*** 1.15*** 3416 
Hotels and Restaurants 0.55*** 0.39*** 0.42*** 0.50*** 0.41*** 0.58*** 0.42*** 3198 
Diverse Goods and Services 0.84*** 1.07*** 1.12*** 1.01*** 1.16*** 0.86*** 1.01*** 3888 
Elasticities by Sector (2SLS)   
                    
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 0.59*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.34*** 0.52*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 4160 
Gas, Electricity and Water 1.04*** 1.29*** 1.55*** 1.37*** 1.04*** 1.56*** 1.30*** 4138 
 
Note: Dependent Variable is log of total household expenditure on a specific product group; Independent Variable is log of total household 
expenditure; Included Control Variables are district dummies, log number of household members (OECD-modified Adult Equivalent Scale), 
share of adult women in the household, elderly in the household, type of family structure, gender of household head, age of household head, 
completed primary education of household head, religion of household head (Muslim or Catholic Christian)  and informal sector is source of 
household head's primary income;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on robust standard errors; a includes country dummies; Authors’ 
calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys. 
 
When comparing these results with the demand system estimation shown in the Appendix, it 
turns out that the pattern of elasticities is very similar, even though in a number of cases the point 
estimates differ quite substantially between the two approaches. Both approaches suggest that 
Clothing and Shoes, Furniture, Health and Education, Transport and Communication as well as 
Culture and Leisure are luxuries, whereas Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages, Housing as well as 
Hotels and Restaurants tend to be necessities. 
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In the lower part of Table 4.7 we report selected results for the 2SLS estimations using the 
wealth index as an instrumental variable.29 According to the tests performed, Food and Non-alcoholic 
Beverages, as well as Electricity, Gas and Water are the only sectors where we are advised to 
perform an instrumental variable estimation. For these sectors, differences between OLS and 2SLS 
estimates turn out to be substantial. Food and Non-alcoholic Beverages are shown to follow Engel’s 
law even more clearly when using 2SLS as indicated by lower budget elasticities in all countries under 
consideration, while Electricity, Gas and Water switches from being a necessity to being a luxury 
good. 
Among the additional control variables, household size uniformly has a positive and significant 
influence on food expenditures. Its impact on expenditures is significantly negative throughout for 
Transport and Communication and in some countries also for Shoes and Clothing as well as Furniture 
and Household Maintenance. These findings are in line with economies of scale concerning these 
commodities. In several cases, the gender of the household head turns out to be another important 
determinant of expenditures, pointing to gender-specific preferences and intra-household 
bargaining. All else being equal, households headed by a male tend to spend less on Food as well as 
Health and Education, and more on Transport and Communication as well as Leisure and Culture. We 
also find that being Catholic or Muslim has a significantly negative effect on alcohol and tobacco 
expenditures in all countries except Mali. 
The quadratic OLS estimations are shown in Table 4.8. Recall that the RESET test points to a non-
linear specification only in the case of Food and Beverages as well as Transport and Communication. 
We find that the elasticity function for Food and Beverages is concave, which is in line with the 
saturation hypothesis. We also observe that the turning point (the maximum) is located in the 10th 
expenditure decile in all countries; it is comparatively higher in Benin and Senegal than in the other 
countries. Given that the turning point is located very close to the maximum of the income range of 
households, our finding arguably does not invalidate Engel’s law. For Transport and Communication 
the elasticity function is first falling with income and after a certain threshold point increasing 
again.30 In this case the turning point is a minimum, which is lowest in Benin and Togo and highest in 
Niger, but practically irrelevant as it is located outside the observable income range. 
                                                          
29 Robustness checks using the other two instrumentations (not shown; available upon request) left results 
qualitatively unaffected. 
30 See Diaz et al. (2008) for a survey of transport expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Table 4.8 – Budget Elasticities for Sectors, Quadratic Specification (OLS) 
Country Benin - Cotonou Burkina Faso - Ouaga Mali - Bamako Niger - Niamey Senegal - Dakar Togo - Lomé 
Elasticities by Sector EXP EXP2 EXP EXP2 EXP EXP2 EXP EXP2 EXP EXP2 EXP EXP2 
                              
Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages 4.47*** -0.13*** 7.11*** -0.23*** 8.03*** -0.25*** 7.67*** -0.25*** 6.06*** -0.18** 5.098*** -0.19*** 
          Marginal Effects 0.84 0.81 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.98 
          Standard Errors 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05 
          Observations 568 933 953 571 567 568 
          R² 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.54 0.65 0.60 
Transport and Communication -2.89* 0.15** 0.47 0.05 -4.88** 0.23*** -9.57*** 0.40*** -6.44*** 0.29*** -3.37** 0.18*** 
          Marginal Effects 1.31 1.74 1.65 1.62 1.86 1.35 
          Standard Errors 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 
          Observations 560 880 868 531 563 560 
          R² 0.66 0.64 0.46 0.56 0.57 0.50 
                              
 
Note: Dependent Variable is log of total household expenditure on a specific product group; Independent Variable is log and squared log of total household expenditure; Included Control Variables are district dummies, log number 
of household members (OECD-modified Adult Equivalent Scale), share of adult women in the household, elderly in the household, type of family structure, gender of household head, age of household head, completed primary 
education of household head, religion of household head (Muslim or Catholic Christian)  and informal sector is source of household head's primary income;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on robust standard errors;  
Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Survey. 
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The estimates shown in Table 4.9 allow us to assess the hypothesis of quality dualism as they 
capture the distinction between formal and informal goods and distribution channels. A very clear 
pattern emerges for formal goods: In all countries the demand elasticity is substantially above unity 
for formal provision and substantially below unity for informal provision. Imported goods and 
services are also uniformly seen as luxuries when distributed via formal retailers, and in some 
countries (Mali, Niger, Senegal) the demand elasticity is above unity even in case of informal 
distribution. Informal goods exhibit elasticities far below unity across the board if they are 
distributed via informal distribution channels, whereas the few formal sales appear to be luxuries in 
Benin, Mali, Senegal and Togo. Aggregated over the two distribution channels, informal goods are in 
all countries considered necessities, while the opposite is true for services. Overall, our evidence 
broadly supports the hypothesis of quality dualism, which is also corroborated by the demand 
system estimates displayed in the Appendix.   
Table 4.9 – Budget Elasticities for Expenditure Categories (2SLS) 
 












a Pooled Obs 
Elasticities by Expenditure Category and  
Distribution Channel  
  
                    
 
            
  
Elasticities of  formal goods 0.85*** 1.38*** 1.33*** 1.22*** 0.95*** 0.58*** 1.22*** 4165 
    Formal distribution channel 1.68*** 2.26*** 2.09*** 1.87*** 2.11*** 1.79*** 2.02*** 2719 
    Informal distribution channel 0.18** 0.63*** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.57*** 4156 
  
Elasticities of  informal goods 0.66*** 0.56*** 0.45*** 0.62*** 0.92*** 0.33*** 
0.63*** 4131 
    Formal distribution channel 1.28*** 0.84*** 1.19* -0.12 1.41*** 1.78*** 1.02*** 634 
    Informal distribution channel 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.33*** 0.61*** 0.63*** 0.28** 0.46*** 4131 
  
Elasticities of  imported goods 1.36*** 1.13*** 1.49*** 0.98*** 0.91*** 1.55*** 
1.12*** 4153 
    Formal distribution channel 1.95*** 1.70*** 2.04*** 2.31*** 1.65*** 3.02*** 1.96*** 3031 
    Informal distribution channel 0.73*** 0.66*** 1.06*** 0.42*** 0.27* 0.91*** 0.59*** 4148 
Elasticities of  services 1.26*** 1.42*** 1.32*** 1.54*** 1.59*** 1.25*** 1.40*** 4174 
  Formal distribution channel 2.00*** 1.89*** 1.81*** 2.25*** 2.11*** 2.17*** 1.98*** 3066 
  Informal distribution channel 0.98*** 1.00*** 1.09*** 1.20*** 1.25*** 0.86*** 1.06*** 4170 
                  
  
 
Note: Dependent Variable is log of total household expenditure on a specific product group; Independent Variable is log of total household 
expenditure  which is instrumented by a wealth index; Included Control Variables are district dummies, log number of household members 
(OECD-modified Adult Equivalent Scale), share of adult women in the household, elderly in the household, type of family structure, gender of 
household head, age of household head, completed primary education of household head, religion of household head (Muslim or Catholic 
Christian)  and informal sector is source of household head's primary income;  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 based on robust standard errors; a 
includes country dummies; Authors’ calculation based on 1-2-3 Surveys. 
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Graphically these results are illustrated for Benin in Figure 4.1. The steep slope of the fitted 
values of formal distribution represents clearly the higher elasticity of this distribution channel 
compared to the informal channel. Using a simple Chow test we find differences in slopes and 
intercepts between formal and informal distribution channels to be significant throughout, for 
informal goods at the 10 percent level and for all other categories at the 1 percent level of 
significance. Regarding the household characteristics, we cannot observe clear tendencies of 
influence, which may at least partly reflect the high level of aggregation. Most notably, employment 
of the household head in the informal sector is in almost all cases statistically insignificant. This 
corroborates the above finding that informal households reveal no particularly strong preference for 
informal goods and services.  




Up to now, we have considered the four expenditure categories only in the aggregate. This is 
because a further disaggregation dramatically reduces the number of observations. We nonetheless 
specifically looked at Food and Beverages as well as Transport and Communication, for which the 
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number of observations is largest.31 But even in these two categories we partly run into data 
problems. For Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages, only between 1 percent and 7 percent of all 
purchases were located in the formal sector, i.e. products that have been distributed by formal 
vendors. The data restriction becomes even more severe if one focuses on a single expenditure 
category such as formally produced domestic products. The corresponding results thus have to be 
interpreted very cautiously.32 For all three expenditure categories considered (services are not 
recorded), the estimated expenditure elasticities for formally distributed food products reveal a very 
mixed picture, which arguably reflects to a large part the lack of sufficient data. By contrast, a stable 
pattern of elasticities below unity appears for informal distribution channels, which corroborates the 
findings obtained at the aggregate level. Aggregated over distribution channels, the three product 
categories are found to be necessities in all but two cases.  
For Transport and Communication, we disentangle different types of products and their 
distribution channels. While formal and imported goods are composed mainly of capital intensive 
items such as private vehicles, services are composed of public and private transport modes such as 
public buses and taxies. Imports and services account for the bulk of expenditures in this category. If 
significant, estimated demand elasticities at formal points of sale tend to exceed unity. Most notably, 
formally distributed formal products such as private vehicles turn out to be strong luxuries in the two 
richest countries, Benin and Senegal. In contrast to Food and Beverages, even the elasticities for 
informal distribution channels are partly above unity, suggesting that informal sales will not 
necessarily fall with rising incomes. 
 
4.5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In this essay, we have offered a descriptive overview of demand in six capitals of the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union as well as an analysis of budget elasticities for different 
sectors and distribution channels. Our main findings are that  
(i) there is support for linkages between the formal and informal sector regarding the channels 
through which goods are distributed, with the exception that informal goods are hardly bought 
through formal distribution channels;  
                                                          
31 Ideally, one would want to disaggregate even further so as to arrive at fairly homogenous items (e.g. single 
goods such as maize or millet) where quantity and quality aspects can be disentangled. This would, however, 
render the distinction between formal and informal distribution channels meaningless as one of them prevails. 
32 To save space, we do not report the regression results here. Estimations are available from the authors’ upon 
request.  
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(ii) there appears to be a strongly overlapping customer base between the formal and informal 
sector;  
(iii) rising incomes tend to lead to a lower propensity to consume informal sector goods and to 
use informal distribution channels. 
We find little systematic variation in demand structures across countries. Most notably, 
expenditure shares for informal goods and informal distribution channels do not appear to be 
consistently higher in the richer sample countries. Macro indicators such as government 
effectiveness or trade openness are also hardly related to cross-country differences in demand. An 
interesting correlation can only be observed for Togo: it exhibits by far the worst governance 
indicators and at the same time has the lowest expenditure shares on both formal goods and goods 
distributed via formal distribution channels. 
Our elasticity estimates imply that overall the development of the informal sector in West Africa 
will most likely be constrained from the demand side, which is in accordance with the hypothesis of 
quality dualism, with the informal sector being characterized by low quality. However, the pattern is 
not uniform, underscoring the notion of a heterogeneous informal sector put forward in studies of 
the supply side. Along expenditure categories, elasticities of the informal distribution channel are 
much higher – in some cases (e.g. Mali) even above unity – for imports and services than for 
domestically produced informal as well as formal goods, suggesting that importers and buyers of 
services tend to value certain characteristics of informal distribution channels and thus do not 
necessarily turn to the formal sector when their incomes rise.  
The overall demand bias against the informal sector suggests that the majority of poor informal 
households, for example those who produce or sell food, would be affected less than proportionately 
by recessions. The implications for their welfare in the longer run depend on how easily they can 
switch to more income responsive activities. As long as the high entry barriers previously identified 
for West Africa (Grimm et al. 2011) continue to limit the adjustment possibilities of informal 
entrepreneurs, the growth process of the urban economy is unlikely to be pro-poor. In the food 
sector, which accounts for a large share of informal activities in all six capitals, future competition by 
supermarkets may even further reduce the room of maneuvering for informal households.  
As concerns future research, the next step would ideally involve a further disentangling of the 
relation of quality and quantity by using more homogenous goods and panel data. This would allow 
us to mitigate the well-known difficulties caused by the aggregation of broad product groups. 
Another interesting area for future research would be to investigate in more detail why formal-
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